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Introduction
This is a study on the philosophical foundations of the Chilean institutional transformation that took
place in the 1970s and 1980s and which is commonly referred to as Chile’s “free market
revolution”. Its primary goal is to determine if a comprehensive version of classical liberalism,
rooted in the American ideas of liberty, including ideas of political liberty and democracy, was
behind the process of economic and institutional change that led Chile to become the most
prosperous country in Latin America. Puzzling in Chilean history is the fact that a harsh military
regime made economic and political reforms that undermined its own power leading, despite
increasing inequalities, to sustained economic growth and also to the reintroduction of a stable
democracy. By analyzing the philosophy that inspired the actors in charge of elaborating and
implementing these reforms, this work contributes to clarify that puzzle and draw lessons with
regard to the relation between beliefs and institutional change as well as the interplay between
economic freedom and authoritarianism. A proper understanding of both factors requires taking into
account the historical and ideological context in which the Chilean reformers, known as the
Chicago Boys, defined and applied their set of beliefs. It also requires considering the influence of
liberalism on the institutional and intellectual development prior to the free market revolution.
Accordingly, this study integrates institutional history, economic history and political history to the
philosophical analysis since all these elements are necessary to explain why the set of beliefs known
as “neoliberalism” made so much sense to the Chicago Boys both as a normative vision and as an
interpretation of the economic and social reality. The main assumption behind this study is that
there is a permanent feedback between beliefs and reality. This means that not only are beliefs a
force of institutional change but also that the practical results of those changes have an impact on
belief formation. In other words, the beliefs, ideas and actions of the Chicago Boys cannot be
understand independently from their historical, political and economic context for it is the feedback
offered by reality that largely defines a set of beliefs. The particular theoretical framework used for
this analysis will be Douglass North’s contribution to understanding economic history as an
evolutionary process where ideologies and ideas define the formation and transformation of the
economic and political institutions and where in turn feedback from reality modifies these ideas and
ideologies.1 Institutions are in turn essential to explain how a given market works and why some
1 The term evolutionary in this context is applied in a cultural sense such as Adam Ferguson and the Scottish
Enlightenment thinkers understood it. It means that over time societies select and develop norms, values and
systems that prove useful for the wellbeing of their members. Thus the institutions that are responsible for economic
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economies perform better than others. Given the focus on beliefs as a force of institutional
transformation, this work will use the Northean approach as a helping tool to understand the liberal
reforms of the Chicago Boys, their institutional success and their connection with Chile’s transition
to democracy. It is interesting to note that North himself pointed out that Chile was a case where a
set of institutions had been put in place that provided the incentives to generate economic growth2
which, as will be explained, the same North considers crucial for the existence of a stable
democracy. These institutions in turn reflected the beliefs of those who were able to make the rules
of the game, that is to say, mostly, but not only, the Chicago Boys.3
The hypothesis of this study
There is no doubt that authoritarianism was instrumental to the introduction of the radical
free market economic and political reforms that made the so-called “Chilean miracle” possible. As
Constable and Valenzuela have pointed out, “in a democracy the Chicago Boys would not have
survived public pressure” while under an authoritarian government “they had no need to account for
their actions”.4 This does not mean however, that the Chilean military was prone to a free market
system.  As Milton Friedman observed, Chile was mostly a “political miracle”, precisely because a
military regime, going against its principles, had supported reforms that reduced “sharply the role of
the state and replace control from the top with control from the bottom”.5 What is even more
surprising is the fact that the same dictatorship that made a free market revolution created the
institutions necessary to reintroduce political liberty and democracy.  It is here where historical as
well as philosophical elements play a decisive role. It is the hypothesis of this study that the
connection between the free market reforms and Chile’s movement towards democracy and
political freedom finds a substantial part of its explanation in the liberal intellectual tradition
applied by the Chicago Boys, which was not reduced to economic liberalism but included ideas of
political freedom and democracy. Political freedom in this context is understood in the classical
liberal sense, that is to say, as the absence of arbitrary coercion on an individual by the government
or by other individuals. In the words of Isaiah Berlin, “political liberty ...is simply the area within
which a man can act unobstructed by others.”6 Democracy in turn is understood from a classical
growth are the result of human action but not of human design, meaning that in general they are not constructed top
down.
2 See: Interview with Peter Robinson, Available at:  http://www.hoover.org/research/few-dollars-more-global-
poverty-and-world-bank.  Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
3 In the first chapter I will provide a deeper explanation of the theoretical framework chosen.
4 Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet, Norton & Company, New 
York 1993, p. 188.
5  Milton Friedman,  “Free markets and the Generals”, Newsweek, January 25, 1982.
6 Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, In Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 
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liberal standpoint as a majority rule which is severely restricted by the constitution in its ability to
affect economic liberties, fundamental rights and private property. As will be argued, the neoliberal
philosophy followed by the Chicago Boys was a direct heir to the classical liberalism of British
American origin which reemerged in the 20th century mostly through the work of Friedrich von
Hayek. Moreover, through institutions such as the Mont Pelerin Society and the Chicago School,
Hayek sought to revive the set of beliefs that had served as inspiration to the American Revolution.
This revival was largely a response to the overwhelming influence of ideologies like fascism and
socialism as well as to interventionist approaches such as New Deal liberalism and different
currents of protectionism.
 A second and related hypothesis of this work is that the ideas behind the free market
revolution, namely British-American liberalism, were not alien to Chile’s political and intellectual
history as is usually argued. Far from that: classical liberal ideas in the British American tradition
had been predominant from the mid -19th century to the early 20th century in Chile. Their influence
came to an end particularly after the Great Depression, which paved the way to the rise of
collectivist and statist ideologies that contributed to shape Chile’s institutional evolution until the
early 1970s. In other words, what the Chicago Boys did after the collapse of the economy and the
end of democracy in 1973 was nothing else than to revive the old Chilean British American liberal
tradition thus taking advantage of an intellectual heritage that facilitated the  implementation of free
market reforms.  
The historical relevance of Chile’s free market revolution
From a historical perspective the topic of the Chilean free market revolution is not only
controversial but also highly relevant. As has been extensively argued, the free market revolution
played a crucial role in the history of political economy and the Cold War and is still widely
considered today as a benchmark for developing countries. In 2006, on the occasion of Augusto
Pinochet’s death The New York Times reminded its readers of the relevance of the Chilean
experience arguing that the Chilean general had “won grudging international praise for some of the
free-market policies he instituted, transforming a bankrupt economy into the most prosperous in
Latin America”, adding that “many elements of the so-called Chilean model were widely emulated
in the region”.7  In 2007, confirming the influence of Chile as a role model for the developing
Oxford 1969, p.3. Available at: https://www.wiso.uni-
hamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso_vwl/johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin_twoconceptsofliberty.pdf.  Last accessed: 
28/06/2014.
7 Jonathan Kandell, “Augusto Pinochet, A Dictator Who Ruled by Terror in Chile, Dies at 91”,  The New York Times
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world, The Economist explained that poverty had “fallen further, faster, in Chile than anywhere else
in Latin America” due to “sustained economic growth and job creation since the mid-1980s”8. The
article was entitled “Destitute no more: A country that pioneered reform comes close to abolishing
poverty” and referred to the second wave of economic reforms made under the military regime of
General Pinochet.
The relevance of the Chilean case for political economic history has also been widely
acknowledged in the academic and political world. For Harvard historian Niall Ferguson the
“backlash against welfare started in Chile”.9 Moreover, for Ferguson, the Chilean economic reforms
such as the privatization of the social security system were “far more radical than anything that has
been attempted in the United States, the heartland of free market economics”.10Along the same lines
William Ratliff and Robert Packenham have pointed out that Chile was the first country in the
world to make “that momentous break with the past away from socialism and extreme state
capitalism” preceding “Margaret Thatcher’s Britain and Ronald Reagan’s United States”.11 For
Marxist intellectual David Harvey “the first experiment of neoliberal state formation occurred in
Chile after Pinochet’s coup” providing “helpful evidence to support the subsequent turn to
neoliberalism in both Britain (under Thatcher) and the US (under Reagan).”12  
As far as the results of the free market revolution are concerned, Nobel laureate economist
Gary Becker argued that Chile became “an economic role model for the whole underdeveloped
world”.13 This performance said Becker, “became still more impressive when the government was
transformed into a democracy“.14 Along the same lines but on the Keynesian side, Nobel laureate
economist Paul Krugman recalled that the reforms introduced by the Chicago Boys “proved highly
successful and were preserved intact when Chile finally returned to democracy in 1989”.15  A
similar view was expressed by President George H.W. Bush, on the first visit of an American
President to Chile in decades. On his arrival in Santiago in 1990, Bush declared that “Chile’s
peaceful return to the ranks of the world’s democracies” was cause for “pride and celebration”.16
      December 11, 2006. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/world/americas/11pinochet.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
8 The Economist, “Destitute no more: A country that pioneered reform comes close to abolishing poverty“, August 
16, 2007.
9 Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, Penguin, London 2008, p.216.
10 Idem
11 William Ratliff and Robert Packenham, What Pinochet did for Chile. Available at: 
http://www.hoover.org/research/what-pinochet-did-chile Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
12 David Harvey,  A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005, pp.7-8.
13 Gary S. Becker, What Latin America Owes to the "Chicago Boys", Hoover Digest, October 30, 1997. Available at:
      http://www.hoover.org/research/what-latin-america-owes-chicago-boys Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
14 Idem.
15 Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics, Penguin, London, 2008, p. 31.
16 Speech available at: http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2531&year=1990&month=12 Last
accessed: 28/06/2014.
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Bush went on stressing the importance of the free market revolution that had taken place under the
military government of General Pinochet: “Chile’s record of economic accomplishment is a lesson
for Latin America on the power of the free market. Nowhere among the nations of this continent
has the pace of free-market reform gone farther, faster than right here in Chile.” 17  Former British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher went even further declaring that Pinochet’s regime had turned
Chile “from chaotic collectivism into the model economy of Latin America”.18
Unsurprisingly, the free market revolution has also been criticized for its economic as well
as its social achievements. According to this line of argumentation, by dogmatically following
neoliberal recipes the reformers had brought unnecessary suffering to workers and lower income
people. As a result, “the neoliberal experiment” had generated a society “with increasing inequality
where financial economicism prevailed”.19 For this position, thanks to the free market revolution
“the rich had got richer” leading to a deterioration of the living standards of the middle class.20 In
this context it was argued that privatizations had been made in periods of economic recession and
high interest rates, which had made it possible for only a few groups to acquire the public firms, and
led to an acute concentration of property.21 Thus, the critics claimed that the privatization of state
enterprises had been extremely advantageous for the new owners, who according to Alejandro
Foxley, had enjoyed a subsidy of around 30% of the companies’ net worth.22
 Overall, despite the critics, it is clear that the free market revolution was an economic
success for the country. The data show a dramatic increase in per capita income and an equally
dramatic fall of poverty since the 1980s on as well as an unprecedented period of monetary
stability.23 The success of the Chilean free market revolution contributed to explain the consensus
that emerged in Chile to keep the reforms after the end of the Cold War and the return to
democracy. From 1990 to 2010 a left wing coalition called “Concertación” came to power. Despite
having been integrated by opponents to the military dictatorship and by many former members of
Salvador Allende’s government, the Concertación left the foundations of the free market system
untouched. A pragmatic view prevailed, leading to the recognition and adoption of the economic
17 Idem.
18 See: Margaret Thatcher, Speech on Pinochet at the Conservative Party Conference, October 6, 1999. Available at:
      http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108383 Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
19 Ricardo French Davis, Chile entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad, JC Sáez, Santiago, 2008, p.115.
20 Joseph Collins and John Lear, Chile’s free market miracle: a second look, Institute for Food and Development
Policy, Oakland, 1995p. 243.
21 French Davis, Chile entre el neoliberalismo y el crecimiento con equidad,  p.86.
22 Alejandro Foxley, Latin American Experiments in Neoconservative Economics, University of California Press,
California, 1983, p.66. See also:  Dahse F, Mapa de la extrema riqueza. Los grupos económicos y el proceso de
concentración de capitales, Aconcagua, Santiago, 1979, and M. Marcel “Privatización y finanzas públicas: el caso
de Chile”, 1985-1988, in: Colección Estudios Cieplan, 26, June, 1989.
23 For a detailed account of Chile’s economic evolution see: José De Gregorio, “Economic Growth in Chile: Evidence,
Sources and Prospects”, Central Bank of Chile Working Paper No. 298, December 2004. Available at:
http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc298.pdf Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
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legacy of the Pinochet years. As the same Foxley explained:
I was minister of finance from 1990 to ‘94. We always said that the main thing we
had to do was to make sure that there was an equilibrium between change and
continuity. The mature countries are countries that don’t always start from scratch.
We had to recognize that in the previous government, the foundations had been
established for a more modern market economy, and we would start from there,
restoring a balance between economic development and social development. And
that’s what we did.24
Thus, Chile continued along the economic path initiated in the 1970s and 1980s. This path
remained unchanged also under the socialist governments of Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet.
Both were former Marxists, convinced of the superiority of the centrally planned economy over the
free market system. Lagos had even been appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union by President
Salvador Allende. With no alternative model after the end of the Cold War, Lagos, like most
Chilean socialists during the 1990s, accepted free market principles. Shortly after being elected
president he declared: “A Socialist today understands that the fall of the Berlin Wall means we live
in a world in which the market is neither leftist nor rightist. It is simply an instrument to be used”.25
Many critics from the left complained, as historian Alfredo Jocelyn-Holt put it, that Lagos had
“unconditionally accepted the Pinochet model”, even though he “was a man of the left and
struggled for years to overthrow the Pinochet dictatorship’’.26
The literature on the ideas behind the free market revolution
 
In general, the literature on the Chilean free market revolution rejects the notion that
classical liberalism or American liberalism were part of Chile’s intellectual and cultural history.
Instead, it assumes that Chile was purely a laboratory to test neoliberal economic theories imported
from the United States. Likewise, it opposes the view that the ideas of political liberty and
democracy were part of the economic and institutional transformation under the Pinochet regime. A
total disregard for human rights and collaboration with an authoritarian government accused of
24 Interview available at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_alejandrofoxley.html#4 
Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
25 Clifford Krauss, “Chile’s Leader Remains Socialist but Acts Like Pragmatist”, The New York Times, December 10,
2001.
26 Idem.
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having destroyed democracy in Chile and engaged in human rights violations is a common criticism
of the architects of the Chilean economic model. The common assumption of these works is that
“the Chicago Boys theoretical background was liberalism, in a very reduced, economic sense”27.
This would explain their commitment to authoritarianism and their disregard for political liberty
and democracy. Along these lines, Harvey argued that the free market system in Chile was imposed
by “brutal means” and was mostly supported by the traditional upper classes which, along with the
Chicago Boys, pushed for the “fierce repression of all solidarities created within the labor and urban
social movements which had so threatened their power”.28 In Harvey’s eyes, the reintroduction of
democracy and political liberties was not only absent from the free market revolution but contrary
to its very nature. Similarly, Carlos Huneeus has argued that the economic reforms were made
under a climate “of terror” pervading large sectors of the population.29 Huneeus does not recognize
the origin of the free market revolution in Chile’s intellectual tradition. Neither does he analyze the
existence of ideas of political liberty or democracy in the free market revolution. Arturo Valenzuela
and Pamela Constable follow the same logic, sustaining that for the Chicago Boys “the only kind of
freedom that mattered was economic freedom”, as they seemed “oblivious to the contradiction of
relying on a repressive state to enforce the promotion of economic freedom”.30 Likewise, Andrés
Solimano has sustained that the most evident contradiction during the military regime was the
dichotomy between economic freedom and the absence of political liberties.31 Like Huneeus,
Valenzuela and Constable, Solimano does not address the role of classical liberalism in Chilean
history.  In his work on the technocratic elites in Chile, Patricio Silva has argued that the Chicago
Boys developed a sophisticated explanation to justify the contradiction between economic
liberalism and political authoritarianism without elaborating on what this explanation was.32 Silva
does see the Chicago Boys as part of the technocratic tradition that had prevailed in Chile since the
1920s but he does not see the tradition of classical liberalism playing a role in the free market
revolution.
In the most comprehensive book written so far on the subject, Juan Gabriel Valdés also
endorsed the laboratory thesis arguing that “the ensemble of neo-liberal ideas that evolved in Chile
after 1975 had no antecedent in the nation’s public life”.33 Valdés added that while the socialist
27 Michael Rösch, The meaning of technocratic elites in Chile, Available at: 
http://tiss.zdv.unituebingen.de/webroot/sp/barrios/themeC1f.html Last accessed: 20/07/2012
28 See: Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 39.
29 Carlos Huneeus, “Technocrats and Politicians in an Authoritarian Regime, The ODEPLAN’s Boys and the
Gremialists in Pinochet’s Chile”, Journal of Latin American  Studies, Vol.32, No. 2, May 2000, p.472. Published by
Cambridge University Press.
30 Constable and  Valenzuela, A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet, pp. 187-188.
31 Andrés Solimano, Capitalismo a la Chilena, Catalonia, Santiago, 2012, p.18.
32 Patricio Silva, En el nombre de la razón: tecnócratas y política en Chile, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago,
2010, p. 171.
33 Juan Gabriel Valdés, Pinochet´s economists: the Chicago School in Chile, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
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experiment of Allende had been tried in a framework of “total respect for public liberties and
democratic rights”, the free market revolution was carried out in a framework “of total deprivation
of public liberties and citizen’s rights”.34 For Valdés, the Chicago Boys reduced their ideology to
pure economic liberalism introducing into the public debate “a self-sustaining economic discourse
whose variables form part of a theoretical framework that excluded ethical, cultural, political or
social considerations”.35  This mindset would explain their “limitless faith in economic science as
the legitimizing basis for their draconian decisions, and in the market’s ability to resolve the bulk of
the problems faced by society”.36
 Joseph Collins and John Lear have gone as a far as arguing that a military regime that could
repress the population’s resistance to economic reforms had long been desired by the Chicago Boys.
In the words of Collins and Lear, the Pinochet regime offered the Chicago Boys “what they always
wanted: guaranteed protection from political, institutional and social pressures while they had a real
country in which to prove their theories”.37 Thus, Chile would have been a perfect laboratory in
order to test neoliberal theories. For Collins and Lear, ideas of democracy and political liberty were
incompatible with the free market revolution. Using a similar tone, in her popular book the Shock
Doctrine, Canadian intellectual Naomi Klein has argued that the Chilean free market revolution was
a case of “disaster capitalism” where free market ideas were imposed by the CIA and the Chicago
Boys. According to Klein, the Chicago Boys and their professors at Chicago University had wished
for a long time that a dictatorship would come to power in Chile in order to test their theories.38
A partial exception to this line of argumentation is Manuel Gárate’s work on Chile’s
capitalist revolution. In it, Gárate dedicates some chapters to analyze the roots of classical
liberalism in Chilean history, starting in the 19th century.39 The connection between the free market
revolution and Chile’s classical liberal intellectual heritage is however absent from the work. In
addition, Gárate’s work lacks a theoretical framework such as North’s approach to institutional
change to make sense of Chile’s institutional evolution from the mid-19 th century onwards. More
than an institutional history linked to a history of ideas, Gárate writes a chronology. Like the rest of
the authors, Gárate also holds the view that the Chicago Boys were basically inspired by mere
economic liberalism and that ideas of political liberty and democracy in the tradition of classical
liberalism were rather absent from the institutional transformation that took place during the 1970s
and 1980s.
1995, p.13.
34 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
35 Ibid., p.6.
36 Ibid.,p.2.
37 Joseph Collin and John Lear, Chile’s free market miracle: a second look, p. 44.
38 Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine, Penguin, London, 2007, p.63.
39 Manuel Gárate, La revolución capitalista de Chile, Ediciones Alberto Hurtado, Santiago, 2012.
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In an interesting paper, Verónica Montesinos and John Markoff identified the origin of the
Chicago Boys liberal tradition in the mid-19th century linking it to the figure of French economist
Jean Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil, who served as adviser to the Chilean government.40 However, this
connection is only briefly mentioned when analyzing the inflation that affected Chile at the time.
There is no further elaboration on this beyond a couple of sentences. Montesinos and Markoff’s
work also lacks institutional analysis as well as proper research on the philosophical foundations of
the free market revolution.
The problems with the laboratory thesis
The first problem with the standard account of the free market revolution is that it ignores
the fact that classical liberalism was rooted in Chile’s intellectual history and therefore that
neoliberalism was not alien to the nation’s culture. This is important because it challenges the idea
that Chile was merely a laboratory to test neoliberal economic theories in a deliberately designed
operation orchestrated by the American government. Instead it indicates that the neoliberal
revolution was to a large extent a phenomenon within the Chilean intellectual tradition and with
clear antecedents in Chile’s political history. As will be explained, from an institutional perspective
this is crucial in order to understand why the free market revolution happened and why it was
institutionally successful.
 A second and related problem with the standard account of the Chilean free market
revolution is that it does not pay proper attention to the intellectual tradition to which the Chicago
Boys belonged, namely British American liberalism, which is the forerunner of what is known as
neoliberalism. For it is not true that classical liberalism and the later neoliberal tradition do not
consider political liberties and democracy as crucial for a free society. Nor is it the case that the
Chicago Boys and other reformers just opted to ignore them. On the contrary, classical liberalism
and neoliberalism regard them as important values. The difference with other philosophies is that
for classical liberals these values cannot exist unless economic freedom is secure. In other words,
economic freedom is seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for political freedom and
democracy. For classical liberals, without economic freedom there can be no authentic democracy
and no political liberties. Economic freedom is therefore the highest value. Accordingly, democracy
must be limited so as not to endanger economic liberty; otherwise the whole project of a free social
order can be destroyed. Following these ideas the Chicago Boys devised an institutional project to
40 Veronica Montecinos, “Economics, the Chilean Story”, in: Economists in the Americas, Edited by John Markoff and
Veronica Montecinos,  Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2009.
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restore first economic liberty and then political liberties and democracy. There is no doubt that they
were willing to tolerate, collaborate and even support an authoritarian government. They did so
however, as this work shows, just as long as this regime offered the chance to restore economic
freedom and democracy. It can certainly be argued that there was some intellectual incoherence on
the part of the Chicago Boys in so far as they did not consistently challenge some of the most brutal
measures of the military regime. For even if it is true that some classical liberal thinkers such as
John Stuart Mill and F.A Hayek justified a dictatorship in exceptional cases and only for a limited
time period, there are no grounds in classical liberalism or its spin-off, neoliberalism, to justify the
violation of fundamental rights. Evidently, this problem has also a pragmatic dimension. For the
Chicago Boys, it was essential to remain silent with regard to human rights abuses as long as they
were in government positions in order to keep their jobs and make the economic and political
reforms that were necessary to restore economic freedom and democracy. Niall Ferguson has
approached the moral dilemma faced by the Chicago Boys in the following terms:
Was it worth the huge moral gamble that the Chicago and Harvard boys made of
getting into bed with a murderous torturing military dictator? The answer depends on
whether or not you think these economic reforms helped pave the way back to
sustainable democracy in Chile. In 1980, just seven years after the coup, Pinochet
conceded a new constitution that prescribed a ten year transition back to democracy.
In 1990 having lost a referendum on his leadership he stepped down as
president...Democracy was restored and by the time the economic miracle was under
way that helped to ensure its survival.41
An additional problem with the argument that the Chicago Boys were only interested in
economic freedom and had no concern for democracy and political liberties is that it does not take
the historical context sufficiently into account. As North explains, the feedback offered by reality is
crucial to understand the formation of beliefs and the process of institutional transformation. In the
Chilean case a statist evolution that had begun in the early 20 th century led to increasing
government intervention. At the same time Chile showed very low economic growth, hyperinflation
and social instability. Finally the economic system collapsed along with the democratic institutions
during the socialist experiment of the UP government. The Chicago Boys and other Chilean
reformers adopted their intellectual position largely as a response to the results of the socialist and
statist ideas that had prevailed in Chile for over fifty years.  Neoliberalism came to offer a theory
41 Ferguson, The Ascent of Money, p. 218.
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that made sense of what had happened in Chile as well as a clear plan on how to solve the problems.
In their view, economic progress was inseparable from social stability and a well-functioning
democracy. The context of the Cold War contributed to enforce these beliefs even more.  The clash
between the Soviet Union and the United States exacerbated ideological polarization at both ends of
the country’s political and intellectual spectrum creating what North calls “political disorder”.42 To
a large extent, the Chicago Boys were a product of their time, most specifically, of the Cold War.
In the literature on the free market revolution it is rarely mentioned that from the 1950s onwards,
the Soviet Union had systematically intervened in Chile in order to bring the country under its
sphere of influence. Moreover, throughout the 1960s, the Chilean Communist Party received more
Soviet funding than any other Communist Party in Latin America.43 Salvador Allende himself, who
in 1970 would become the first Marxist president in the world to be democratically elected, was the
most important contact of the Soviet secret service (KGB) in South America.44  The KGB also
supported Allende’s campaign financially. As Cold War historian Christopher Andrew put it, the
KGB “played a significant part preventing Allende being beaten to second place”.45The reaction of
the American government was equally intense. Henry Kissinger’s comment that Allende’s election
was "one of the most serious challenges ever faced in the hemisphere”46 reflects with absolute
clarity the decisive importance that Chile had for U.S foreign policy during the Cold War.
The fear among the non-Marxist political elites that the Unidad Popular could destroy the
constitutional order in Chile led the Christian Democratic Party to demand guarantees before
Allende took power. Since Allende had not obtained more than 50 per cent of the votes, Congress
would have to decide between the two first majorities. In exchange for their support, the Christian
Democratic Party demanded from the UP coalition to agree on several constitutional reforms. The
aim was to strengthen the Constitution so as to force the newly elected government to respect
human rights and the rule of law. The parties of the UP coalition accepted the terms and Allende
became President. Once installed, in an interview with French Marxist intellectual Régis Debray,
Allende admitted that the UP coalition had accepted to sign the constitutional compromise called
“Estatuto de Garantías Democráticas” only for “tactical reasons”, adding that they had no intention
of modifying “one comma” of their revolutionary program.47
 Under the government of the Unidad Popular, the polarization that had been growing within
42 A full explanation about what is meant by “political disorder and its emergence in Chile during the Cold War will be
offered in the third chapter.
43 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, Basic Books, New York, 2005, p.69.
44 Idem.
45 Ibid., p.72.
46 The White House, SECRET/SENSITIVE Memorandum for the President, "Subject: NSC Meeting, November 6-
Chile," November 5, 1970  Available at:  http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/chile02.pdf Last
accessed: 28/06/2014
47 See: Régis Debray/Salvador Allende, Der chilenische Weg, Luchterhand Verlag, Berlin, 1972, p.130.   
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Chilean society in the previous decades reached its climax. The country fell into a spiral of violence
stimulated by government actions, political fragmentation, foreign intervention and left and right
wing extremist organizations such as the terrorist group Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria
(MIR) and the paramilitary group Patria y Libertad. The economic policies of the UP government,
which sought to achieve massive redistribution of wealth through the nationalization of mining
companies and the confiscation of land and industries, were implemented in a context of
hyperinflation, economic distress and social upheaval. In addition, the UP government kept
systematically violating the Constitution confirming the fears expressed by the Christian
Democratic Party in 1970. As a result, the democratic nature of Allende’s government was put into
question. It was a general belief among the opposition parties that the UP government was trying to
establish a Marxist totalitarian state.48 Eventually, the situation turned unsustainable. Fear of civil
war was widespread because there was no clarity with respect to the ideological and political
position within the armed forces. It was a known fact that some generals and parts of the military
forces supported the UP government and endorsed the Marxist cause. Allende himself, in a
desperate attempt to stabilize the political and social situation of the country, had appointed several
generals as ministers to his government. That decision stimulated speculations about a left wing
military coup that would install a Marxist dictatorship in Chile.49
By the time the armed forces intervened in 1973, some of the Chicago Boys had already
elaborated an economic program inspired in neoliberal ideas. The document was known as “El
Ladrillo” (“The Brick”), because of its thickness. It was written at the time of the presidential
election of 1970 as an economic program for the eventual victory of conservative candidate Jorge
Alessandri. The idea was to make profound economic changes to put an end to what the authors
viewed as the economic mismanagement that had characterized the Chilean economy since the
1930s. For the authors of “El Ladrillo”, statism and corporatism were the cause of Chile’s
economic, cultural and social stagnation.
Under the government of the UP the document was rewritten and updated taking into
account the socialist experience. The final version presented in 1973 had the purpose of “defining a
set of interrelated and coherent economic policies that would enable to solve the acute economic
crisis” in which Chile found itself.50 The authors declared to have felt an “inescapable
responsibility” to offer their “intellectual contribution” to help to “reconstruct the country and
liberate it from the chaos” brought about by the “disastrous” Marxist economic policies of the UP
48 See: Resolution of the Chilean Deputies Chamber, August 22, 1973. Available at: 
http://historiapolitica.bcn.cl/obtienearchivo?id=documentos/10221.1/13377/1/mj_00061.pdf Last accessed: 
28/06/2014.
49 See, declaration of Patricio Aylwin to Televisión Nacional de Chile, 1973. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bNfcjkL37zE&feature=related Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
50 See: El Ladrillo, Centro de Estudios Públicos, Santiago, 1992, pp.15-16.
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government.51 As the military lacked competence in economic issues and after two years of failed
management of the economy, “El Ladrillo” became the economic program of the military
government and their authors the experts in charge of applying it. It was the beginning of the
Chilean free market revolution.
The structure of this work
This work will be structured into five chapters. The first chapter (I) will explain the
importance of beliefs in the process of economic change. It will examine some of the different
approaches in the science of economics to the relationship between ideas, intellectuals and
economic policy. On a more concrete level it will develop the theoretical framework that will serve
as analytical tool for the rest of the work. In particular the contributions of Douglass North will be
examined. This chapter will also explain what is meant by “neoliberalism” as the set of beliefs
behind the free market revolution of the Chicago Boys, its direct connection to classical liberalism
and its essential difference with other forms of liberalism like New Deal liberalism and the
liberalism of the French rationalist tradition. The chapter argues that neoliberalism and therefore the
Chicago Boys belonged to a tradition of liberalism of British-American origin, which understands
liberty mostly in a negative sense and views progress as the result of the spontaneous forces that
develop in society and the market.
The second chapter (II) will deal with the intellectual heritage behind the free market
revolution. Accordingly, it will focus on the presence and impact of an earlier form of neoliberalism
showing that, contrary to what is generally believed, the Chicago Boys belonged to a long Chilean
tradition of British-American thinking that had been founded in Chile by the famous French laissez
faire economist Jean Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil. Courcelle-Seneuil’s impact on Chile’s intellectual
and political class will be analyzed in order to explain how classical liberalism managed to become
the most influential set of beliefs in Chile for more than half a century. This chapter will also
analyze the case of Andrés Bello, who is widely considered as one of Latin America’s most
influential and outstanding intellectuals. His major work was made in Chile, where he founded the
Universidad de Chile, became a legislator and created the Civil Code that defined Chile’s legal
tradition for centuries to come. This chapter will explain that Bello, who was not primarily an
economist, was nevertheless a close follower of Adam Smith and other British classical liberal
thinkers having a substantial impact on Chile’s institutional and intellectual history.
51 Idem.
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The third Chapter (III) will deal with the rise of the Chicago Boys. It will explain the
historical context, analyzing the demise of early neoliberalism and the rise of antiliberal ideologies.
Special emphasis will be given to the influence of the United Nations Commission for Latin
America (ECLA)52, which had the declared aim of debunking the British-American liberal
economic and political philosophy. This analysis will be made taking into account the political and
ideological evolution in Chile in the context of the Cold War. Applying North’s theoretical
framework, this chapter will explain that the Chicago Boys were basically a reaction in the tradition
of British-American liberalism to the economic results of the ideologies that had prevailed since the
1930s as well as to the threat of a socialist revolution.  It further explains that the revival of classical
liberalism in Chile was a process that took place over decades starting in the mid-1950s with the
agreement between the Catholic University and Chicago University, the efforts made by the
newspaper El Mercurio to spread the ideas of classical liberalism and the visit of the Klein & Saks
mission to Chile. More importantly, this chapter shows that the beliefs of the Chicago Boys
included a concern for political freedom and democracy in the tradition of classical liberalism
previously promoted by Courcelle-Seneuil and his followers. Crucial in the analysis is the role
played by Milton Friedman’s ideas, the intellectual efforts of the think tank Centro de Estudios
Públicos, which was created by leading Chicago Boys and presided by Hayek and the presence of
the Mont Pelerin Society in Viña del Mar in 1981.
The fourth chapter (IV) will address one of the most important intellectual pillars of the free
market revolution, namely Jaime Guzmán. Guzmán was the most influential civil adviser to the
military regime. A law professor, he was a close ally of the Chicago Boys and was in charge of
creating the1980 Constitution which, in practice, came to institutionalize the free market revolution
and Chile’s transition to democracy. Guzmán’s ideas are crucial since he was, as North would say,
one of the actors in the position of making the rules of the game. As the chapter shows, Guzmán
was deeply influenced by the ideas of Friedrich von Hayek, who like Friedman, happened to visit
Chile a couple of times while the free market revolution was taking place. Guzmán’s Constitution
was largely the result of the influence of ideas in the tradition of British-American liberalism,
whose most coherent and influential proponent in the 20th century was Hayek.
The last chapter (V) will deal in detail with the intellectual contributions of José Piñera. The
reason for dedicating a special chapter to Piñera is twofold. On a practical level, Piñera was
responsible for the most radical reforms in the Chilean free market revolution.53   He can therefore
be considered one of the most important “Founding Fathers” of the Chilean economic model.54 On a
52 In the 1980s ECLA incorporated the Caribbean countries. Since then its official name is United Nations 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC.
53 Ferguson, The Ascent of Money,  p.214.
54 Angel Soto, “The Founding Fathers of Chile´s Capitalist Revolution”, Yale Journal of International Affairs,
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philosophical level, Piñera wrote more than any other of the Chicago Boys on the intellectual
foundations of the free market revolution. More importantly, Piñera founded a magazine that was
extremely influential among the ruling elites, business people and academicians during the 1980s.
The aim of the magazine, called Economia y Sociedad, was to influence the climate of opinion and
support the free market revolution and Chile’s transition to democracy. Given his status among the
Chicago Boys, his intellectual engagement and his influence in Chile, Piñera’s contribution must be
considered as one of the main intellectual sources of the free market revolution. Accordingly, this
chapter analyzes Piñera’s writings and also the diverse publications of his magazine Economía y
Sociedad from the late 1970s to the 1990s showing that the free market revolution was openly
linked by Piñera and Economía y Sociedad to ideas of classical liberalism and to the American
Founding Fathers.
Spring/Summer 2007, p.126. Soto’s claim seems to be accurate with regard to the second generation of reformers
but not the first one. It is usually attributed to Sergio de Castro to have been the main architect of the Chilean
economic model. De Castro was one of the first Chileans to obtain a PhD in economics from Chicago University
and served as finance minister from 1976 to 1982.
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Chapter I:  Beliefs and economic change
Economists and the importance of ideas
This is essentially a study about the impact of ideas on Chilean institutional history,
especially on the free market revolution of the 1970s and 1980s. In focusing on the role of ideas,
this work follows a long tradition in economic thinking that has identified them as a major force of
historical change. In other words, ideas are crucial to explain institutional evolution and the process
of economic change. A brief examination of what some of the most reputed minds in the history of
economic thought had to say about this issue will contribute to have a clear notion about the
theoretical premise of this study.
John Stuart Mill was among the first economists to warn about the decisive impact of
philosophy and ideas on men’s actions and human history. According to Mill, a central lesson
“given to mankind by every age, and always disregarded” is that “speculative philosophy, which to
the superficial appears a thing so remote from the business of life and the outward interests of men,
is in reality the thing on earth which most influences them, and in the long run overbears every
other influence save those which it must itself obey”.55  In his Essays on Politics and Society, Mill
would insist that “opinion is in itself one of the greatest active social forces” in defining
government institutions, adding that “one person with a belief is a social power equal to ninety-nine
who have only interests”.56 For Mill, “it is what men think that determines how they act”.57  Thus
Mill was making the case for the relevance that intellectuals and ideas have in the process of social
and economic change. It is interesting to note that Mill not only explained the impact that experts or
intellectuals have on political or economic institutions but also on public opinion which, in his
view, largely defined what sort of institutions would prevail.58 As we shall see, in the Chilean case
this reflection is important because there was a systematic campaign by the Chicago Boys and by
important media to make neoliberalism popular especially among the country’s elites. Ideas,
however, usually have a less direct way in influencing society. Moreover, for this approach many
people who follow a certain set of beliefs are not even aware of the origin of those beliefs. Perhaps
55 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society,
Edited by John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1985, p.164.
56 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X IX- Essays on Politics and Society, Part 2,
Edited by John M. Robson, Introduction by F.E.L. Priestley, University of Toronto Press,Toronto, 1985, p.57.
57 Idem.
58 Ibid., p.58.
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no one made this point more categorically than Mill’s countryman John Maynard Keynes. In the
concluding remark of his famous General Theory of Unemployment, Interest and Money, Keynes
observed:
 The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy
from some academic scribbler of a few years back....the power of vested interests is
vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas... soon or late,
it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil.59
Keynes’ insight that many people in leading positions are often influenced by some thinkers
whom they probably have never heard about was especially true in the case of Chile. There is no
doubt that the military regime knew next to nothing about economics and that Pinochet had never
read Adam Smith. Even so, he eventually became convinced that free market institutions were the
solution for many of the country’s problems. In so doing the military regime enabled the application
of a set of beliefs whose origin was largely unknown to them. Nobel laureate economist Friedrich
von Hayek dedicated much effort to explain this phenomenon. Despite his unsolvable differences
with Keynes, Hayek held the same view with regard to the role of ideas and intellectuals in defining
the social and economic evolution.60 In his major work The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek
explained that “the belief that in the long run it is ideas and therefore the men who give currency to
new ideas that govern evolution... has long formed a fundamental part of the liberal creed”.61
According to Hayek, a “practical man merely chooses from the possible orders that are offered to
him and finally accepts a political doctrine or set of principle elaborated and presented by others”.62
Thus, “people rarely know or care  whether the commonplace ideas of their day have come to them
from Aristotle or Locke, Rousseau or Marx...most of them have never read the works or even heard
the names of the authors whose conceptions and ideas have become part of their thinking”.63
Accordingly if a certain social order is to prevail, in Hayek’s view the most decisive element is to
59 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Harvest/Harcourt, New York,
1964, pp. 383-384.
60 In his work “Free Enterprise and Competitive Order”, Hayek explicitly declared his agreement with Keynes on this
issue. See: Friedrich Hayek, “Free Enterprise and Competitive Order”, in: Individualism and Economic Order,
Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1980, p. 108.
61 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, p.98.
62 Ibid., p.99.
63 Ibid., p.98.
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keep vibrant in society the ideas that make that order possible. Accordingly, for Hayek it is “the
beliefs which must spread if a free society is to be preserved” and not what is politically possible at
a certain moment.64
The reason why ideas and ideologies are so influential in human history was explained by
Hayek’s professor Ludwig von Mises. A worldview explained Mises, is a theory and interpretation
of all things, an opinion about the best means to remove uneasiness. Insofar religion, metaphysics
and philosophy provide worldviews they “advise men how to act”.65 Ideology, said Mises, is a
narrower concept that only includes doctrines concerning the individual’s conduct and social
relations. Like a worldview, an ideology is not only a descriptive theory but also a doctrine about
what ought to be. For Mises, it was the result of the clash between different world views, political
philosophies, ideologies and ideas, what defines the type of economic organization and institutions
a society has: “The genuine history of mankind is the history of ideas. It is ideas that distinguish
man from all other beings. Ideas engender social institutions, political changes, technological
methods of production, and all that is called economic conditions.”66 This is the reason why ideas,
economic history and institutional history are not separable and why focusing on ideas is so
important to understand the Chilean free market revolution and the role played by the Chicago
Boys. The Chicago Boys themselves were firmly convinced that ideas were crucial in order to
transform Chile. So was one of their main mentors: Milton Friedman. Like Mises, Friedman
believed that the economic organization of a country depended on which ideas about the role of
government prevailed in the intellectual battle. In Friedman’s eyes, it was the translation into
practice of two sets of ideas and not material factors that had made America a success story. The
first set had to do with the free market ideas developed by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations.
The second set of ideas was the individualistic philosophy that was embodied by Thomas Jefferson
in the Declaration of Independence.67  According to Friedman, until the 1930s “the United States
remained largely as its founders had envisaged it”, with a federal government that only performed
specific functions of providing for national defense, a legal framework and a common commercial
policy for the states.68 Intellectuals came to change the free market institutional framework of the
United States during the Great Depression. According to Friedman, Franklin Roosevelt’s brain trust
integrated mainly by Columbia graduates, “reflected the change that had occurred earlier in the
intellectual atmosphere on the campuses, from the belief in individual responsibility, laissez faire
and a decentralized government to belief in social responsibility and a centralized powerful
64 Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order,  p. 108.
65 Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, Fox &Wilkes, Fourth Edition, San Francisco, 1996,p.178.
66 Ludwig von Mises,  Theory and History, Ludwig von Mises Institute, Auburne Alabama, 2007, p. 187.
67 See: Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, Harvestbooks, Orlando, 1990, pp.1-2.
68 Milton and Rose Friedman, The Tyranny of the Status Quo, Pelican, Harmondsworth, 1985 p. 24.
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government.”69 Like Keynes and Hayek, Friedman observed that the relation between ideas and
economic change was strong but not instantaneous. Along with his wife Rose he wrote: “After a
lag, sometimes of decades, an intellectual tide ‘taken at its flood’ will spread at first gradually, then
more rapidly, to the public at large and through the public’s pressure on government will affect the
course of economic, social, and political policy”.70
Friedman of course, did not disregard material factors such as personal interest as a strong
human motivation. In this sense he was close to Max Weber whose work treated ideas and their
impact on the process of economic and social change as a major theme without disregarding
material interest to explain human behavior.71 For Weber, ideas “can become effective forces in
history”.72 Weltbilder, world images worked as guides for people’s actions while organizations
resulted from putting into practice certain ideas.73 For Weber, nowhere could the power of ideas be
seen more clearly than in the history of capitalism. In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, Weber argued that the ideas of Protestantism had given rise to a new type of institutions
and economic organization resulting in modern capitalism.
 It is important to stress that the view according to which ideas play a decisive role in
institutional, social and economic evolution is far from being undisputed. Marxism for example
completely ruled out the possibility of ideas playing a role in defining social and economic history.
For orthodox Marxists, only material factors such as class interest and productive forces count in
order to explain the process of institutional formation. In other words, the economic structures
define everything else, from prevailing ideologies and rules, through laws, art and culture in
general. Marxist sociological determinism is compounded by what Karl Popper called
“historicism”. Historicism is a doctrine that holds that the course of history is already predetermined
by laws which, once discovered, allow to make predictions about the future.74 For this approach,
ideas, beliefs or philosophy, have no impact on human history. Moreover, individuals have no
power to alter the course of history at all for it has already been determined by a society’s natural
development law. In the preface to the first German edition of his central work Capital, Marx made
this point very clearly. According to Marx, even when a society “has got upon the right track for the
discovery of the natural laws of its movement ...it can neither clear by bold leaps; nor remove by
legal enactments the obstacles offered by the successive phases of its normal development.”75
 Marxism is not the only economic approach that has given little or no importance to the role
69 Ibid., p.92.
70 Friedman and Friedman, “The Tide in the Affairs of Men“, The Freeman, Vol. 39, April, 1989.
71 Richard Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts, Stanford University Press,
Stanford, California, 2005, p.121.
72 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1950, p. 90.
73 Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary, p. 121.
74 See: Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge,  London, 2002, p.3.
75 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.1, Charles H Kerr & Company, Chicago, 1909,  p.15-16.
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of ideas in explaining economic phenomena and human history. From a non-deterministic position,
neoclassical economists have long ignored the importance of ideas and culture to explain human
behavior and the performance of the market. One of the most emblematic cases of the rejection of
the role of ideas in the process of economic change was Vilfredo Pareto. In his work The Mind and
Society Pareto argued that “the proposition so often met with that 'this or that people acts as it does
because of a certain belief' is rarely true; in fact, it is almost always erroneous.”76 Along similar
lines Nobel laureate economist George Stigler argued that economic institutions and policies are
mostly defined by the interest of the actors in the political process, who pursue a policy of “utility
maximization”.77 According to Stigler, the ideas of economists are not influential enough to make a
difference in terms of economic policy.78 Following a similar approach in their bestseller book on
economic development, professors James Robinson and Daron Acemoglu argued that beliefs,
values and culture in general are not decisive in the economic evolution of nations and that material
factors are more important in defining institutions.79
North’s integral approach
One of the main critics of the neoclassical approach and its rationalist assumptions has been
Nobel laureate economist Douglass North, who has stressed the importance of beliefs and
ideologies for understanding the process of economic change. According to North, “economics has
little to say about ideology and even less to say about how it affects choices and economic
performance.”80 For North, the neoclassical assumptions are incorrect. 81 Sharing Hayek’s
viewpoint about the role of ideas, North argued that it is not possible to make sense out of the world
with a purely economic approach. It is necessary to integrate social and political theories as well as
cognitive science because “we do not live only in an economic world”.82
Once the reductionist neoclassical assumptions are put aside, it becomes clear that human
interaction is characterized by a set of complex problems that create uncertainty.83 In this context,
76 Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, Vol 1. Hartcourt Brace, New York, 1935, p. 90.
77 George Stigler, The Essence of Stigler, Edited by Kurt Leube and Thomas Gale More, Hoover Press, Stanford,
California, 1986,  p. 309.
78 Idem.
79 James Robinson and Daron Acemoglu, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, Crown
Business, New York, 2012, p.56 ff.
80 Douglass North, “Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions”, Cato Journal, Vol.8, No.1, Spring /Summer 1988, 
p.15.
81 The main assumptions of rational choice are: a) individuals always maximize utility with their decisions; b) there are
no frictions in the world where individuals make decisions; and c) decisions are made in a world where resources 
are scarce.
82 Douglass North, The Role of Institutions in Economic Development, Unece Discussion Papers Series, No. 2003.2, 
October, 2003, p. 1. Available at: http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/oes/disc_papers/ECE_DP_2003-2.pdf Last
accessed: 30/06/2014.
83 North uses the term uncertainty as formulated by Frank Knight, who distinguished between uncertainty and risk. For
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institutions are those restrictions that provide structure to human interaction in order to reduce
uncertainty. In a world without frictions, such as the one assumed by the neoclassical economic
models, institutions would not be necessary because there would be no uncertainty. In the real
world however, institutions work as mechanisms to reduce the complexity of the problems faced by
individuals in their interaction. This means that, contrary to what the rationalist approach assumes,
in the real world individuals do not possess complete information or unlimited mental capacity to
process the information at their disposal. This fact explains the development of norms and
regularities -institutions- so that exchange relations can take place within a structure that lowers
transaction costs. In North’s words, institutions “can make predictable our dealings with each other
every day in all kinds of forms and shapes. They thereby not only reduce uncertainty in the world
but allow us to get on with everyday business and solve problems effectively”.84 As a result,
institutions provide “incentives and disincentives for people to behave in certain ways”.85
Moreover, without institutions, adds North, “there would be no order, no society, no economy, and
no polity”.86 Therefore, the construction of an institutional framework is an “essential building
block of civilization”.87
 In this framework, says North, “ideas, ideologies, prejudices, myths and dogmas have
importance because they play a key role in decision making”.88 North argued that beliefs and
ideologies are the mental models people use to make sense of the world around them in order to
make decisions in a context of uncertainty.89 In North’s words:  
In order to make uncertain situations “comprehensible” humans will develop
explanations. The pervasiveness of myths, taboos and particularly religions
throughout history (and prehistory, as well) suggests that humans have always felt a
Knight, while risk was a situation in which it was possible to calculate a probability distribution of outcomes so that
it was possible to insure against such a condition, uncertainty was a situation where no such probability distribution
existed. See: Douglass North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press, New
Jersey, 2005, p.13.
84 North, The Role of Institutions in Economic Development, p.1.
85 Idem.
86 Douglass North, Economics and Cognitive Science, Washington University, St Louis, p.1 Available at: 
http://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/north.econcognition.pdf Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
87 Idem.
88 Douglass North, “Que queremos decir cuando hablamos de racionalidad?”, Revista Estudios Públicos, No. 34,
Santiago, 1989. p.3.
89 According to North, Mantzavinos and Shariq, a belief is a relatively crystallized mental model which has been
confirmed by environmental feedback. A belief system is in turn the interconnection of beliefs which can be
consistent or inconsistent.  Belief systems generate an emotional adaption that will work as a filter to the processing
of new stimulus. North, Mantzavinos and Shariq go on to argue that due to natural limitations of the mind, nothing
guarantees that “the reception of environmental feedback” would be accurate. This would explain the historical
persistence of myths, dogmas, ideologies and superstitions based on flawed belief systems. See: Douglass North, By
C. Mantzavinos and Syed Shariq, Learning, Institutions and Economic Performance, Max Planck Institute for
Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, 2003/13, December 2003, p. 4-5.
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need to explain the unexplainable and indeed it is probably an evolutionarily superior
trait to have any explanation rather than no explanation.90
Ideologies like communism explains North, are “organized belief systems frequently having
their origins in religions which make prescriptive demands on human behavior. They both
incorporate views about how the ‘world works’ and how it should work. As such they provide a
ready guide to making choices”.91 Thus, ideology refers to the “subjective perceptions that people
have about what the world is like and what it ought to be”.92 Insofar as ideologies entail a
prescriptive component they “affect people’s perception about the fairness or justice of the
institutions of a political economic system”.93
 North explains that ideologies are especially important in political markets where the
transaction costs are more difficult to measure than in economic markets. Unlike economic markets,
where the products exchanged can be directly measured and tested, in political markets votes are
exchanged for promises, which makes it  almost impossible to demand what has been offered in
exchange for the vote. Voters in turn have little incentive to inform themselves because the
probability that their vote matters is almost nonexistent. As a result, stereotypes and ideologies
become the main decision criteria shaping the performance of the economy.94 And since the
ideologies and beliefs available in a given culture finally define the form of government that
determines the formal rules of the game, namely property rights and enforcement characteristics, it
is not a surprise, says North, that efficient economic markets are so exceptional.95 Moreover, North
argues that ideologies are a key aspect for understanding the poor economic performance of third
world countries for they usually lead to policies that provide institutional constraints that do not
encourage productive activity.96
A similar argument on the importance of beliefs for institutions and human behavior has
been made by Robert Dahl in his work Polyarchy. According to Dahl “beliefs guide action not only
because they influence or embody one’s more distant goals and values...but because beliefs make
up for assumptions about reality, about the character of the past and the present, our expectations
about the future, our understanding of the hows and whys of actions: in short our ‘knowledge”.97
90 North, Economics and Cognitive Science, p.4.
91 Idem.
92 North, Ideology and Political/Economic Institutions, p.15.
93 Idem.
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Furthermore, like North, Dahl concludes that evidently “individual beliefs influence collective
actions and hence the structure and functioning of institutions and systems”.98  
Institutions in turn, as North explains, are made of formal and informal rules. The former are
those created by authorities such as laws and constitutions while the latter refer to ways of doing
things in a specific culture. These elements explain the performance of a given economy, but only
formal rules can be altered at will. This means that a new government can change the formal rules
in order to create incentives that lead to economic growth but it cannot fundamentally change the
cultural heritage. The rulers find constrains in path dependence, that is to say, the aggregate of
norms, belief systems and rules that have evolved over time and survive. This would explain why it
is not possible to introduce formal rules from developed countries into developing countries and
expect them to produce the same results. North argues that in the Latin American case, the widely
held beliefs embodied in the informal constrains of the European and American societies, which
account for the existence of flexible institutions and their success, are not to be found.99 This point
is crucial, for even if it is correct that in general Latin American countries have failed to create
similar conditions to the more advanced nations, the Chilean case shows that informal institutions,
especially a belief system compatible with free market institutions and the rule of law did in fact
exist as part of the cultural heritage. This was a central factor to explain the institutional success of
the economic and political reforms made in the 1970s and 1980s and their preservation from the
1990s onwards. Chapter II will deal with the reception and influence of classical liberalism in Chile
in the 19th century and its lasting impact on institutional evolution and the intellectual climate of
opinion.
Two revolutions: Chile and the Soviet Union
 North observed that the structure of an economic market reflected “the beliefs of those in a
position to make the rules of the games”.100 In other word, it is the beliefs of those “political and
economic entrepreneurs” in a position to make policies that result in an institutional matrix that sets
constrains for new actors willing to modify institutions.  As a result of this path dependence,
gradual change is in general the only possible change. However, as the same North explains, there
are occasions were radical changes take place.101 According to North, the Soviet Union was an
excellent example of the process of change as an exercise of the intentionality of the players, where
sense and not only in a scientific one.
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the beliefs of those who are in power positions got implemented via formal rules.102
From an institutional perspective, what happened in Chile is comparable to what happened
in Russia with the communist revolution. Supported by a military regime, the Chicago Boys also
made a radical transformation of the formal rules that had characterized the Chilean economic
model since the 1930s. In so doing, the Chicago Boys put into practice their own set of beliefs to
transform the Chilean economy in order to achieve economic prosperity and social stability. Thus,
like the Soviet Union, the Chilean experiment under the Chicago Boys was not the result of the
gradual trial and error process that according to North had resulted in the institutions that gave rise
to the Western World.  As this work shows, there was in fact a “sequential evolution of beliefs
modified by experiences” but it was not the case that they “gradually resulted in the changes
producing economic growth”.103 It is important to note at this point that the radical transformation
of formal institutions seems to require an authoritarian political context in order to take place. This
was the case both in Russia and Chile. In practice, what the Chicago Boys did was a radical
transformation that broke away from decades of path dependence.  It is in that sense that this work
uses the concept “free market revolution”. It is an analytical concept that helps to understand the
radical process of institutional transformation that took place in Chile. The central difference
between the Soviet and the Chilean experiment was not so much one of institutional procedure but
one of historical context and theoretical content. While socialist theories inspired the Soviet
leadership to make their revolution, classical liberal ideas inspired the Chicago Boys to make theirs.
There is however another important difference from an ideological and institutional point of view:
while socialism had no major antecedent in the Russian institutional and political history,
neoliberalism was rooted in the origins of the Chilean republic. In this sense, the Chilean free
market revolution was only partially a revolution for it was rooted in an intellectual tradition that
had been an essential part of Chilean economic and political history. In addition, for decades before
the free market revolution, the Chicago Boys had engaged in the public debate with the aim of
changing the intellectual climate of opinion. The intensity and content of this liberal engagement
was in turn defined by the perception that previous ideologies had not managed to create the
institutions necessary for solving the social and economic problems. This is the reason why the
performance of Chile’s economy prior to the free market revolution is relevant from an ideological
perspective. As North explains, those sets of beliefs that accord to reality the most, will more likely
produce the results intended by those who make policies inspired in them.104 This means for
example that socialism, as followed by the Soviet leadership, simply misunderstood the economic
102 Ibid.,p.146.
103 Idem.
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reality and led to failed economic policies. In North’s words, the belief system imposed by the
Soviet leaders reflected that the players had a very “primitive understanding of the fundamental
structure of an operating economy” and an “even more primitive understanding of the necessary
incentive structure to accomplish their objectives”.105 Similarly, in Chile the ideologies prevailing
since the 1930s had not led to a relevant increase in the life quality of the people. And while in
Russia Michael Gorbachev reversed course initiating a process of political and economic
liberalization known respectively as glasnost and perestroika, in Chile the Chicago Boys reacted
embracing a radical classical liberal ideology. Thus, the equation beliefs →  policies → reality
feedback → modified beliefs → new policies, is crucial to understand the rise and fall of the Soviet
Union and also the philosophical foundations behind the free market revolution in Chile. After all,
the Chicago Boys sought to correct what they viewed as the economic and political failures of a
system which did not enable large spaces of economic and individual freedom. If North is right,
then it was neoliberalism that provided the intellectual basis for an institutional structure able to
efficiently adapt to the uncertainties of a non-ergodic world.106 The key concept here is “adaptive
efficiency” which entails institutions flexible enough to allow experimenting with various
alternatives in order to deal with problems that are emerging all the time.107 As North explains,
adaptive efficiency “encourages the development of decentralized decision-making processes that
will allow societies to explore many alternative ways to solve problems”.108 And since it is beliefs
that connect reality to institutions, in order to achieve adaptive efficiency a belief structure that
encourages experimentation and the elimination of failures is required. In other words, according to
North, a set of beliefs favorable to economic freedom is crucial for the creation of adaptive
efficiency and efficient markets. In turn, efficient markets require institutions that lower transaction
costs, that is to say, the costs involved in protecting property rights, measuring what is being
exchanged and enforcing agreements.109 Neoliberalism was an ideology favorable to economic
liberty and thereby to efficient markets. According to North, this enabled the Chicago Boys to
create the formal institutions that were vital for generating economic growth in Chile.110 From a
philosophical perspective this is important because the idea of democracy in neoliberalism is
inextricably linked to its economic philosophy. The reason why the Chilean reformers sought to
105 Ibid.,p.149.
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make a transition to a limited democracy was precisely that in their view a limited democracy was
the only one that made possible the preservation of economic freedom, economic growth and a free
society at large. In this position they were not far from North’s prescription for economic success in
the long run. As North and Weingast argued:
The development of free markets must be accompanied by some credible restrictions on
the state’s ability to manipulate economic rules to the advantage of itself and its
constituency. Successful economic performance, therefore, must be accompanied by
institutions that limit economic intervention and allow private rights and markets to
prevail in large segments of the economy.111
According to North and Weingast, a Constitution that creates such a framework in which the
government, whether democratic or not, is limited, would enable the conditions for economic
growth.112 As will be explained in the third chapter, this was exactly the aim of the Constitution of
1980. Largely inspired by a classical liberal philosophy, the 1980 Constitution and the economic
reforms that were thereby institutionalized sought to correct what was seen as problems created by
decades of interventionist policies and especially those created by the socialist revolution of the UP
government.
The reforms of the Chicago Boys and the 1980 Constitution also sought to put an end to
“political disorder”. Political disorder is define by North, Summerhill and Weingast, as a situation
where a large portion of a society fears for its lives, families or sources of livelihood and wealth
while political order is defined as exactly the opposite.113 In a different chapter we will elaborate on
this issue.114 At this stage, it has to be pointed out that political order according to North is essential
for achieving long term economic growth and political stability because disorder increases
uncertainty, thereby increasing transaction costs. For this reason, focusing exclusively on market
reforms and the configuration of democracy is not enough to bring a state in transition into a path of
sustainable development.115 For North order has to exist or otherwise neither the market can work
efficiently nor democracy can be sustained.  In this context North explains that there are two ways
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in which order can be achieved. One is via a consensus and the other one via an authoritarian
regime.  The latter does not require the consent of the governed. North himself argues that an ideal
type of authoritarian political order exists when the participants find it in their interest to obey the
written or unwritten rules given by the ruler.116  This analysis is relevant for the Chilean case for
two reasons: first, political disorder was an important factor in the definition of the Chicago Boys
worldview and their willingness to collaborate with a pro market authoritarian regime.  Secondly, if
North is rights, for authoritarianism to work, the existence of a set of informal rules and beliefs
compatible with the new formal institutions is essential. In other words, the philosophical or
ideological foundations of the free market reforms required some kind of support in Chile’s cultural
heritage. As North explains, when the formal rules are changed overnight, if the informal rules,
namely the traditions, ideas, codes of conduct, norms of behavior and conventions do not conform
with the new formal rules, economic growth and institutional success will not be achieved.117
Insofar as informal rules account for the largest part of the sum of constrains that shape our
decisions they are far more important than formal rules for explaining economic performance.118 In
this logic, a strong liberal tradition prior to the free market revolution would be part of those sets of
informal institutions which contributed to make sustainable the reforms introduced by the Chicago
Boys during and after the military regime. This was exactly the case. The fact that those beliefs lost
their influence during the decades that preceded the free market revolution does not mean that they
disappeared as part of the knowledge accumulated over time. On the contrary, they were present in
the intellectual spheres and through the system of private law, which enabled them to come back
and become influential once again. As this work shows, the Chicago Boys were able to work on the
foundations of a classical liberal tradition long existent in Chile. Hence their institutional success.
This analysis seems even more pertinent when we consider the fact that Chile was an exception in
terms of economic performance among the third world countries that went through a similar
process. As Huneeus observed, Chile was almost “the only environmentalist dictatorship in the
Third World that left a good economic legacy”.119 In general, argues Huneeus, “public
administration of military governments is almost always associated with economic failure”.120
Moreover, many other authoritarian regimes also had competent economic teams and good
economic programs but nevertheless failed to generate economic prosperity.121
It could of course be argued that the free market revolution itself changed the Chilean
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culture overnight in such a dramatic way that it made the new economic model possible to work.
This does not seem a plausible explanation for what happened in Chile. Otherwise the informal
institutions of a given society would not be an obstacle for achieving economic growth or any kind
of institutional transformation. The institutions could be successfully changed at will by the
authority if it had enough power to do so. North however, has argued that reality is far more
complex and that beliefs and other informal institutions play a decisive role. Applying North’s
theory to the Chilean free market revolution makes it therefore necessary to explore if there was in
Chilean history a belief system related to neoliberalism which formed part of the Chilean cultural
heritage, which thereby contributed to the institutional success of the free market economic and
political reforms made by the Chicago Boys. Before clarifying to what extent the set of beliefs
applied by the Chicago Boys were present in Chile’s intellectual heritage it is necessary to establish
exactly the content of those set of beliefs and the sort of institutional arrangements they promoted.
In other words, it is crucial to define what is to be understood as neoliberalism.
The beliefs behind the Chilean free market revolution: British-American liberalism
 The set of beliefs imported by the Chicago Boys from the United States is usually referred
to as “neoliberalism”. This label, as Rachel Turner observed, leads to confusion and has been used
with lack of precision in the political debate.122 Similarly Taylor C. Boas & Jordan Gans-Morse
have shown that the term “neoliberalism” is largely undefined in academic discourse and has
experienced an evolution that has dramatically altered its connotation since it first appeared in the
1930s.123 In the context of this work, the term will  refer to the different streams of liberalism that
were present in the foundation of the Mont Pelerin Society, (MPS) including the Chicago School,
the Austrian School, James Buchanan and the Virginia School, Walter Eucken and the Freiburg
School, as well as philosophers like Karl Popper, Bertrand de Juvenel and Michael Polanyi. To be
sure, there are important differences between the various streams of the so-called neoliberalism and
the Chicago Boys were clearly proponents of one of the most radical versions. What in any case
seems clear is that neoliberalism is the natural successor of the classical liberalism of British-
American origin. This becomes evident when the history of the central force in the development
and spread of neoliberal identity, namely the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), is examined.124 When
this Society was founded in 1947, classical liberalism was at its lowest point in terms of influence
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on intellectuals, politicians and society in general.125 The Soviet Union had vastly extended its
domain over Eastern Europe while Scandinavia, Britain and America were moving towards welfare
states and Spain and Portugal had fascist dictatorships. In this context Hayek decided to found a
society which would revive classical liberalism in order to preserve what he believed were the
intellectual foundations of western civilization. Among the co-founders of the society were figures
such as Lionel Robbins, Michael Polanyi, Karl Popper, Ludwig von Mises, Walter Eucken and
several Chicago economists such as Milton Friedman, Frank Knight, Aaron Director and George
Stigler. In the statement of aims the founders argued that the central values of civilization were in
danger and that the position of the individual was “progressively undermined by extensions of
arbitrary power”.126 These threats, declared the founders, were fostered by the growth of a view of
history which denied “all absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories which question the
desirability of the rule of law”.127 Most importantly, these ideologies had been also fostered “by a
decline of belief in private property and the competitive market” that guaranteed a diffusion of
power and initiative without which it was “difficult to imagine a society in which freedom may be
effectively preserved.”128  Thus as R.M Hartwell noted in his History of the MPS, the goal of the
MPS was to discuss classical liberalism “and its decline, the possibility of a liberal revival, and the
desirability of forming an association of people who held certain common convictions about the
nature of a free society.”129Milton Friedman would later declare that the society sought to “promote
a classical, liberal philosophy, that is, a free economy, a free society, socially, civilly and in human
rights”.130 For Turner “The neo-liberal project strove for a new understanding of the state, economy
and society within an ideological framework of traditional liberal tenets”.131 Turner identified four
general principles that are key to neoliberalism:132  a) A belief in the market system as the most
efficient way to allocate resources and as a safeguard of personal freedom; b) the commitment to
the rule of law which implies limits to the use of arbitrary power by the authorities; c)  minimal
state intervention which entails the constitutional limitation of the powers of the state; and d) a
strong defense of the institution of private property that protects the individual against the collective
and allows the decentralization of power as well as the correct functioning of the market. It is not an
exaggeration to sustain that from this last principle all the others are derived. As Mises put it “The
program of - classical- liberalism, if condensed into a single word, would have to read: property,
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that is, private ownership of the means of production. All the other demands of liberalism result
from this fundamental demand.”133
The ideas spread and developed by neoliberals had their origin in thinkers such as John
Locke, Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Adam Smith and the Scottish
Enlightenment philosophers and included later proponents such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Frederic
Bastiat, Benjamin Constant, Jean Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil, and Lord Acton among many others.
This British- American liberal tradition, as Hayek stressed, was opposed to the French rationalist
liberal tradition of Rousseau and the precursors of the French revolution, who believed that
institutions could be rationally designed and progress could be achieved by government planning.134
These differences between both intellectual traditions is crucial in order to understand  the nature of
the worldwide ideological conflict that took place in the 20th century between neoliberalism and
socialism, fascism, Keynesianism, structuralism and the progressive ideology of New Dealers.
Hayek himself viewed the conflict of the 20th century as another chapter in the clash of ideas that
had taken place during the 18th and 19th century between classical liberals in the British tradition
and rationalist thinkers in the French tradition. In his best seller The Road to Serfdom, published
shortly before the foundation of the MPS, Hayek argued that the West was giving up “the freedom
in economic affairs without which personal freedom and political freedom has never existed”.135
He went on to explain that the road to serfdom consisted precisely in abandoning the views of
Cobden, Bright, Smith, Hume, Locke and Milton.136 The Austrian professor identified this
philosophy with the old British Whig tradition which in his eyes had had its most important
development in the American Revolution.137 In other words, it was the aim of the MPS and of all of
Hayek’s efforts to revive the values and beliefs of the American Revolution. Hayek himself
dedicated his work The Constitution of Liberty, which he considered as the 21st century equivalent
of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, to “the unknown civilization that is growing in America”138.
Henry Hazlitt saw Hayek’s aim to revive the British-American classical liberal tradition more
clearly than anyone at the time. In his review of the Road to Serfdom for the New York Times
Hazlitt commented that it was a “strange stroke of irony that the great British liberal tradition, the
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tradition of Locke and Milton, of Adam Smith and David Hume, of Macaulay and Mill and Morley,
of Acton and Dicey, should find in England its ablest contemporary defender not in a native
Englishman but in an Austrian exile”.139  
 In Hayek’s project of reviving the ideas of the American Revolution the Chicago School of
Economics also played a crucial role. As Rob van Horn and Phillip Mirowski argued, Hayek was in
fact not only the founding father of MPS but also of the Chicago School, which was expected to
play a complementary role to the MPS. In the words of Van Horn and Mirowski: “the Chicago
School of economics constituted just one component of a much more elaborate transnational project
to reinvent liberalism...Hayek provided both the intellectual impetus and the organizational
spadework for both the Chicago School and the MPS”.140 For Hayek, the adoption of the ideals of
the American Revolution was also the only way in which Latin America could make economic and
social progress. In an interview with the Chilean newspaper El Mercurio in 1981, Hayek declared
that an important reason why Latin America had been economically and politically unsuccessful
compared to the United States was that both had different intellectual traditions. In Hayek’s words:
The United States takes its tradition from England. In the 18th and 19th centuries
especially, this was a tradition of liberty. On the other hand the tradition in South
America, for example, is rooted basically in the French Revolution. This tradition lies
not in the classical line of liberty, but in maximum government power. I believe that
South America has been overly influenced by the totalitarian type of ideologies....This
is obviously very far from the liberal English tradition of the Whigs. So the answer is
that the United States remained faithful to the old English tradition even when
England partly forsook it. In South America, on the other hand, people sought to
imitate the French democratic tradition, that of the French Revolution, which meant
giving maximum powers to government.141
It is interesting to note that North and Weingast have argued that the spectacular rise of the
British Empire was largely due to the liberal tradition promoted by the Old Whigs in the Glorious
Revolution of 1688 which in turn has been considered an antecedent of the American
Revolution.142 According to the authors, the commercially minded Whigs fought for limited
government and political liberties in order to secure economic liberties, which had been threatened
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by the Crown under the Stuarts.143 The achievement of the Glorious Revolution was a severe
limitation to the government’s ability to affect personal liberties and economic liberties. This was
achieved by destroying the administrative apparatus used by the Crown to alter rights, replacing it
with an independent judiciary.144 North and Weingast explain that the institutional and political
changes brought about by the Glorious Revolution put the government on a sound financial basis
by regularizing taxation and removing “the random component of expropriation associated with
royal attempts to garner revenue”.145 With increased predictability in government actions, capital
markets flourished and a financial revolution took place. The capital markets, in turn, resulted
crucial for the British economic expansion of the 18th century. Contrasting the British experience
with other countries such as France, North and Weingast conclude:
It is clear that the institutional changes of the Glorious Revolution permitted the drive
toward British hegemony and dominance of the world. England could not have
beaten France without its financial revolution...The contrast between the two
economies in the mid-century is striking: in 1795 France was on the verge of
bankruptcy while England was on the verge of the industrial revolution.146
French versus British- American liberalism: the importance of negative liberty
This work will use the concepts neoliberalism, British-American liberalism and classical
liberalism interchangeably because all refer to the same intellectual tradition. A tradition that many
thinkers have identified as opposed to another current of ideas which goes also under name of
liberalism and which finds its origin in the French rationalist movement.  John Adams for example,
one of the most important intellectual forces behind the American Revolution said that the French
revolutionaries had “no single principle in common with the Americans”.147 Adams, went as far as
arguing that the French revolution had been “all madness” suggesting to the French emperor calling
“every constitution of government in France from 1789 to 1799 an Ideocracy.”148 For Adams,
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thinkers such as Voltaire, D’Alembert, Buffon, Diderot, Rousseau, La Lande, Frederic and
Catherine, “were all totally destitute” of common sense and sought to create a “paradise of
pleasure.” 149 Likewise in his study comparing the origins and principles of the French and the
American revolutions, German statesman Friedrich von Gentz concluded that every parallel
between both revolutions served “much more to display the contrast than the resemblance between
them”.150 In the introduction of the English edition of Gentz work, the sixth President of the United
States, John Quincy Adams, praised Gentz for having “rescued” the American Revolution from the
“disgraceful imputation of having proceeded from the same principles as that of France”.151 An
even stronger case along the same lines was made by Edmund Burke, who argued that the
American Revolution was a quest for true liberty while the French revolution was an attempt that
could only lead to violence and tyranny. Burke predicted the terror of 1792-1794 in France because
he was convinced that the French Revolution, with its pretension of making a tabula rasa of all
institutions and traditions in order to create new ones designed by enlightened authorities, could
only lead to violence and disaster.152 Such a brutal event, he believed, could have never happened in
England: “We are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has
made no progress amongst us. Atheists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers” he
said.153 According to Burke, with their attack on private property, the French revolutionaries had
destroyed the foundations of civilized life. Like all classical liberals, Burke believed that property
had to be guaranteed by law, or otherwise man would return to barbarism. He argued that “the
power of perpetuating our property in our families is one of the most valuable and interesting
circumstances belonging to it, and that which tends the most to the perpetuation of society itself.”154
Burke noted that unlike the French revolutionaries, the Americans never tried to make a
tabula rasa to create a completely new social order nor did they try to achieve de facto equality as
the Jacobins did. Quite the contrary: in Burke’s eyes the colonists were striving for freedom along
the lines of the British tradition. In a famous speech in defense of America, Burke said that the
colonists were “not only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English ideas, and on English
principles” adding that in America, “abstract liberty, like other mere abstractions, is not to be
found.”155
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Burke’s reflection brings us back to what should be understood under American liberalism
or neoliberalism in the context of this work: a set of beliefs that have their origin in classical
liberalism mostly but not only in British thinkers, and which recognizes as its central idea the
protection of individual liberty, including civil and economic liberties, and where private property is
seen as a guarantee for the decentralization of power and for the possibility of each men providing
for himself.  In this view, the destruction of private property and thereby of the free market
automatically implies the destruction of all liberties and of civilized life. As Adams argued,
property “must be secured or liberty cannot exist... the moment the idea is admitted into society,
that property is not as sacred as the laws of God, and that there is not a force of law and public
justice to protect it, anarchy and tyranny commence”.156
 For this tradition, liberty is understood in a negative sense. In Milton Friedman’s words,
“political freedom means the absence of coercion on a man by his fellow men” and is best
guaranteed under a system of private property that keeps power decentralized.157 Accordingly, the
function of the law is to protect the individual’s fundamental rights against the aggression of others.
John Locke’s conception of the role of government and his idea of liberty is one of the pillars of
American liberalism and neoliberalism. In his Second Treatise of Government, which has been
considered a theoretical justification of the Glorious Revolution,158 Locke wrote:
Liberty is to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be where
there is not law: but freedom is not, as we are told, “a liberty for every man to do what
he lists:” (for who could be free, when every other man’s humor might domineer over
him?) but a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions,
and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and
therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.159
As Francis Lieber would explain, this British-American idea of liberty, which he called
“Anglican liberty”, was opposed to the French idea of liberty or “Gallican liberty”. For Lieber,
while Gallican liberty was sought in the government, leading the French to look for “the highest
degree of political civilization in organization, that is, in the highest degree of interference by public
power”, Anglican liberty distinguishes itself “by a decided tendency to fortify individual
independence, and by a feeling of self-reliance” and a “very high degree, in a proper limitation of
156 Adams, “Discourses on Davila” p.188.
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public power”.160 In other words, Anglican liberty consists “in a proper restriction of government,
on the one hand, and a proper amount of power on the other, sufficient to prevent mutual
interference with the personal independence among the people themselves.”161 According to Lieber,
to the English and Americans, “public interference is odious.”162 Lieber conclude that when the
many constitutions the English race has produced are examined, “we almost fancy to read over all
of them the motto, ‘Hands off’”.163
As can be observed, the central implication of the classical liberal view is that the legal
framework of society has to be defined by rules of behavior that allow all individuals to pursue their
internally defined aims. Social outcomes such as a certain type of wealth distribution are excluded
from this framework precisely because the law is designed to maximize individual preferences. In
such a system, only individual purposes are attained: collective purposes never are. As James
Buchanan put it,  “to lay down a ‘social purpose, even as a target, is to contradict the principle of
liberalism itself, the principle that leaves each participant free to pursue whatever it is that remains
feasible within the limits of the legal-institutional parameters”.164Classical liberalism is thus
incompatible with any kind of philosophy that has aims other than the protection of individual
freedom. This philosophy of negative liberty that largely inspired the Chicago Boys rests on an
epistemological skepticism regarding the power of human reason for planning progress.165 In that
logic the market is conceived of as a spontaneous order that does require a framework of rules, but
other than that, as Adam Smith argued, it works best when it is left alone. Government in turn,
being necessary to protect the individual’s fundamental rights and providing public goods, is at the
same time seen as the main threat to individual liberty and prosperity. Accordingly, classical
liberalism and neoliberalism, reject the notion of unlimited democracy because it opens the door to
a majority rule that can destroy individual liberty. In other words, liberals believe that individual
liberty is a higher value than democracy having a deep mistrust in the power of authorities and
rejecting redistributive schemes. They therefore promote constitutional arrangements in order to
limit democracy. In the case of the United States, the limitation of democracy and the security of
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private property and economic liberty was the main reason for writing a constitution, an experiment
that had never been done before in history. James Madison, the main architect of the constitution
and a follower of Adam Ferguson, openly rejected unlimited democracy and the possibility of using
democratic majorities for social engineering.166 Madison’s great concern was precisely how to
prevent oppression on the public by the government, for which he designed a system of check and
balances. He also feared, as is typical in the case of neoliberals, that interest groups or “factions”
might capture the government for their own benefit. According to Buchanan, there is evidence that
Madison believed that men follow a policy of utility maximization in collective as well as private
behavior fearing that different groups could use the democratic process in order to further their own
interest.167 Along these lines Hayek argued that the American Constitution was conceived as a
protection of the people against all arbitrary actions of any branch of government.168
Several scholars have stressed the dominance of British classical liberalism in the
foundation of America. In his classic work The Liberal Tradition in America, Harvard professor
Louis Hartz argued that the American society had begun with Locke and had stayed with Locke in
virtue of an “irrational attachment “ which made it become indifferent to the challenge of
socialism.169 For Hartz, the Lockean individualism had defined the Constitution and was the
essence of American liberalism which in turn was defined by a fear of democracy and a love to
capitalism.170 Along similar lines, Carl Lotus Becker observed that the Founding Fathers were
“directly influenced” by English writers, notably by Locke, whose work had been absorbed by most
Americans “as political gospel.”171 This influence according to Becker, explained that the
Declaration of Independence, mainly drafted by Jefferson, “in its form, in its phraseology follows
closely certain sentences in Locke’s Second Treatise on Government.”172 Progressive historian
Vernon Parrington famously argued that the Framers of the American Constitution, following
British thinkers such as Adam Smith, believed in the “social, political and economic sufficiency of
laissez faire” which was translated into an attempt to give free play to the economic forces.173
Furthermore, as George Carey has observed, for Parrington, the Framers’ conception of limited
government closely resembled the idea of the “night watchman state” of modern libertarians.174
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According to Parrington, inspired in classical liberalism the Framers of the Constitution restricted
the role of government to providing defense and internal order and solving disputes among different
economic interests.  A crucial aspect in Parrington’s work is the distinction between French
egalitarian liberalism and the British tradition.  The latter, argued Parrington, had ultimately
prevailed in America with enormous consequences in institutional and political terms:
The total influence of old-world liberalism upon the America of post-war days was,
therefore, favorable to capitalistic development and hostile to social democracy.
Until the early years of the nineties the democratic spirit of French radicalism was
little understood in America, and the field remained free to the English middle-class
philosophy, which appealed equally to the agrarian and the capitalistic groups.175
Along the same lines, libertarian economist and Mont Pelerin Society member Murray
Rothbard argued that the program of the dominant republican-libertarian wing of the Founding
Fathers was
ultra-minimal government: guarding the rights of private property, free markets and
free trade, freedom of speech, press and religion, separation of government from
money, banking and the economy, allowing neither public debt nor public works...
keeping government revenue and expenditures so low as to be nearly invisible, and
generally binding down governmental Power with chains of iron, and watching
government like a hawk and with vigilance and deep suspicion.176
 It must be stressed that the view that British liberalism, especially Locke’s philosophy, was
the main intellectual driver behind the American Revolution, has been disputed most notably by
J.G.A Pocock. According to Pocock, John Locke’s philosophy was relatively insignificant among
the Founding Fathers, who were much more influenced by republicanism.177While this debate about
the intellectual influences on the Founding Fathers has continued over time, it seems clear, as many
scholars have observed, that the quest for limited government played a crucial role in the founding
of America. And there is no doubt that neoliberals worked for a revival of classical liberalism in
20th century with the aim of limiting governments in the western world. This modern version of
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classical liberalism was opposed to socialism, fascism, protectionism, structuralism, Keynesianism
and especially, as Daniel Stedman Jones noted, New Deal liberalism.178 All of them were ideologies
prone to government intervention in the economy and endorsed an idea of liberty that implied the
redistribution of wealth. Perhaps no one formulated the redistributive nature of the progressive idea
of liberty more clearly then progressive philosopher John Dewey, who argued that the “demand for
liberty is a demand for power, either for possession of powers  not already possessed or for
retention and expansion of powers that  already possessed”.179 In this view, to be free required
access to material goods and therefore the government had to redistribute wealth affecting private
property and restricting economic freedom. This idea was clearly opposed to the idea of freedom in
classical liberalism and neoliberalism which saw economic freedom as the base for all other
freedoms. As Frank Knight, one of the founders of the Chicago School would argue, economic
freedom was a necessary condition for the existence of all other freedoms such as religious
freedom, political and intellectual freedom.180
Neoliberals saw progressivism as an ideology opposed to the American intellectual tradition
which had serious institutional consequences. As legal scholar Richard Epstein has pointed out,
progressivism emerged as a reaction against classical liberalism. Before the progressive set of
beliefs became hegemonic, the dominant legal tradition in America had been classical liberalism
which stressed the dominance of private property, individual liberty and limited
government.181According to Epstein, the progressive movement achieved the most profound
domestic change in the United States from the early 20 th century onwards defining the American
institutional evolution towards a major expansion of government.182 Along the same lines professor
Randall Holcombe argued that from the beginning of the 20th century the idea that the government
had to further the economic wellbeing of the people became dominant in politics while new
interpretations of the Constitution gave credit to the notion that the government had to become a
material gratifier.183 As a consequence, the democratic principle overran the liberty principle that
the founders sought to secure. In this context, Holcombe defines liberty as the private ownership of
resources and the individual deciding what to do with them, and democracy as a system which
implies a collective approach to resources and the majority deciding upon their use.184 According to
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Professor Lawrence White, the new ideas prone to government intervention, particularly in the field
of economics, had been largely imported from Europe by scholars that had studied in Germany and
came back to the United States with the goal of challenging the prevailing free market classical
economics.185 Eventually they became extremely influential and a cornerstone of the Progressive
Era and New Deal liberalism, which turned into the natural enemy of neoliberalism.
Neoliberals in Chile were nothing but part of the worldwide conflict between the heirs of
classical liberalism of British-American origin and the diverse forms of collectivist and welfare
state theories. By adopting the economic and philosophical views that had inspired the creation of
the MPS, namely British-American liberalism, the Chicago Boys reacted against socialism and the
philosophy of government interventionism as a whole. They viewed the expansion of the welfare
state as the ultimate cause of Chile’s economic and democratic failure and the restoration of
economic freedom as the only way to return to economic health and a free and democratic society.
What is more interesting, the Chicago Boys worked on the foundations of a classical liberal
tradition that had been extremely influential in Chile from the mid 19th century until the great
depression of the 1930s.
Conclusions to Chapter I
In order to better understand the theoretical framework of this work, this chapter has shown
that there is a long tradition in economic thinking which sees beliefs as a major force of institutional
change. Specifically, Douglass North institutional analysis allows to understand how the interplay
between reality and beliefs works and what consequences it has on the institutional evolution. In the
Chilean case, this is crucial because it was a coherent set of beliefs applied under a dictatorship that
was largely responsible for the institutional evolution that took place in the 1970s and 1980s. As the
third chapter will explain, these beliefs were in turn largely the result of the feedback offered by
reality, that is to say, the previous results of alternative ideologies. More importantly, this chapter
has explained, following Douglass North, that for a radical transformation of formal institutions to
work, it must find some kind of support in the belief system or cultural heritage of the society
where the change has been made. If North is right, than this means that the Chilean free market
revolution was successful in institutional terms because there was in Chile an intellectual and
institutional tradition compatible with the new formal institutions created by the Chicago Boys. In
order to determine if such a tradition existed in Chile it is first necessary to clarify what exactly was
the intellectual tradition applied by the Chicago Boys. As this chapter argues, such tradition was
185 Lawrence White, The Clash of Economic Ideas, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012, pp.19-20.
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“neoliberalism”, which is a modern version of the classical liberalism of British-American origin.
As explained in the previous pages, the whole neoliberal project, which had in Friedrich Hayek its
main driving force, was about to revive the ideas of thinkers such as Adam Smith, John Bright,
John Locke, Scottish Enlightenment philosophers and many others.  Hayek thought that the ideas
promoted by these thinkers had found their most relevant political expression in the American
Revolution—a conclusion shared by many of the scholars cited in this chapter. This means that the
aim of the creation of the Mont Pelerin Society and also of the Chicago School was the revival of
the main intellectual tradition behind the American Revolution. The Chicago Boys were thus
followers of an old American tradition of liberty that had been largely imported from the United
Kingdom. As this chapter shows, this tradition viewed economic freedom as a necessary condition
for other freedoms, while making a strong defense of political freedom and democracy. In short,
ideas of political freedom and democracy were an essential part of neoliberalism. It is crucial to
note that for this tradition freedom in general is understood in negative terms leading to the
limitation of government activities. Democracy on the other hand is considered as a means to
enlarge freedom and not as an end in itself. As a result the classical liberal tradition and
neoliberalism were essentially opposed to diverse ideologies and doctrines including socialism,
fascism, protectionism and New Deal liberalism.The third chapter will deal with the extent to which
the Chicago Boys did indeed have a concern for political freedom and democracy in the classical
liberal tradition. So far, this work has established that ideas have an impact on institutional change,
explained why a transformation of formal institutions requires the support of belief systems and
informal institutions in order to be successful, and defined what is to be understood under
“neoliberalism”. The next chapter will establish if there was a neoliberal or classical liberal
tradition in Chile prior to the Chicago Boys’ free market revolution, which fits the description of
neoliberalism and classical liberalism presented in this chapter and, if that was the case, what
impact did that tradition have on Chile’s intellectual spheres and institutional evolution in the light
of North's theoretical framework.
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Chapter II:  The intellectual antecedents of neoliberalism in Chile
The emergence and impact of British-American liberalism in Chile's early republic
In Chile the classical liberal ideas of limited government that according to many scholars
inspired the American Revolution achieved considerable influence in the second half of the 19 th
century. This was the period of time during which the formal economic institutions and the
intellectual base for the economic policy of the newly created Chilean republic were being defined.
In the 1850s and 1860s economics became a professional study at Chile’s most influential
educational institutions. Of particular importance, if North is right, is the fact that it was a free
market classical liberal set of ideas of the same kind that would be later applied by the Chicago
Boys that set the foundations both for the professionalization of economics and the economic
institutional framework of Chile. This has long been ignored by the literature on the subject of the
Chicago Boys, which holds the view that the Chicago Boys introduced ideas and concepts that had
“no antecedent in Chilean political culture”.186 In Valdés words the Chicago Boys “introduced ideas
into Chilean society that were completely new, concepts entirely absent from the ‘market of ideas’
prior to the military coup”.187 Evidence, however, shows that the opposite is true. Classical
liberalism or neoliberalism was not a set of beliefs completely alien to Chile’s political and
intellectual tradition. Far from that. British-American liberalism was the most influential economic
philosophy in Chile for over half a century and had a lasting impact both in intellectual and
institutional terms. This is relevant from an institutional perspective because it shows that there was
a precedent in the Chilean institutional and intellectual history for the free market economic and
political reforms made by the Chicago Boys. A brief look at Chile’s economic history suffices to
understand the enormous importance of classical liberalism for the country’s institutional and
intellectual history.  
Ever since its independence from the Spanish Crown in 1818 until the early 1850s, the
Chilean economy had been run in a very intuitive way. The political elite lacked the necessary
competence to develop a modern economic policy. Works of classical economists such as Adam
186 Valdés, Pinochet Economists,  p. 12.
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Smith and Jean Baptist Say, that had been of gigantic influence in Europe and the United States,
were known but had no major influence among the Chilean policy makers. The prevailing idea was
that free trade and liberalism were good for countries that had already progressed, but not for
Chile.188 This attitude was best expressed by finance minister José Rodríguez who, arguing against
free trade in 1822, declared: “We are all liberals in all that does not tend to ruin us”.189 These beliefs
had their roots in the colonial era, where neo-mercantilism, as promoted by Spanish thinkers such as
Campomanes, Ward, and Campillo y Cossio was the dominant ideology. As Robert Will has
pointed out, these theorists were by far the most influential economic thinkers of Hispanic
America.190 According to Professor Guillermo Subercaseaux, a promoter of protectionism, the main
ideas of this mercantilist approach were government intervention in the economy, accumulation of
gold and silver, positive trade balance, government support of industries and hostility towards
foreigners.191
Interestingly, despite the dominance of protectionist ideas in the Spanish speaking world, the
economy was also in many respects more free in Chile than in many developed
countries.192Moreover, classical liberalism, even if it had not been the most prevailing worldview,
had already started to gain influence in Chile’s political and intellectual spheres already in 1819.
That year, Jean Baptist Say’s work Traité d’économie politique, a cornerstone of economic
liberalism and Thomas Jefferson’s favorite book on the subject of economics, became the  basis of a
course on political economy at the emblematic Instituto Nacional, being also compulsory for all law
students.193
In the early 1850s, liberal theories developed in the industrialized world had gained a major
influence in Chile. Eventually, the set of beliefs that conformed the ideological base of classical
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liberalism became extremely influential even among the political actors. During this time, formal
institutions were changed from a model based on protectionism into a model based on the free
market. One of the most outspoken critics of economic liberalism of the first half of the 20 th
century, Leonardo Fuentealba, complained that due to the influence of this new laissez-faire
approach, “the solution to any kind of economic problem was left to private hands” so that “the
government should under no circumstances have to hinder the free play of individual interest”
limiting its role “to secure personal safety and property rights”.194 Moreover, the Chilean state,
according to Fuentealba, became a “night watchman state”.195
Essential to the radical liberalization of Chilean economic policy and the intellectual shift
from protectionism to classical liberalism was the role played by French economist Jean Gustave
Courcelle-Seneuil. Born in 1813, Courcelle-Seneuil would dedicate his life to defend republican
ideas and economic freedom. Due to financial problems, for a time Courcelle-Seneuil worked as
manager for a metallurgic company in the city of Limoges. However, he never abandoned the
intellectual work. A prolific writer, Courcelle-Seneuil would become one of the most distinguished
proponents of French classical liberalism, which was opposed to the liberal rationalist tradition. He
became the editor of the influential Journal des économistes and a member of the prestigious
French Academy for Moral and Political Sciences. Charles Gide described Courcelle-Seneuil’s
liberal engagement in the following terms: “He was virtually the pontifex maximum of the classical
school; the holy doctrines were entrusted to him and it was his vocation to denounce and
exterminate the heretics. During many years he fulfilled his mission through book reviews in the
Journal des économistes with priestly dignity. Argus-eyed, he knew how to detect the slightest
deviation from the liberal school”.196 Cited by Karl Marx in his work Capital, Courcelle-Seneuil
would be praised by Joseph Schumpeter as someone who had “that clear grasp of economic affairs
that comes from firsthand experience” which was rather absent in modern literature.197
 Courcelle-Seneuil was hired by the Chilean government under the presidency of Manuel
Montt in 1855. Courcelle-Seneuil became, as North would say, one of the actors able to “make the
rules of the game”. His task consisted in creating and teaching the subject of political economy at
the Universidad de Chile and the Instituto Nacional as well as serving as an adviser to the minister
of finance. From those positions, Courcelle-Seneuil, who was a follower and translator of the works
of Adam Smith, William Graham Sumner and John Stuart Mill, engaged in the teaching and
194 Leonardo Fuentealba, Courcelle-Seneuil en Chile. Errores del liberalismo económico, Universidad de Chile,
Santiago, 1946, p.10.
195 Idem.
196 Quoted in: Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Views of Market Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachussets, 1992, p. 184.
197 Joseph Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis, Routledge, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006,  p. 473.
Available at: http://digamo.free.fr/schumphea.pdf  Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
46
application of free market economics and classical liberal philosophy. As an adviser to the Chilean
government, he participated in the making of several laws that liberalized the economy. Among his
most emblematic reforms were the privatization of nitrate mines, the promotion of free trade and
the establishment of a free banking system. All of them were free market reforms that reflected a
deep mistrust in government. The free banking legislation was particularly radical. For libertarian
economist Murray Rothbard, “the law of 1860 created a free bankers’ paradise in Chile. Any one or
any group could set up a bank and issue notes. There were no reserve requirements, no limits on
loans to directors, and no inspection by government agencies.”198
That the Chilean political class would approve a system like this, with almost no
government control over an issue as crucial for the economy as banking and money, shows how
influential were the early neoliberal ideas in the Chilean political culture. As Jere Behrman
observed, the free banking legislation devised by Courcelle-Seneuil was “an important symbol of
the acceptance of laissez faire by the Chilean body politic”.199 Along the same lines, Subercaseaux
argued that as a result of the influence of Courcelle-Seneuil, the liberal ideas had achieved a
“complete triumph” in Chile, leading to the adoption of the principle of liberty “without any
restrictions” particularly with regard to banking. Moreover, according to Subercaseaux, the current
of liberal ideas were so “powerful” that the finance commission of the Chamber of Deputies, even
complained that there were not enough liberties in the banking law.200
Courcelle-Seneuil’s substantial influence over policy making in Chile went hand in hand
with an overall influence on the intellectual climate of opinion and the academy.201  As Professor
Juan Pablo Couyoumdjian has observed, “Courcelle-Seneuil’s mentoring implied the creation of a
unique liberal tradition in the Chilean academy” underscoring “a period of liberal dominance in
public policy”.202 Indeed, as the first professional professor of political economy he could spread
classical liberalism more than anyone before him. He was nothing less than the founding father of
the discipline of economics in Chile. Before the arrival of Courcelle-Seneuil, political economy was
reduced to a few empiric axioms without any coherence or relation. As a result, the students did not
understand the relation between the different economic propositions they had learned even if they
had passed the exams.203 Courcelle-Seneuil came to make a radical change in the way economics
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was taught and understood, anticipating the revolution that the Chicago Boys would make in the
Chilean academy a century later. In the words of Diego Barros Arana, one of the most renowned
historians of the time: “Mister Courcelle-Seneuil taught economics as an exact science, as a positive
science in its foundations, a positive science in the manifestation of economic phenomena, and in
the consequences they originated”.204 And he did this in a way that “awoke young people’s love for
study” leaving “permanent pleasant memories in those who were lucky enough to become his
disciples”.205 A charismatic professor, in the words of Albert Hirschman, Courcelle-Seneuil
managed to instill “apostolic zeal in his students” who, in many respects, were seen as even more
radical in their liberalism than Courcelle-Seneuil himself.206
As Barros Arana noted, for Courcelle-Seneuil economics was a science of universal validity
that sought to understand the spontaneous forces of the market in order to increase the wealth of
nations. He rejected the German historical school which advocated protectionism, government
intervention and the idea that there were no universal economic laws. Thus, Courcelle-Seneuil
would make the same case of Austrian economist Carl Menger, one of the founders of the
neoliberal Austrian School of Economics, who in the second half of the 19th century attacked
thinkers like Gustav von Schmoller and other proponents of the German historical school for their
advocacy of government intervention and their rejection of economic theories of universal
validity.207 With this notion of economics as a universal science, from their positions in government
and the academy, Courcelle-Seneuil’s disciples continued the teaching and application of the
British-American classical liberal worldview. One of his followers, Miguel Cruchaga, a radical
laissez-faire economist, wrote a treatise on economics that would become the basic text book of all
students of political economy in the Universidad de Chile for decades to come.208 Another of the
most influential of Courcelle-Seneuil’s disciples was Zorobabel Rodriguez, who between 1884 and
1891 would become the main promoter of the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and Frederic
Bastiat in Chile.209 According to Zorobabel Rodriguez, who like Cruchaga would become professor
at the Universidad de Chile, the ideal from of government was that of laissez -faire and consisted in
the following:
Laissez -faire means governments that are strictly limited to guarantee that no one
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affects someone else’s right, to maintain peace, security and order in the inland and
frontiers, to manage the goods of the nation and collect the taxes in order to perform
those very important tasks. It means let doing...that men who are grownups and are in
their right minds work or rest, save or waste, make brilliant business or ruinous ones,
speak or write, move or isolate, associate, dispose of their own person and properties
as they wish. As long as there is no violence or fraud the best governments can do,
what they must do in order to stay within the sphere of their competence, is to go to
the balcony and let pass.210
Complaining about the hegemony of liberalism in the country, in 1911 conservative
historian Francisco Encina, an ardent supporter of protectionism and nationalism, complained that
Courcelle-Seneuil’s ideas taught by his disciples at the Universidad de Chile constituted “the almost
exclusive fountain from which politicians, journalists, and the rest of the elements that defined
public opinion have drunk economic ideas for almost fifty years”.211 Coinciding with Encina, Oscar
Mac-Clure has pointed out that the University of Chile was the main center of the ideological
absorption of Courcelle-Seneuil classical liberalism.212
Courcelle-Seneuil’s classical liberal economic and political philosophy
An analysis of Courcelle-Seneuil’s political and economic philosophy shows beyond any
doubt that he promoted essentially the same set of beliefs that would in later years be defended by
the Chicago Boys and neoliberals at large. Courcelle-Seneuil’s defense of the banking law provides
a useful approach to his overall libertarian economic and political philosophy. According to the
French professor, “freedom has its problems but it has action and provides useful lessons. It causes
some disasters but they can be foreseen and are to be expected.”213 This means that “if one opts for
freedom one should not build up false hopes.”214  This notwithstanding, continued Courcelle-
Seneuil, “the regime of liberty is the best and most normal one” because it corrects itself, while
privileges “can stop the first blows but they can also jeopardize the future”.215 The regime of liberty
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was inseparable from private property, which for Courcelle-Seneuil was an expression of human
nature that could “not be affected without harming others”.216Moreover, Courcelle-Seneuil argued
that “ of all the institutions established for public utility  - private property- is the most useful and it
constitutes, in a way, the base of the whole social edifice: it is the most energetic instrument of
civilization”.217 As we saw in the previous chapter the preservation of property as a guarantee for
liberty was the cornerstone of the classical liberal and neoliberal project. John Locke first
formulated this idea when he wrote that “the great and chief end...of men’s uniting into
commonwealths...is the preservation of their property”.218
 Given the utility of liberty, which Courcelle-Seneuil understood entirely in a negative
sense, all interference with it had to be prevented. The same as in the case of property, for him an
attack on one individual’s liberty did not only affect the individual that had been attacked but the
whole of society.219 Accordingly, by “securing personal liberty and the liberty to work of every
human being, society obtains more wealth and power in all branches of human activity than by
making the individual’s activity dependent on the impulse or authorization of its coercive
agents”.220 The same case for liberty had been made by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations where
the Scottish philosopher argued that as every individual “endeavors as much as he can both to
employ his capital in the support of domestic industry...every individual necessarily labors to render
the annual revenue of the society as great as he can.”221 Like Courcelle-Seneuil, Smith had argued
against government intervention in the economy:  
A statesman, who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to
employ their capitals, would ... assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only
to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so
dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy
himself fit to exercise it.222
Evidently Courcelle-Seneuil shared Smith’s idea that the system of natural liberty led by the
invisible hand of the market was best to achieve social progress. Although far from perfect, it
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created the incentives to adapt to new situations and prepare for future crises. Government
intervention in turn, even if it could prevent some evils in in the short run, would do so at the cost
of hindering progress in the long run. For the classical liberal worldview, social and political
progress were inseparable from the operation of the free market. The French professor argued that it
had been industry that had founded and consolidated human societies. Moreover, industry and
commerce had made the cities and brought about political deliberation:  “the agora and the forum
were not more than markets, and in the markets our grandparents came together to deliberate and
made collective decisions...In all times and places, commercial centers have been the source of
civilization”.223
 As was the case with most neoliberals, Courcelle-Seneuil’s political and social philosophy
derived from his economic theory. In the words of Barros Arana, Courcelle-Seneuil was
“fundamentally liberal in politics but even more so in economics.”224 Accordingly, he fought
against state interventionism “in all the manifestations that could affect political, social or economic
liberty”.225 For Courcelle-Seneuil, the main enemies of a free society were socialism and
protectionism.226 In his view, both ideologies sought to exploit the hatred of the people towards
others, based on attractive rhetoric and flawed economic theories. Contrary to the egalitarian claims
of socialists, Courcelle-Seneuil believed that a free economic system based on equality before the
law was the only one compatible with liberty and a classless society where individuals could move
up and down the social ladder without legal impediments. In such a society there were no casts or
privileges established by law. In Courcelle-Seneuil’s view, the demand for social equality was
therefore incompatible with liberty and with the very idea of equality before the law.  Men were
made unequal by nature and material inequality was nothing but the result of natural inequalities.
Therefore, material inequality was nor immoral not even inconvenient for society. Moreover, in
Courcelle-Seneuil words, inequality was “a cause of imitation and progress” because the poor,
“stimulated by necessity, make efforts to achieve comfort and then to become wealthy”.227
Consequently, inequality “far from being an evil, has been a primary cause of progress and the
central factor of civilization”.228
Courcelle-Seneuil concluded his reflection on social inequalities with the following statement:
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Let us abandon the belief that men are naturally equal and that inequality in
conditions, which is not more than the result of natural inequalities, is an evil that has
to be fought. Let us repeat with all strength that inequality has to be respected because
it is useful and because no attempt can be made to fight it without doing injustice and
without introducing artificial inequalities much more shocking than those that
originate in human nature.229
Friedrich Hayek would make the same case for inequality in the following terms:
From the fact that people are very different it follows that, if we treat them equally,
the result must be inequality in their actual position...Equality before the law and
material equality are therefore not only different but are in conflict with each other;
and we can achieve either the one or the other, but not both at the same time. The
equality before the law which freedom requires leads to material inequality. 230
For Courcelle-Seneuil, the system of liberty not only had positive economic consequences
but also deep ethical implications. In his view, a free individual was also by definition responsible
for his own life. Therefore, he was not entitled to demand from government any kind of social
assistance. In a radical defense of private property and individual freedom, Courcelle-Seneuil
argued that he who wants to be free has to “provide for himself and for his children” adding that a
free person has “no rights on the fruits of the neighbors’ labor, because if he had such a right the
neighbor would not enjoy complete liberty”.231
Philosophically, Courcelle-Seneuil also rejected the use of abstractions such as “State”,
arguing that they were instruments to make absurd ideas defensible. Likewise, entities such as
“society” and “republic” did not exist; they were abstractions and could therefore not be entitled to
any kind of rights or have any duties.232 This meant that individuals could not demand from the
“society” or the “republic” benefits of any sort. Thus, Courcelle-Seneuil not only rejected socialism
and protectionism but anything similar to a welfare state. In his view, government had a few
concrete functions: to protect individual rights, to provide for internal and external security and to
collect taxes in order to finance those functions.233 For Courcelle-Seneuil, a government that does
more than that and seeks to benefit certain groups becomes corrupt and creates the incentives for
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people not to engage in productive activities but to look for benefits from the government. Such a
process, argued Courcelle-Seneuil, makes government become sclerotic with too many bureaucrats
who live at the expense of the rest and who favor their friends at the expense of the public. In this
way, government ends up serving mostly private interest thereby undermining the whole economic
and republican system paving the way for a revolution.234
Thus Courcelle-Seneuil saw an intrusive state as a direct threat to democracy, which he
viewed as the best system of government. He argued that “the republican constitution is more
rational than any other and more appropriate to ensure social peace because it leaves open all the
changes that could be required.”235 However, for Courcelle-Seneuil democracy was not an end in
itself. It was rather a mechanism to guarantee social peace and individual liberty. He argued that
periodic elections could only perform this sanitary role if a free press and a strong civil society were
watching over political power and the democratic process. In order to secure the republican
constitution and the civilized order, Courcelle-Seneuil went as far as promoting an incipient form of
what in modern constitutional theory is called a “protected democracy”. In his opinion, “liberty
does not consist in the absence of all discipline. Newspapers and orators that rise against the bases
of civilization, that preach robbery, homicide, burning down things and civil war could be repressed
by the laws and the judicial power”.236 Thus Courcelle-Seneuil was making the case for limiting
liberty and thereby democracy in order to prevent its own destruction.
 These reflections of Courcelle-Seneuil are interesting because the same analysis of the
dangers of the expansion of government would be made by Friedman, Hayek and other neoliberals.
In particular the idea of a rent-seeking society where government serves interest groups rather than
the public would be crucial in the Chicago Boys’ explanation of failure of the Chilean democracy
and economy in 1973. The fear that what James Madison called factions could capture the state had
been a central concern for classical liberal thinkers since Adam Smith. Following this tradition,
Courcelle-Seneuil attacked Rousseau’s idea that society was the product of a social contract,
defending instead an evolutionary approach to social institutions. Almost in the same logic of
North, he said that “the essence of a constitution is always to be found in the customs and ideas of
the citizens,”237 and that no constitution could be sustained if it did not reflect the prevailing culture
of the country.238 Moreover, Courcelle-Seneuil also rejected the rationalistic idea that laws could
make individuals better in a moral sense. Writing against sumptuary laws, he argued that “when
public opinion is so corrupt as to honor theft and despise labor, when all religion is destroyed, when
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it is honorable among the great to eat and drink immoderately and to vomit in order to eat again,
laws can have no efficacy”.239
Courcelle-Seneuil’s republican and evolutionary approach was largely the result of his main
intellectual influences, namely Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, and most importantly Benjamin
Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville. This last one was particularly influential on Courcelle-
Seneuil.240 Tocqueville was also one of the main intellectual influences on Hayek’s thinking. In
Hayek’s view, Tocqueville was so connected to the British-American tradition of liberalism that he
originally proposed to name the Mont Pelerin Society the “Acton-Tocqueville Society” in honor of
both Lord Acton and Tocqueville.241 As Alan Rayn has argued, the classical liberal tradition of
Hayek was the same of John Locke, Adam Smith and Tocqueville.242 This sort of liberalism, as
Rayn himself explained, is hostile to the welfare state, promoting limited government, the rule of
law, the avoidance of arbitrary and discretionary power, “the sanctity of private property”, freedom
of contract and the individual’s responsibility for his own life.243 In addition, this liberal tradition,
does not necessarily entail a democratic doctrine because it does not unconditionally support the
majority rule.244 It was this set of beliefs spread by Courcelle-Seneuil and his followers and later on
by the Chicago Boys that achieved enormous influence on Chile’s institutional development.
 
Andrés Bello’s British -American liberal legacy
Courcelle-Seneuil’s arrival in Chile was to a large extent the result of the influence of
Andrés Bello, the founder and president of the Universidad de Chile.245 Born in Venezuela, Bello is
considered one of the most outstanding and influential intellectuals in Latin American history.246
His contributions cut across many disciplines including law, philosophy, grammar and poetry. Bello
had the greatest influence in Chile, were he spent several decades of his life serving not only as
president and founder of the Universidad de Chile but also as senator, legislator, public intellectual
and newspaper editor. His most relevant work was the Civil Code, which is the most important
legal document ever created in the history of Chile. Since its publication in 1855 it has remained
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fundamentally unchanged being the milestone of the Chilean legal tradition. Bello also decisively
contributed to create the conditions for Chile’s political stability, an achievement that was soon
admired in the rest of the region. Referring to Chile’s political exceptionalism, in 1852 at a banquet
in the port of Valparaiso, Argentinian intellectual Juan Bautista Alberdi proposed a toast to the
“honorable exception in South America”.247 Alberdi was not exaggerating. It took Chilean leaders
fifteen years to construct a constitutional government that in terms of stability and durability was
exceptional in the region.248 Moreover, as Phillip Oxhorn put it, Chile’s political development was
an “anomaly” in Latin America, showing levels of political stability that were extraordinary even by
European standards.249 Along the same lines, North, Summerhill and Weingast, argued that unlike
the rest of the region, Chile and Brazil successfully created institutions that promoted political
stability.250 A crucial institution in this respect was the 1833 Constitution, enacted after a period of
political chaos. Seeking to solve the lack of order, the 1833 Constitution had authoritarian features
and was openly supported and even probably partly drafted by Bello.251
Philosophically, Bello was deeply influenced by the liberalism of British origin. According
to Professor Agustin Squall, despite its focus on order, Bello’s concern for liberty has similarities to
the concern that John Stuart Mill showed in his famous work On Liberty.252 Overall, Bello’s aim
was to limit the power of government in order to increase individual liberty but without going so far
as to opening the way to political chaos.253 His reception of British ideas was encouraged by the
years he spent in England. There Bello was a regular attendant of the Edinburgh Review, a group
that had been founded by utilitarian thinkers in 1802 and in which Bello had the chance to meet the
father of John Stuart Mill, James Mill, as well as Jeremy Bentham.254 More importantly, Bello
widely read British authors such as John Locke and especially the proponents of the Scottish
Enlightenment, who had an important influence on his thinking.255 This aspect is crucial since the
Scottish Enlightenment tradition was one of the main intellectual sources behind the American
Revolution and a forerunner of neoliberal philosophy. Particularly James Madison, the architect of
the American Constitution was a close follower of the Scottish tradition.256 In a controversial work,
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Garry Wills has even argued that Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence reflected the ideas of the
Scottish Enlightenment more than any other philosophical school.257 This tradition included authors
like Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, David Hume, Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Ried, among
others. Overall, Bello saw the intellectual basis to build Hispanic America in the British
enlightenment tradition rather than in the French enlightenment tradition.258  Moreover, probably
influenced by the skepticism and moderation of Scottish thinkers, Bello rejected the excesses of the
French revolution and strongly opposed the Jacobin worldview. As Professor Alfredo Jocelyn Holt
has argued, Bello’s liberalism belongs to the tradition of thinkers like Tocqueville and Constant,259
both of them classical liberals along the lines of the British tradition just like Courcelle-Seneuil.
Bello himself made a clear indication of the relevance of British thinkers when he was asked to
design the curricula for the University of Caracas in the early 1820s. His aim was not only to
provide valuable material to the students of the university but also to spread an anti-Jacobin
worldview.260 It is interesting to note that among the 78 books recommended by Bello, among the
set of books for teaching social sciences, philosophy and humanities, Bello gave special importance
to authors such as William Paley, John Locke, Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart and George
Campbell.261 More interesting is Bello’s selection for the subject of political economy, where he
chose essentially classical liberal economists, including Adam Smith, Jean Baptist Say and David
Ricardo.262This was no surprise. In the sphere of economy, Bello had been a proponent of liberal
doctrines, particularly free trade, which was the main issue debated during his time. In the words of
historian Jaime Eyzaguirre, Bello “loved political and economic liberty”.263 Moreover, Bello had
read Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations with great care, which had been written by the Scottish
philosopher precisely with the aim of demolishing protectionist doctrines.264 Following Smith’s
doctrine, Bello himself would ferociously attack protectionist attempts in Chile. A famous case
occurred in 1831, when the province of Santiago came up with a plan to restrict foreign imports
invoking the standard argument about the need to protect local jobs and local industries. Bello
reacted with an article in which he declared that the old “prohibitionist system” was “absurd” and
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contrary to sound economic principles.265 In order to refute the protectionists, Bello argued with
concrete examples showing how free trade had made the people wealthier, especially the poor
people. According to Bello, the new protectionist measures would only have the effect of enriching
a few industrialists while impoverishing the mass of consumers.  Bello went on sustaining that
liberty had brought the Chilean public a comfort unknown to them before.266Bello concluded with a
devastating attack on protectionists:
If our industries had declined with the introduction of foreign manufactures, if we had
closed our factories, if we had had to abandon our own production to use the foreign
one, if we saw at least one sign of backwardness in our craftsmen, then we could
adopt such an insidious and damaging system to our mechanical arts; a system that
has made of politicians the destroyers of order and in which governments become
primi ocupantis. But everywhere we see progress; factories are created,
improvements are invented and manufacture is multiplied.267
Bello’s predilection for economic liberty was also crystallized in his Civil Code. The Civil
Code is of interest from an institutional and ideological perspective because it provided the
framework for all interactions involving private people in Chile until today. It also became the
benchmark for legal philosophy in private law and has left an imprint on generations of scholars,
lawyers and judges defining Chile’s legal culture and private law institutions which are crucial for
the functioning of the market order. One of the most revolutionary aspects of the Civil Code was its
new property regime. Before the Civil Code, property was regulated and conceived of from a more
collectivist perspective, which had been inherited from medieval Europe. As Felipe Westermeyer
has pointed out, the strong liberal economic influence of the Civil Code opened a previously closed
space to the individual.268 Among the central principles inspiring Bello’s regulation of property
were the free circulation of wealth, the almost absolute right of the individual over his own
property, freedom of contract and equality before the law. These were the fundamental elements
through which the Civil Code exalted individualism in private market interactions.269As Mauricio
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Tapia has pointed out, liberty was the main philosophical inspiration of the Civil Code.270 There is
almost absolute freedom of contract and no differences made between persons. There are no slaves
in a disadvantageous position or aristocrats who enjoy special privileges. In Bello’s code all men
and women are equal with only a few exceptions pertaining to family law. As was explained in the
first chapter, this idea of absolute equality before the law is a cornerstone of classical liberalism. It
is not only an ethical imperative but also, as North explains, a necessary condition for the proper
functioning of the market which requires the protection of property and the freedom of contract of
all its participants without distinction.  For Bello, free will, that is to say, the idea that all people are
capable of making free decisions, was the cornerstone of private contractual law. Equally important
is the idea that every person is responsible for his actions and is always obliged to repair the
damage caused to another person.271Liberty, responsibility and property are all inseparable pillars of
Bello’s system. Based on them, Bello’s established a completely capitalist system of private law.
Furthermore, in the words of Professor Luis Diaz Müller, in Bello’s Code private property is
“absolute, intangible and sacred”.272 Philosophically, Bello’s Code crystallized the idea that
property is the extension of an individual’s personality. This idea, formulated by Locke with more
emphasis than any other thinker, had gigantic consequences for Chile: it ended the barriers of the
feudal system paving the way for the free circulation of wealth, free trade and the private
enterprise.273
Along with his good friend Courcelle-Seneuil, without any doubt Bello made one of the
greatest contributions to the promotion of liberalism in Chile. From an economic perspective, his
philosophy was clearly classical liberal along the lines of Adam Smith’s. But given the fact that
Bello was not an economist and that his main legacy was in the legal field and the humanities, he
never became the target of protectionists and other scholars and politicians seeking to debunk
liberalism. That target was Courcelle-Seneuil. This does not mean however, that Bello did not make
his own intellectual and institutional contribution to spread British-American liberalism. As we
have seen, Bello’s Civil Code was largely inspired by the same classical liberal philosophy
followed by Courcelle-Seneuil. It is hard to exaggerate the relevance of Bello’s Civil Code in
shaping Chile’s legal culture and the impact of that culture on the way the Chilean society
approached institutions like private property, freedom of contract and others. If North is right about
the importance of beliefs and the cultural heritage for a  country’s institutional evolution, than there
is little doubt that early neoliberalism survived not only in the intellectual influence that people like
Bello and Courcelle-Seneuil achieved on their Chilean followers, but also through the institutions
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created by the Civil Code and its capitalist approach. This tradition continued to exist despite the
apparent extinction that liberal ideas underwent particularly from the 1930s onwards. The fact that
liberalism was dormant and not dead explains the liberal reaction and, eventually, the rebirth of
neoliberalism through the Chicago Boys who, with their free market revolution,  reinstated
institutions of the type Courcelle-Seneuil had  advocated, including a Constitution that incorporated
the protection of private property and freedom of enterprise along the lines of  Bello’s  Civil Code.
Conclusions to Chapter II
This chapter has shown that there was indeed a classical liberal tradition in Chile prior to the free
market revolution of the Chicago Boys—a tradition that was extremely influential both in
economic and institutional terms. This is important because according to North’s theoretical
framework, the existence of this tradition could be seen as an important element for the
institutional success of the reforms made by the Chicago Boys. The chapter has focused mainly
on the legacy of two emblematic figures of Chile’s intellectual history, namely Jean Gustave
Courcelle-Seneuil and Andrés Bello. As the prior analysis shows, both were followers of the
British-American tradition of liberalism and created formal rules as well as an intellectual
climate with the aim of limiting the power of government especially in economic affairs. In
particular  Courcelle-Seneuil was a direct heir of thinkers such as Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill
and Benjamin Constant rejecting the French rationalist liberal tradition. As this chapter shows,
his ideas on democracy, freedom, the role of government and equality, among others, perfectly
fit the description of neoliberalism and classical liberalism developed in the previous chapter.
This French professor was thus responsible for developing an early form of neoliberalism in
Chile which despite its later decline, remained present in the intellectual spheres for decades to
come. The fact that the intellectual rivals of Courcelle-Seneuil were many of the same that
neoliberals would confront a century later, namely, socialism, protectionism and statist ideas
such as the ones promoted by the German historical school, confirms the ideological identity of
Courcelle-Seneuil and his followers and later neoliberals.  As for Bello, his legacy is crucial from
the perspective of North. With his capitalist-liberal revolution in the system of private law, Bello
changed the most important rules of the game in the direction of free markets, private property
and personal responsibility. In addition, he contributed to the intellectual classical liberal legacy
especially through his contributions in the field of legal theory, but also through the many
disciples that he left in the country. 
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In short, the British-American tradition of liberty existed in Chile long before the Chicago
Boys made their free market revolution.  What is more, this tradition was the most influential in
terms of institutional and intellectual development for more than half a century. Therefore, the
standard argument that the Chicago Boys introduced ideas that were alien to Chile`s political
culture and intellectual history is not true. The next chapter, applying North’s theory of
institutional change, will analyze the decline and reemergence of this British-American liberal
tradition through the work of the Chicago Boys and will explain to what extent, if at all, ideas of
political liberty and democracy  were part of the institutional project.
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Chapter III: The rise of the Chicago Boys
 The ideological reaction against Chile’s early neoliberalism
The influence of liberal thinkers like Bello and Courcelle-Seneuil on Chile’s intellectual and
institutional evolution cannot be understated. Historian Gonzalo Vial has pointed out that until the
end of the 19th century classical liberalism was indeed the official doctrine of Chile’s governing
elite and intellectual class.274 But it is also true that throughout the 19th century there was an ardent
defense of protectionism by different intellectuals and interest groups. In particular, the economic
elites advocated protectionism when it served their interest.275 The shift in market opportunities
played a crucial role in the rise of agricultural protectionism for example.276  A grater factor in the
demise of early neoliberalism was the crisis of the free banking system that had been introduced in
1860. As Rothbard observed, this episode was used to discredit other of Courcelle-Seneuil’s liberal
ideas and reforms such as free trade and privatizations.277 Moreover, according to Hirschman,
Courcelle-Seneuil became the scapegoat of all Chilean economic problems.278 As North explained
reality-feedback can lead to false conclusions and thereby to mistaken ideas. The failure of the
banking system helped paved the way for the return of the protectionist and nationalist ideas
imported from Europe that would eventually become hegemonic. Mostly developed by the German
historical school of economics, the new economic nationalism sought to debunk classical liberalism
and its individualistic approach.279 John Maynard Keynes referred to this new world trend in his
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1926 work The end of laissez-faire, observing that in Europe there was “a latent reaction, somewhat
widespread, against basing society to the extent that we do upon fostering, encouraging, and
protecting the money-motive of individuals”.280
In Chile, Subercaseaux, who would become Chile’s finance minister in 1907, observed that
due to these new anti-laissez-faire ideas, political economy no longer considered protectionism as
“contrary to the natural laws of economic order”.281 For Subercaseaux, who defined himself as a
nationalist reacting against the liberal-individualist school,282 the impact of this new intellectual
development had contributed to debunk what he called “liberal absolutism”, clearing the way for
“the evolution of the economic policy of the American republics towards nationalism and
protectionism”.283 Taking the ideas of Friedrich List, Gustav von Schmoller and other thinkers, this
new doctrine criticized free trade arguing that it had prevented the inward development of the
country.284 For Fuentealba, classical liberals did not understand that free trade was “necessary and
convenient for industrialized nations”, but could only produce “fatal consequences” in a country
like Chile.285 In the view of the critics of liberalism, economic laws had a national component and
were not universally applicable. Accordingly, if free trade was good for developed nations,
protectionism was the best way to foster the domestic industry and to promote the Chilean
economic development. Along those lines Subercaseaux argued that one of the central principles for
organizing the republic was a “determined protection of the national industry and the promotion of
all productive sources by the most effective means at the disposal of the state”.286 For this view, in
order to be able to compete with those industries of more advanced nations, infant industries had to
achieve a critical size. As List put it when refuting Adam Smith and Jean Baptist Say “a new
unprotected manufacturing power cannot possibly be raised up under free competition with a power
which has long since grown in strength and is protected in its own territory”.287 Interestingly
enough, after the period of liberal dominance, these new nationalist and protectionist views became
more influential in Chile than in any other country in Latin America.288
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  Economic nationalism went hand in hand with the emergence of collectivist ideas. One of
the main influences in this respect was German historian and philosopher Oswald Spengler, who
became the most influential thinker on Chilean conservative intellectuals and politicians for much
of the 20th century.289 As Juan Enrique Uribe observed in 1934, Spengler was by far “one of the
German intellectuals who awakes more interest in the Spanish speaking world.”290 At the same
time, new movements such as Communism and Social Christianity contributed to undermine the
period of classical liberal dominance.  The Communist Party, founded in the early 20th century
sought to “put an end to slavery and exploitation by international capitalism and the domestic
oligarchy” in accordance to “the principles of scientific socialism formulated by Marx, and Engels
and applied by Lenin and Stalin and defended by the Communist International”.291 Social
Christianity was in turn a form of populism that was not that different from European fascist-
populist movements.292 It provided the intellectual basis for the creation of a new political
movement that would define Chilean politics: the falangistas. The name was taken from the fascist
Falange which was the nationalist party that had been founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera in
Spain a few years earlier.293 The political philosophy of falangistas was defined by a rejection of
individualism and capitalism. Following a collectivist approach, they conceived of society as an
organic whole that was linked by Christian solidarity.294 Their aim was to “redeem the proletarians”,
who were the social segment that suffered “the conditions created by capitalism”.295  Their most
important leader and later president of Chile, Eduardo Frei Montalva, also a follower of Spengler,
would go as far as to declare that “the progressive liquidation of the capitalist system of production
and the rise of a new historical age” were  an “indisputable reality”.296
These new ideologies played an important role in the institutional shift from the free market
approach to state interventionism which had started in 1916 and 1921 with protectionist laws
promoted by conservative President Juan Luis Sanfuentes.297 This was also the time in which the
welfare state in Chile started to emerge. According to United Nations data if in 1905 the Chilean
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government spent only 1.1% of GDP on welfare programs, by 1930 it had more than doubled.298 As
a share of total government spending, welfare spending increased from 6.6% in 1920 to 18.1% in
1930 and over 40% in the 1960s.299 The maximum was reached during the government of the UP in
1972, when 53% of all government spending was destined to finance welfare programs.300 As North
has explained, a key factor in defining institutional evolution is the “sense of fairness” with regard
to the economic system. In Chile, according to progressive economist Jose Pablo Arellano, the rise
of the welfare state was largely the result of a change in the climate of opinion which did not see
social problems as a private charity issue anymore but as a problem of justice.301 In other words, if
Arellano is right, the sense of fairness among political actors, opinion leaders and the population
changed in favor of more government, thus departing from the previous classical liberal views.
A critical problem, especially during the new welfare era, was inflation.  This would become
one of the main preoccupations of the Chicago Boys who saw Chile experiencing higher inflation
levels than the international average for almost a century with serious social and political
consequences.302 Indeed, rising prices in the 1920s not only posed a problem to investment but also
to social stability. According to the Universidad Católica economists Carlos Clavel and Pedro
Jeftanovic, between 1914 and 1920 the average cost of living in Santiago increased by 56%.303 By
1924 it had increased 72% and by 1929, 87%.304 With declining purchasing power, the Chilean
workers and their families intensified protests and strikes. In response the Chilean government
looked for technical advice abroad. This time, the authority invited was Princeton Professor Edwin
Walter Kemmerer, an American classical liberal economist who later on opposed New Deal fiscal
policies. Kemmerer, who was known as the “money doctor”, believed that a strong gold standard
was essential to limit the government powers to confiscate the wealth of the people through
inflation. In his classic work on the history of the gold standard Kemmerer argued that the framers
of the American Constitution had followed Adam Smith’s advice regarding the need to limit the
power of government to debase the currency.305
Although the means to achieve a stable currency strongly differ, the philosophy of hard
money and its need in order to prevent the over expansion of government was shared by Courcelle-
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Seneuil, the later Klein & Saks mission, the Chicago Boys and had been long a concern of classical
liberals in general. Perhaps Ludwig von Mises put the need for hard money more clearly than any
other neoliberal when he argued that “the gold standard was the world standard of the age of
capitalism, increasing welfare, liberty, and democracy, both political and economic.”306 For Mises,
“the classical or orthodox gold standard alone is a truly effective check on the power of the
government to inflate the currency. Without such a check all other constitutional safeguards can be
rendered vain”.307
Armed with these ideas, Kemmerer arrived in Chile in 1925 enjoying wide support from the
Chilean labor organizations, government officials and business class.308 Despite the initial success
of the establishment of a gold standard, the fiscal irresponsibility of the Chilean political class led
the country to abandon once again the road to sound money, putting an end to Kemmerer's reforms
and opening a new era of inflation and social instability.309 But the liberal institutions were far more
undermined by the onset of the Great Depression, which caused the value of Chilean exports to
plummet almost 90% from its 1929 levels.310 The reaction of the Chilean government, along with a
substantial increase in spending, was a radicalization of protectionism and government
intervention.311 Chile was thus no exception to the wave of protectionism and nationalism that
shook the world during the 1930s.312 With the passing of time, and unlike other countries, these
protectionist policies were not reversed. Instead, the Chilean trade system became increasingly
complex and inefficient, a situation that lasted until the breakdown of the economic system in
1973.313
During the depression Chile also experienced severe political turmoil leading to the creation
of the “Socialist Republic of Chile” in 1932. The Socialist Republic was a short episode in a
country submerged in economic and social chaos. Its self-declared aim was to “overthrow a
reactionary oligarchic government” that had only served the “interest of foreign capitalists”.314 The
revolutionaries also declared to seek the “economic liberation of the country and the triumph of
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social justice” through the control of the economy.315 This could only be achieved by liberating
Chile from “international capitalism”.316
Despite its short life, the Socialist Republic was important from an intellectual and
institutional perspective. As Drake noted, from 1932 onwards, socialism in a populist version
became increasingly attractive for the masses, changing the electoral spectrum for decades to
come.317 Moreover, according to Drake the Socialist Republic itself reflected the dramatic shift in
the climate of opinion towards socialism, which became a new fashion.318 More importantly, this
shift towards socialism during the 1930s, not only implied a radicalization of leftwing political and
intellectual movements but also moved the traditional right wing parties to definitely abandon the
classical liberal philosophy they had previously endorsed in order to promote a paternalist and
corporatist political project that could offer an alternative to populist socialism.319
 As a result of all these economic and intellectual changes, after the Depression,
neoliberalism was marginalized and protectionism, welfare state liberalism and Keynesianism
became the new dominant ideas.320 These ideas achieved a strong influence through the work of
Keynes’ most influential Latin American follower, Raul Prebisch who was known as the “Latin
American Keynes”.321Keynes had been a promoter of protectionism, economic nationalism and
large scale government intervention giving credence to the old doctrines developed by nationalist
economists322. In an article defending economic nationalism Keynes illustrated his critical position
towards the free market and classical liberal theories in the following terms: “The decadent
international but individualistic capitalism, in the hands of which we found ourselves after the War,
is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous —and it doesn't
deliver the goods”.323 The alternative, for the British economist, had to be a government-directed
economy which included protectionism, inflationary policies, strong regulation of capital markets
and massive government spending. It is telling of the anti-liberal bias of these ideas that the same
Keynes in the prologue to the German edition of his famous General Theory of Interest, Money and
Unemployment, published in 1936, argued that his theory was “much more easily adapted to the
conditions of a totalitarian state, than is the theory of the production and distribution of a given
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output produced under conditions of free competition and a large measure of laissez-faire.”324
If North is right about the interplay between ideas and institutions, than the new wave of
ideas have to be taken into account in order to understand what happened later with the Chicago
Boys. Prebisch, who assumed the direction of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) in 1950, followed Keynes in his critique of free market capitalism. But unlike
Keynes, Prebisch believed that economic laws were not universal. This would become a central
factor in the clash of ideas that had been going on since the mid-19 th century between the liberals in
the classical tradition and protectionists  If Courcelle-Seneuil, anticipating the Chicago Boys, had
argued that political economy could not have a national character because sciences “could not have
another fatherland but the truth”,  as it was absurd to conceive of a “national mathematics or a
national physics”,325 Prebisch argued that “one of the central flaws of general economic theory” in
developed nations was “its false sense of universality”.326 Following this approach, Prebisch
developed the theory of “structuralism”. Structuralism argued that industrialized nations with their
exports of technology were to blame for the underdevelopment of Latin American countries which
exported raw materials of less value.327 Economic development, Prebisch believed, was the result of
technological advance and industrialization. The structural problem arose because the periphery
exported cheap raw materials while the industrialized countries exported more sophisticated goods
of higher value. And since demand was more elastic for primary goods than it was for more
advanced goods, the result were permanent trade imbalances. This, according to Prebisch, led to a
sustained drain of resources from the periphery to the industrialized countries perpetuating
economic under- performance in Latin America. In this logic he argued, it was clear that while the
centre had fully retained the benefits of its technical progress the countries, the periphery had
transferred the benefits of its own technical progress.328 The solution to the structural problem,
according to Prebisch, was large-scale government intervention in the economy and what became
known as import substitution (ISI). ISI implied the restriction of free trade as well as an active
engagement of the government in business activities in order to foment the inward industrial
development of Latin American countries. The rationale was very similar to the one applied by the
German historical school of Von Schmoller and List, namely, that by fostering the industrial
development of the country through subsidies, government-owned enterprises and import
restrictions, Latin American countries would develop enough to be competitive with developed
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countries.  As had been the case in the past between classical liberals and the German historical
school, the Prebisch doctrine clashed with the free trade and non- interventionist philosophy
defended by neoliberals.  According to Celso Furtado, Prebisch contributions always implied a
criticism to laissez-faire.329 Prebisch himself would declare that after the Great Depression he had
abandoned the belief in free trade “as well as in the positive results of the international division of
labor” so much advocated by Adam Smith.330 Some authors have observed that Prebisch completely
rejected economic liberalism and firmly embraced government intervention.331
 In general, ECLA promoted Prebisch’s interventionist philosophy with the explicit aim of
debunking classical liberalism. As Luis Ortega has explained, ECLA was strongly influenced by
ideologies critical to liberalism that had emerged in the early 20th century, and formulated “a
relentless critique of the orthodox liberalism of the 19th century, in particular of its assumption
regarding the external sector and the role of the state”.332  Confirming this view, in an interview
given in 2000, Professor Osvaldo Sunkel, a former leading member of ECLA, described the group
of people related to ECLA as a “group of center-leftwing intellectuals and social scientists” who
believed that “the government was the solution to every problem”.333 It is important to stress at this
point, that ECLA was not a group of unorganized unprofessional leftwing intellectuals
experimenting with the economy. Far from that: among its members ECLA had highly trained
economists and social scientists who had a coherent and fully developed vision of society and a
clear idea of how economic policy should be designed. It was therefore as serious an intellectual
project as the classical liberal one, only on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum.
 In Chile the attack on British-American liberalism was led by one of the most emblematic
members of ECLA's brain trust: Professor Anibal Pinto Santa Cruz who in 1959 wrote an
influential book explicitly attacking Courcelle-Seneuil and economic liberalism.334 Pinto argued that
the French professor had formed the first generation of Chilean economists who had ruled “almost
without resistance” defining “the central criteria for public decisions”.335 According to Pinto, the
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fundamental thesis of this economic liberalism was an “absolute absence of government and of all
official regulations in the free play of natural laws”.336  Jorge Ahumada, one of the first Chileans in
getting a degree from Harvard University and main economic adviser to Frei’s government, made
the same case against liberalism in 1958, arguing that the solution to the economic and social
problems of Chile consisted in more government intervention.337
If ideas as North explains, have an impact on the institutional evolution then the ideas
promoted by ECLA certainly had a substantial impact on the whole of Latin America. Several
scholars have accounted for this influence. For Emanuel Adler, ECLA “influenced the Latin
American intellectuals, who later influenced politicians and also influenced politicians directly”.338
Along the same lines, Joseph Love observed that in the 1980s, the Prebisch thesis was probably “the
most influential idea of economy and society ever to come out of Latin America”339. For Silva,
ECLA achieved a “clear intellectual hegemony in the early sixties among economists, many of
whom occupied government positions”.340 ECLA's influence would become so overwhelming that
Willard Beaulac, former US ambassador to several Latin American countries, warned in 1980 that
ECLA had become “the most powerful single voice in the economic field” in Latin America adding
that “its influence among those who wield political power has been great”.341 According to
Professor Vittorio Corbo, of all Latin American countries Chile was the one where ECLA's ideas
had the greatest impact.342 Moreover, as Verónica Montesinos observed, between the 1950s and
1970s, Santiago became a vibrant intellectual centre for antiliberal ideas.343
The Cold War, political disorder and the ultimate attack on British-American liberalism
The new protectionist, socialist and nationalist ideas rose in the extremely polarized
political and ideological context of the Cold War. From a philosophical and institutional
perspective this is important because, as Jussi Hanhimäki and Odd Arne Westad explained, far
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from being a mask of real interest, in the Cold War ideology was in itself a crucial interest.344
Moreover, according to Hanhimäki and Westad, it is precisely because the Cold War was
fundamentally a confrontation of “ideas, values and belief systems”, that it was unique among
conflicts.345 This conflict between belief systems and ideas took place in Chile with particular
intensity. A clear case that illustrates the radicalization of ideological positions due to the
influence of the Cold War is the way in which structuralism, developed by ECLA in the late
1940s and the 1950s, was used as the base for a Marxist theory of development called
“dependency theory.”346 By adding Lenin’s approach to the relation between poor and developed
countries to structuralism, dependency theorists basically argued that poverty in the third world
was caused by the exploitation of core countries through international capitalism and
imperialism.347  According to the founder of dependency theory, André Gunder Frank —a
German American Marxist economist with a PhD from Chicago University who became
professor at the Universidad de Chile and adviser to Salvador Allende— underdevelopment in
Latin America was “generated by the very same process that generated economic development:
the development of capitalism itself”.348 Consequentially, Latin America was poor because “of
centuries long participation in the process of world capitalist development”.349 Particularly Chile,
according to Frank, had been incorporated “fully into the expansion and development of the
world mercantile and later industrial capitalist system”.350 For Frank, the only way to brake Latin
American dependency and misery was by making an armed socialist revolution.351  
The idea of dependency had long been present in ECLA’s analysis of the dichotomy
between periphery and center.352 Among the main proponents of dependency theory were Osvaldo
Sunkel and Celso Furtado, both ECLA members who, observing economic stagnation despite of
the implementation of ECLA’s policies, became even more radical in their positions.353
Unsurprisingly the new Marxist interpretation of underdevelopment and its large impact on the
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political and intellectual Latin American world posed a direct threat to American ideology and
interests. According to Hal Brands “dependency theory allowed Latin American politicians to
blame underdevelopment and poverty on external factors rather than acknowledging their own
failures or confronting regressive economic structures”.354 These external factors were mainly
American capitalism.
Under such a climate of opinion, the growing threat of revolutionary movements in Latin
America led the US government to develop a counter revolutionary strategy in order to prevent
other Latin American countries from following Cuba’s path.355 At the time when dependencia
started to become fashionable among Latin American intellectuals and politicians, President
Kennedy launched his famous Alliance for Progress.  Kennedy defined the program as “a vast
cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of
the American people for homes, work and land, health and schools”.356  The rationale behind it was
that only if material misery had been eliminated could political freedom and a stable democracy
emerge, thereby minimizing the threats of Marxist revolutionary movements. According to
Kennedy, the poor nations in Latin America and other regions of the world were “without
exception under Communist pressure”.357 In that context, the fundamental task of programs like the
Alliance for Progress was to make “a historical demonstration that ...economic growth and political
democracy can develop hand in hand.”358  In practice, the Alliance for Progress was a sort of
Marshall Plan for Latin America. It destined 20 billion dollars in grants and loans over a period of
ten years. In exchange, Latin American countries had to commit themselves to make reforms in
order to redistribute fairly the wealth created by economic growth. These reforms included an
improvement of the use of land, the reduction of corruption and an increase in economic
collaboration.359  
 Philosophically however, the Alliance for Progress promoted the same antiliberal ideology
of ECLA. This was due to the fact that the intellectual godfather of the Alliance program was not
Kennedy or any of his advisers but Raul Prebisch.360 Prebisch would recall decades later that
Kennedy himself had admitted that the intellectual basis for the Alliance for Progress were the ideas
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of ECLA.361 Prebisch’s influence was so decisive that he managed to get the charter to incorporate
the complete ECLA program, including many proposals that had been strongly opposed by
Washington. Among them were land and tax reform, social change and long term economic
planning within mixed economies.362  In Chile the program was massively implemented by Eduardo
Frei's government after he became president in 1964.  By then Frei was a member of the Christian
Democratic Party, which had been founded in 1958 after a fusion between the Social Christian
Conservative party, the National Christian party and the Falange Nacional. Like the falangistas, the
political philosophy of some of some of the most important Christian Democratic leaders was
deeply anti-American and anti-capitalist. As Federico Gil put it, the political philosophy of some of
the leaders of the Christian-Democrats “was not so far from Marxism...they agreed with Marx that
private capital is the root of most evils and therefore support the abolition of private property”.363 A
proof of this intellectual anti liberal bias is that, although less radical, Frei’s program for the
presidential election of 1964 was very similar to the platform of the Marxist coalition FRAP
(Popular Action Front) led by candidate Salvador Allende.364 At the time the view prevailed that
Chile could become a Soviet satellite if the FRAP won the election of 1964. As Thomas Wright has
pointed out, given the FRAP’s alignment with Cuba and the Soviet Union, the 1964 election was
indeed a referendum on the Cuban revolution.365 Consequently, Frei had the full support of the
United States government.366 Frei, called his government program a “revolution in liberty” which
he believed could be carried out within the framework of constitutional democracy.367 One of the
crucial parts of Frei’s revolution was the radicalization of the agrarian reform initiated by his
predecessor Alessandri. Inspired by ECLA, Frei argued that the government had to control
individual interest in “order to benefit the collective”.368 This led to massive confiscations of land
and large scale government intervention. Observing Chile’s evolution at the time, Brazilian author
Fabio V. Xavier Da Silveira warned in 1967 that the Christian Democrats promoted “class warfare”
and the transformation of social structures.369  He added that Frei’s revolution was socialist in
nature but not radical enough to satisfy the genuine socialist.370 Therefore, according to Da Silveira,
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Frei’s successor would be someone more extreme, a real Marxist that would in fact deliver what
was demanded from the left and the radical Christian democratic world.371 Salvador Allende would
indeed succeed Frei as President of the Republic.
As for the economy, neither Frei nor the Alliance for Progress managed to be successful.
Frei’s government was characterized by low economic growth, high inflation and persistent
unemployment.372 Meanwhile, ideological polarization increased creating what North, Summerhill
and Weingast called “political disorder”. This is a situation in which a large portion of a society
fears for its lives, families, properties or sources of livelihood and wealth.373 In such a context,
transactions costs rise making it impossible for the market to work properly. Political order is thus,
in the words of North, Summerhill and Weingast “a necessary condition for political and economic
development.”374According to North, political order is also necessary for “the establishment and
maintenance of the variety of conditions underlying freedom of person and property we associate
with a consensual democratic order”.375 Thus, according to North, democracy cannot be sustained
without political order.
During the UP government, political disorder increased dramatically disrupting existing
relationships in political and economic markets. In a survey conducted by Ercilla, a conservative
magazine, in August 1972, 83% of the people said the country was experiencing a climate of
violence.376 This perception was shared across the social spectrum with 98% of the high income
people and 75% of the low income people saying Chile was under a climate of violence.377
Moreover, according to the same survey 60% of the Chilean population perceived the project of the
UP government as a threat.378 As noted by Georgetown professor and former Barak Obama’s
adviser Arturo Valenzuela, the authority of the UP government was severely undermined because it
was seen by the population as incapable of containing the escalating violence and, more
importantly, it was held responsible by a substantial part of the population for feeding the climate of
violence.379
The political disorder of the early 1970s is crucial to understand the institutional project of
the Chicago Boys, the design of the 1980 Constitution and the authoritarian regime of general
Pinochet. As North, Wallis and Weingast observed, human beings pay considerable attention to the
threats of violent physical action and use their beliefs to evaluate if those threats of violence are
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credible or not.380 This means that violence and the perception of violence has a direct influence on
the way people understand the social order around them. In the case of the Chicago Boys, there is
no doubt that they were deeply influenced by the perception that the country was on the verge of a
violent revolution, a civil war or a socialist dictatorship. Many Chileans at the time saw Pinochet’s
military regime as the lesser evil. In the words of former senator Francisco Bulnes: “We had no
choice. We were heading into either a military or Marxist dictatorship. At that moment a military
dictatorship seemed the lesser evil”.381 Even the Catholic Church, which throughout the 1960s had
promoted ideologies prone to socialism and would remain a strong opponent to the military
government during the 1970s and 1980s, welcomed the coup declaring that it had liberated Chile
“from a Marxist dictatorship that seemed inevitable and irreversible”.382
Polarization was fed by the rhetoric of right wing and left wing political parties and actors,
which became increasingly radical from the late 1960s onwards. This aspect is crucial because as
North, Wallis and Weingast explain, revolutions are one of the main sources of political disorder.
Typically, revolutionary movements involve a group of political entrepreneurs who develop a new
belief system which is in fundamental contradiction with the existing order.383 Once these new
beliefs are accepted by key decision makers, the ground is ready for radical action.384 This was the
case of Chile where socialist revolutionary movements sought to end what they viewed as the
capitalistic-democratic society. An essential document with this regard was the Socialist Party’s
national convention program of 1967 in which the party declared its intention to create a
“revolutionary state” by violent means.385 Similar statements about the necessity of creating a
Cuban style regime and annihilating the class enemy in Chile were made consistently by UP leaders
before and after the presidential election of 1971.386 Leftwing and rightwing paramilitary groups
and terrorist organizations also increased political disorder. The largest and most active terrorist
group was the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). Shortly after its foundation in
Concepcion in 1965, with the aim of destroying what they viewed as the Chilean capitalist system,
the MIR engaged in violent actions such as kidnappings and torture, target assassination, detonation
of explosives in public places, bank robberies and attacks on private firms, all of which resulted in
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the death and injury of civilians and members of the police forces.387 The MIR had ties with other
similar Latin American organizations serving as an instrument for Castrismo in Chile. According to
former Allende’s ambassador to Cuba Jorge Edwards, it is likely that one of the greatest moments
of Castrista interventionism in South America occurred in Chile under the UP government through
the MIR.388
Illustrative regarding the credibility of the socialist revolutionary threat, is a report written
by US ambassador to Chile Edward Korry in August 1970 before Allende became president of the
republic. In the report entitled “Fidelism without Fidel”, Korry informed Washington that the
Unidad Popular was the same kind of “uneasy alliance between revolutionary nationalists and
orthodox Communists that Castro has established in Cuba”.389 Korry went on arguing that “with the
same basic forces and the same ideological commitments at work, we foresee a repetition of the
Cuban experience, at least in programmatic terms if not in the element of revolutionary style.”390
Kissinger shared Korry’s assessment.391 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union provided massive support to
the Chilean left.392 As former sub director of the KGB General Nikolai Leonov explained, “Russia
did the most it could” to help the UP government.393 This included not only “political and moral
support” but credits for over 100 million dollars that were never repaid and a “loan” to deliver
Soviet armament that according to Leonov, “no one ever imagined” calling in.394 KGB files also
show that President Allende’s campaign received substantial financial support from the Soviet
Union and that Allende himself received personal payments from the KGB in exchange for
information. According to KGB files, Allende “stated his willingness to co-operate on a confidential
basis and provide necessary assistance because he considered himself a friend of the Soviet
Union”.395
It was in this polarized ideological and political context, that the UP government started its
socialist economic revolution. A revolution that did not achieve the desired results. According to
Chicago Boys critic Ricardo French Davis it is “beyond dispute that in 1973 substantial
macroeconomic imbalances prevailed, that had to be corrected” and that the economy was “over
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intervened with excessive microeconomics controls over private business”.396 Along the same lines,
in his classic work on the UP government Princeton professor Paul Sigmund explained that the UP
economic policies that boosted economic growth during the first year were fundamentally wrong
and carried the seeds of its own destruction.397 Eventually, the expansion of the money supply,
wages increases that were far greater than productivity increases, massive redistribution of income,
limitless subsidies, prices fixation and industries and land take overs, among other interventionist
measures, led to a complete economic and social crisis.398 Moreover, according to Sigmund there is
little doubt that the economic policy makers of the left had given “no serious thought” to problems
such as controlling inflation, correcting balance of payment imbalances and the excessive size of
government.399 Sigmund even concluded that the economic policies of the UP government were
largely responsible for the breakdown of the democratic order in Chile because “no democratic
system, no matter how stable initially, could have withstood the pressure of  runaway inflation, a
very widespread black market, deepening shortages of essential commodities, and continually
declining productivity”.400 Similarly, Dieter Nohlen in his study on the Chilean socialist revolution
argued that even if it is true that opposition groups tried to sabotage the UP government, the
economic policies of Allende’s government were largely to be blamed for the collapse of the
economy. In the words of Nohlen, Allende’s policy was “too contradictory to have been successful
in the long run”.401 Particularly destructive according to Nohlen, was the government’s price fixing
policy which imposed “unrealistically low prices” on producers thereby affecting production and
encouraging black markets while the artificial policy of salary increases led to more inflation and
excessive domestic demand that could not be satisfied by internal production.402
 In the Chicago Boys’ view, the failure of Allende’s project was due to the “irrational faith
with which socialism emerged in Chile”, whose proponents believed that society could be changed
overnight and that they could even turn “white what until then had been black”.403 Following a more
evolutionary or Hayekian approach to institutions, the Chicago Boys rejected the idea of an order
designed from the top like the one attempted by socialists. In their view, there were economic and
institutional realities like private property that could not be changed at will without devastating
consequences. Already in 1972, Chicago Boys Álvaro Bardón, Jorge Cauas, Andrés Sanfuentes and
José Luis Zabala along with Sergio Molina had written a book alerting of the voluntaristic nature of
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the economic program of the UP.  In the book, the authors argued that the authorities of the UP
government were making economic policy with “little consideration to the knowledge provided by
economic science” warning that the policies of the government, inspired in the wrong theories, were
causing serious economic problems.404 Coinciding with this analysis, Sigmund observed that in the
case of the UP, ideology had a distorting effect.405 Balance of payments and inflationary problems,
it was believed, were concerns of “bourgeois” economists.406From an ideological and institutional
economics perspective these remarks are relevant because, as North explains, those ideologies that
have a more accurate understanding of how economic reality works have higher chances of creating
economic growth and achieving the results sought by those who implement reforms. At the same
time, says North, a functioning economy with a relevant degree of economic liberty is essential for
sustaining a democratic order. Bad outcomes in those terms lead to ideological reactions and
alternative mental explanations.
 The failed free market revolution of the Klein & Saks mission and the rebirth of
neoliberalism
 North has argued that the intellectual climate of opinion of a given society is more likely to
change when a set of beliefs that has been applied over a certain period of time in the form of
economic and social policies has shown poor results. In Chile, the once dominant classical liberal
ideas re-emerged largely as a reaction against the poor economic performance since the 1930s and
the perceived threat of Chile becoming a socialist country. The Chicago Boys saw themselves not
only as a reaction in the American-liberalism versus Soviet-socialism Cold War dichotomy, but
also as part of the reaction against the philosophy of government interventionism at large.   In the
eyes of the Chicago Boys it was the statist philosophy that had essentially led to the stagnation of
the Chilean economy, to widespread political disorder and eventually to the breakdown of
democracy. British-American liberalism or neoliberalism offered a logical explanation of why the
economy was performing so poorly and what was to be done if prosperity and democratic stability
were to be secured. It also offered them a political philosophy which considered economic freedom
as the essential value. This point is crucial. In the view of the Chicago Boys it had been the
progressive destruction of economic freedom that had led to increasing populism, to the socialist
regime of Salvador Allende and finally to the collapse of Chile’s economic and democratic order.
As Chicago Boy Hernán Büchi observed, the government of Salvador Allende was not entirely
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different from its predecessors. It was more radical, but it followed the same path.407 Data compiled
by Chicago Boy Rolf Lüders shows that the economic performance of Chile had been better under
the period dominated by liberal ideas and institutions, a conclusion also consistent with North’s
theory of economic development. Specifically, until the early 20th century, Chile had experienced
a process of convergence with the per capita income of developed countries becoming the 16th
nation with the highest per capita income in the world.408 From the early 20t h century until the
1970s however, Chile stagnated showing substantially lower economic growth than Europe, the
United States, Asia, and even Latin America.409 Many economists, both sympathetic and critical of
neoliberalism, have attributed the poor economic performance of Chile to wrong economic polices
inspired by a set of beliefs that misunderstood economic reality. Universidad de Chile Professor
Felipe Morandé, for example, has argued that “a context of widespread regulation and intervention
in markets, together with macroeconomic endemic instability unsurprisingly ended in
disappointing growth throughout much of the century”.410 Along the same lines former World
Bank economist Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel argued that from the 1930s until the 1970s, the Chilean
governments increased redistributive policies and interventionism in the markets, expanded social
policies and engaged in destabilizing macroeconomic policies.411 As a result, says Schmidt
-Hebbel, after a short period of high growth in the post-Depression 1930s, average per capita
growth reached only 1.4% between 1938 and 1973.412
 Economists have also observed that from the 1930s onwards Chile failed to create the
institutions necessary for solving problems such as inflation, unemployment, low economic growth,
income inequality and poverty. According to several scholars, in particular the ISI model promoted
by ECLA proved highly inconvenient for creating employment. As Meller and Corbo argued,
Chile’s unemployment problem from the 1950s onwards was the “failure of employment
opportunities to grow”.413  For both economists, this was in turn the result of the ISI model which
had created very inefficient domestic industries that were capital- intensive instead of labor-
intensive. Moreover, since the model itself was not financially self-sustaining, it led to greater
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consumption of resources than the savings the economy managed to generate. As a response, the
governments financed themselves by exchange rate manipulations, borrowing and money
printing.414  Meller, a strong critic of the Chicago Boys and neoliberalism, has explained that under
the ISI system all over Latin America the industrial sector was highly inefficient generating few
jobs and failing to produce sufficient basic goods at affordable prices to satisfy the needs of the
population.415 According to Meller, protectionism resulted in higher prices for consumers for lower
quality products. In addition, the industrial sector turned out to be “excessively diversified and
inefficient” with underutilized industrial plants, which could only stay survive through subsidies
and a system of monopoly pricing created by import restrictions.416
As has been mentioned, in Chile inflation was a crucial issue for classical liberals. It had
also been a central problem the ISI model and the structuralist approach had promised to solve
without success. Rising prices had been a major burden for the Chilean economy since the end of
convertibility in 1878. But it really became critical after the 1930s, coinciding with the increase of
government intervention in the economy. Data compiled by University of Chicago professor
Arnold Harberger shows that while in the 1930s the price level doubled, between 1939 and 1958
the wholesale price index and the cost of living index increased by a factor of 80.417 On average,
during the 1950s and the 1960s inflation reached 31% per year.418   The central reason for the
inflationary spiral according to UCLA professor Sebastián Edwards, was an excessive expansion of
the money supply to finance government expenditure.419
For Chilean neoliberals, the necessity of solving the problem of inflation both for economic
and philosophical reasons cannot be minimized. In 1960, Harvard professor and classical liberal
economist Gottfried Haberler explained the effects of chronic inflation in the following terms: “The
modern form of repressed inflation and semi-repressed inflation causes or implies a proliferation of
controls and interventions, price control, import controls, exchange control, rationing, allocation,
etc. This overtaxes and corrupts the administrative apparatus and diverts government energies and
know-how from more important functions.”420 According to Haberler, this was a major problem for
any country, but especially for underdeveloped countries, which were “poorly endowed with the
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precious resource of governmental know-how, administrative efficiency, and political honesty”.421
In those countries, inflation led to a “great waste of scarce manpower and brainpower” that they
could not afford.  Of all this malaise, wrote Haberler coinciding with the Chicago Boys, Chile
presented “an extreme case”.422
As a result of the inflationary spiral, in 1955 another group of American classical liberal
economists known as the Klein & Saks mission came to Chile with the intention of preventing the
collapse of the economic and democratic system. It was the third group of foreign experts to come
to Chile in one century with the aim of restoring economic soundness. Like the previous ones, the
Klein Saks mission promoted a classical liberal economic philosophy. Moreover, it anticipated
much of what would be done by the Chicago Boys two decades later in terms of economic
reforms.423 This time the group was hired by President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, a protectionist and
a nationalist former military man who in 1931 had to flee from Chile during his first presidency as
a result of a complete economic and political crisis. Even though Ibáñez del Campo had inherited a
critical macroeconomic situation from the so-called radical governments of the 1940s, it was only
after two years in office that he decided to do something about inflation. His predecessor, Gabriel
Gonzalez Videla, a statist politician who was the last president of the radical era (1938-1952), had
recognized the gravity of the situation of Chile in the president’s annual state-of the-nation address
to Congress in May 1950: “The country continues in the clutches of an inflationary process which
for many years has threatened to destroy the foundations of economic life and social tranquility”.424
For the structuralist theorists, inflation was not the result of an expansion of the money supply
caused by excessive government spending but mainly the consequence of a deficient socio
economic structure. Therefore, the problem could only be solved by political action and
comprehensive socio economic reform.425 Many scholars have argued that, contrary to what
Gonzalez Videla and the structuralist theorists of ECLA believed, the connection between high
inflation and the ISI model of development was straightforward. As Ardanaz, Scartascini and
Tommasi explained, since the 1930s exchange rate appreciation and expansive fiscal and monetary
policies in countries like Chile, Peru, Brazil and Argentina, had been systematically used in order
“to shift income to popular groups”  and to the ISI sectors of the economy.426  In order to deal with
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inflation and keep ISI industries afloat these countries also introduced price controls and foreign
exchange rationing.427 Ardanaz, Scartascini and Tommasi argued that eventually the depletion of
foreign exchange reserves and the increase in fiscal pressures derived from these policies led to
inflationary disaster and economic collapse in all these countries.428 If this theory is correct, it could
contribute to explain Chile’s persistent inflationary problem and the inability of the ISI system to
solve it. Whereas inflation had reached an average of 18% a year in the 1940s in 1953, one year
after del Campo’s election, it reached 56% and 71% in 1954.429  In 1955 inflation even exceeded
80%.430 Facing social upheaval and the possible breakdown of the economic and social system,
Ibáñez del Campo decided to invite the Klein & Saks firm to advise the government on how to
prevent an imminent social catastrophe. From 1955 to 1958 the Klein-Saks Mission would do a
complete study of the Chilean economy in order to come up with a set of recommendations.
According to the report of the mission, inflation had established itself as an “institution” that had
caused a true “economic civil war” between the different groups and classes of the country.431 The
mission pointed out that workers sought to protect themselves by demanding automatic
readjustments of their salaries, merchants fought for credit access under favorable conditions,
exporters wanted quotas and special exchange rates and farmers demanded the liberty of raising
prices more than other groups. The mission went on arguing that the government also took part in
this war by financing its spending with money emissions. As a result, concluded the Klein & Saks
report, inflation was threatening to destroy the “whole democratic structure of the country”.432 This
last remark is crucial. Like Courcelle-Seneuil and the Kemmerer Mission had done before them and
the Chicago Boys would do after them, the Klein & Saks report warned that an economy with the
distortions of the Chilean economy was incompatible with a stable democracy. As was explained
earlier the connection between economic development and a functioning democracy is also part of
North’s economic and institutional analysis. In the Chilean case, a concern for democracy was
inextricably linked to a concern for a well-functioning economy.  Accordingly, the mission
proposed a sort of shock therapy that dramatically reduced government intervention in the
economy. Among the reforms suggested was the liberalization of international trade, the
elimination of price fixation, the privatization of public firms, the reduction of government
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spending, the increase of interest rates and a complete overhaul of the social security system.
Facing economic disaster, Ibáñez del Campo accepted to introduce the economic reforms putting
the mission to work on their implementation. For a short time, the mission seemed successful
bringing inflation down from 38% in 1956 to 17% in 1957.433The success however, did not last: in
1958 inflation was back above 30%.434
In a sense, the Klein & Saks mission was doomed to fail from the start. Even though it had
technical credibility and political independence, it went completely against the prevailing ideas of
the time. In the words of historian Cristián Garay, “there was no consensus in favor of liberal
economic policies, for even the conservatives resisted the (liberal) model, promoting a Christian
economy instead”.435 Moreover, the reforms proposed by the Klein & Saks mission not only meant
a radical break away  from more than twenty years of statist path dependence but also the
elimination of massive benefits for interest groups. This last aspect proved to be crucial in the
failure of the mission. After decades of government expansion to all spheres of society Chile was
transformed into the rent-seeking society so feared by classical liberals from Adam Smith and
Courcelle-Seneuil to James Madison and the 20th century neoliberals. As Anne Krueger explained,
rent-seeking societies arise when in market oriented economies, governments create restrictions
upon economic activity that give rise to rents for which people compete.436 The result of this
process is bad economic performance. North, Wallis, Webb and Weingast have defined such as a
situation as “Limited Access Order” (LAO). A LAO creates limits on political and economic
access in order to generate rents.437 In such a society, reforms usually fail because they threatened
privileges and rent creation which leads elites and non-elite groups to resist the reforms.438 LAO are
a central reason for explaining the failure of development policies favoring “Open Access Order”
(OAO). This last situation is one in which there is open competition in markets as well as in the
political sphere all of which is based on the rule of law.439 According to this approach, the failure of
Third World countries to develop is their inability to sufficiently overcome the rent-seeking
problem by making reforms to make the transition from LAO to OAO possible. In North’s words:
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“Third World countries are poor because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to
political/economic activity that do not encourage productive activity”.440 Chile, prior to 1973 fits
the description of a rent-seeking society or a LAO. Some scholars have observed that even though
the “redistributive state” did enjoy the support of a wide ideological consensus during the 1940s
and 1950s, it did not necessarily benefit the poor. It rather granted privileges, rents and benefits to
the most influential interest groups.441 Meller has pointed out that this problem was also a common
feature of other Latin American countries that had followed protectionism and intrusive
governments. According to Meller, trade restrictions in Latin America had created a “burgeoning
bureaucracy which led to a complex network of regulations, extreme instability in government
decisions, arbitrary action and incentives for corruption”.442 As a result, under the ISI model
success was not achieved by productive activity but by having the right connections.443 If Meller
and North are right, then the Klein & Saks mission did partly fail due to the opposition of interest
groups which had been formed as a result of an institutional evolution that limited the access of
competitors to the market. Ideologically of course it was not the intention of those who conceived
the ISI system to favor interest groups but to develop the country. Their ideas however, had an
impact on institutions creating unintended consequences. At any rate, the fact that the Klein & Saks
mission failed to make the reforms is further indication that a free market revolution would have
not been possible in Chile at the time under a democratic regime. Massive strikes and lobbying plus
intensive political and intellectual resistance from all sides of the spectrum made it impossible for
the government to sustain the liberalization course proposed by the American economists. As
professor Garay observed, due to the immense public pressure and the ideological reaction against
the reforms practically no politician defended the reforms with determination.444Furthermore, the
set of reforms proposed by the Klein & Saks mission was only partially approved. According to
Garay, the mission basically failed for political reasons and the lack of a favorable climate of
intellectual opinion, which was still on the side of protectionism and government intervention.445
In spite of its failure, from a classical liberal perspective the mission accomplished
something relevant. It contributed to start the shift from interventionist to classical liberal ideas,
thereby paving the way for the Chicago Boys’ intellectual work. Few at the time understood the
nature of the intellectual process that was taking place in Chile like ECLA economist Anibal Pinto.
Pinto not only warned about the shift in the climate of opinion towards American liberalism. He
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also noted that what many at the time considered to be new economic ideas were nothing more than
a rebirth of a classical liberal tradition long present in Chilean history. Determined to alert opinion
leaders and policy makers on the danger posed by the rebirth of classical liberalism, in 1957 Pinto
wrote an article with the telling title ¿De vuelta a Courcelle-Seneuil? (Back to Courcelle-
Seneuil?).446 In the piece, Pinto stressed the role of intellectuals and ideas in defining economic and
social evolution. According to Pinto, the “intellectual compass” was again moving towards a
different north that could be defined as “liberal” in the classical sense.447 This new orientation, said
Pinto, sought to achieve less government intervention, more competition, less protectionism as well
as the promotion of foreign investment. For Pinto, these ideas were a “copy” of similar ideas of
other episodes of Chilean history. Thus, Pinto saw the Chilean liberal tradition reemerging once
again through the hand of a foreign influence. This is a distinctive characteristic of the Chilean
liberal tradition. Even if it remained present in Chile’s intellectual spheres and some institutional
arrangements such as the Civil Code, it always took the input of foreign experts for this tradition to
become an effective force of institutional transformation.  Such was the case with Courcelle-
Seneuil, with the Kemmerer mission, with the Klein & Saks mission and with the Chicago Boys. In
turn, it is precisely because classical liberalism was present in Chile's cultural heritage that the
governments sought advice from foreign experts always chose classical liberal economists.
Commenting Chile’s classical liberal tradition, Pinto argued that the shift that Chile’s
economic policy had experienced in the second half of the 19th century, from protectionism and
state intervention to a free market model, had been the result of a “current of foreign ideas” that had
penetrated “the country’s conscience” and which saw in Courcelle-Seneuil a “brilliant and
persuasive prophet”.448 This prophet, insisted Pinto, had formed legions of disciples who had
promoted the free market doctrine as “indisputable dogma”. In Pinto’s eyes, Chile was now
experiencing a similar process with the rebirth of what he called “Courcelle-Seneuilism”.449 He
disqualified this set of ideas as a free market “magical therapy” that included free prices, freedom
of international trade, free exchange rates, and free flow of foreign investment. For Pinto there were
two reasons for the rebirth of Courcelle-Seneuilism. The first reason was excessive and inefficient
government control and government intervention in the economy, which he admitted had not
worked as it was supposed to work. Like North, Pinto believed that the change in the intellectual
climate of opinion was taking place as a consequence of the reality feedback, specifically of the
poor results of the ISI model. The second and most important reason for the change in the climate
of opinion, said Pinto, was the “powerful ventilator of ideas which has its irradiation center in the
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United States” and which reached an “overwhelming influence” in Chile.450 It is interesting to note
here that Europe provided classical liberal ideas through Courcelle-Seneuil as well as critical views
of liberalism such as the German historical school of economics, Keynesianism and others that had
considerable influence on Chilean scholars and politicians. The United States, on the other hand,
provided Chile almost exclusively with classical liberal ideas. The exception was the Alliance for
Progress but, as has been explained, the Alliance was in actual fact a product of ECLA. Thus it
could be argued that after Courcelle-Seneuil, who was anyway a proponent of the British
-American liberal tradition, the United States became the sole pole of classical liberal influence in
Chile. A clear indication of this is the fact that the foreign experts hired by Chilean governments
throughout the 20th century were all American. In the case of the Chicago Boys it is true that they
were Chilean but they had been educated in the United States and enjoyed the support of their
professors at the University of Chicago as well as the neoliberal circles worldwide. Therefore, it
could be argued that more than an exception to the tradition of hiring American classical liberal
experts, the Chicago Boys were the ultimate stage of a history of increasing American influence on
Chile’s institutional evolution.
Promoting British- American liberalism: the Point Four program and the University of
Chicago-Universidad Católica agreement
For Americans, Chile was of particular importance in the clash of ideas because Santiago
was a powerful center for the irradiation of statist economic policy through the work of the
ECLA.451 In order to fight back the influence of these ideas, about the same time the Klein & Saks
mission was trying to reform the Chilean economy, the Catholic University and the University of
Chicago signed an agreement that would make it possible for Chilean students to complete
postgraduate studies at Faculty of Economics at Chicago University. The Chile Project, as the
agreement between both universities was called, was financed by the State Department and must
also be understood in the context of the Cold War because it arose as part of the Point Four program
developed by President Harry Truman in his Inaugural Address in 1949 with the aim of containing
communism. Recognizing the philosophical dimension of the Cold War, Truman claimed that the
United States found itself “directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims and a totally different
concept of life”.452 A regime, said Truman, that “adhered to a false philosophy which purports to
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offer freedom, security, and greater opportunity to mankind” misleading many peoples who had
“sacrificed their liberties only to learn to their sorrow that deceit and mockery, poverty and tyranny,
are their reward. That false philosophy —concluded Truman— is communism”.453 Truman depicted
communism as a totalitarian ideology that was completely opposed to democracy and American
values of individual freedom. In his eyes, these values had been responsible for America’s success
and were a constructive force for all mankind. The differences between communism and
democracy, said Truman “do not concern the United States alone. People everywhere are coming to
realize that what is involved is material well-being, human dignity, and the right to believe in and
worship God... the actions resulting from the Communist philosophy are a threat to the efforts of
free nations to bring about world recovery and lasting peace”.454
In order to fight back communism and continue America’s  “great constructive effort to
restore peace, stability, and freedom to the world” Truman argued that the United States had to take
four courses of action: to strengthen the United Nations, to continue programs of economic
recovery around the world, to strengthen ally nations against the dangers of aggression and to make
the benefits of American “scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement
and growth of underdeveloped areas”.455 Thus, the aim of the Point Four program was to bring
underdeveloped nations to the path of American-style capitalist democratic development. It is in
this context that the Chile project has to be understood. It sought the same anti-communist aim of
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, only in this case the people in charge of the project were Chicago
University professors inspired by a liberal philosophy. The materialization of the Chile Project
corresponded to the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), which had been created by the
Kennedy administration in order to replace the International Cooperation Direction (I.C.D). The
ICD had been responsible for administrating foreign aid in compliance with Truman’s Point Four
program.
The story of how the agreement between the Catholic University and Chicago University
came to existence has been examined in detail elsewhere.456 It is important however to remember
some facts in order to understand the real nature of the agreement. The first thing that has to be
stressed is that the University of Chile had been originally selected for the project with the
University of Chicago, an option that was rejected by the university authorities. According to Vial,
this fact suffices to discredit Valdés’ suggestion that the Chile Project was the result of a
“conspiracy” to use Chile as a laboratory to introduce and test the Chicago model.457 The Chicago
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professors were well aware of the fact that the prevailing ideology of the University of Chile was
ECLA’s statism and knew that it was the worst possible place to introduce the Chicago model.458
Moreover, four of the first seven people sent to Chicago were students of the Universidad de Chile,
who never accepted neoliberalism. 459
With a clear notion of the importance of ideas, the goal of the Chicago-Catholic University
agreement was to influence on an ideological level in order to change the course of economic and
social evolution in Chile and the countries under the ISI model. And education offered the perfect
place to start. As North, Wallis and Weingast explained, along with experience education is one of
the main sources of belief formation.460 In the Chilean case, it was the belief that economic
education was crucial for the wellbeing of the country that led to the Chicago University-Catholic
University agreement. A crucial antecedent in this respect was the meeting between human capital
expert Theodore Schultz, Dean of the Faculty of Economics of Chicago University and Albion
Patterson. Patterson had served as director of the Point Four program in Paraguay and had assumed
the same role in Chile in 1953. The meeting took place on the occasion of a visit Schultz made to
Chile as a guest of the Ford Foundation in 1953. It was Schultz who convinced Patterson of the
importance of economic education and a modern economy for the development of a nation.
Patterson came to believe that Chilean economists lacked the knowledge that was necessary to
improve the study of economics on a graduate and postgraduate level because they had been trained
in the sort of economic theories promoted by ECLA, which in his view were wrong.461 But
Patterson was also ideologically motivated. As Ernesto Fontaine recalls, Patterson was very critical
of ECLA's economic views and saw the agreement between Chicago University and the Catholic
University as an effective way to change the climate of opinion in Chile and Latin America by
debunking ECLAC’s influence.462
Patricio Ugarte, a Chilean employee of the Point Four program and professor at the Catholic
University also played a crucial role in the materialization of the agreement between both
universities. His reasons however were more practical than ideological. Contrary to the prevailing
climate of opinion at the time, Ugarte was convinced that Chile needed foreign investment in order
to jumpstart its economy. He talked to Patterson about the idea of creating an ad hoc research
institute in the Catholic University to attract foreign capital. Not without difficulty, Ugarte, who had
attended MIT for post graduate studies, convinced Dean Julio Chaná to meet Patterson. Chaná was
aware of the weak stand of the discipline of economics at the Catholic University and had long
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evaluated cooperation with international counterparts so as to improve it. Unsurprisingly, when the
idea of creating an institute for the promotion of foreign investment with assistance of the United
States was presented by Chaná, numerous professors rejected it for ideological reasons. Embedded
in nationalistic and corporatist ideas, conservative professors at the Catholic University claimed that
foreign investment was a sell-out of the country, while the influence of the social doctrine of the
Catholic Church led many to reject American liberalism.463 After several meetings between
Patterson and Chaná, and with the support of Ugarte and other professors of the University, the
decision to accept US aid was finally made. A visit of a delegation headed by Schultz came to
Santiago to prepare the way to the agreement, which was finally approved in Chicago in March
1956. The contract which had originally been signed for three years was prolonged on two
occasions and lasted until June 1964. During that time, twenty six Chilean students pursued studies
at Chicago, many of whom returned to the Catholic University, where they carried out a complete
reform of the department of economics.464 In other words, they changed the curriculum of the
teaching of economics, which was essentially replaced by free market Chicago economics.
Thus, the task of changing the prevailing ideas in Chilean political and intellectual elites was
immediately assumed by the first graduates from Chicago that returned to the country. There were
basically two pillars of the strategy in order to win the battle of ideas for the side of the neoliberal
economists. One consisted in revolutionizing the teaching of economics at university level with the
aim of making of classical liberalism the predominant economic theory once again. The other
strategy aimed at delivering a systematic educational campaign in the press to make classical liberal
ideas popular, thereby changing the worldview of the country’s elites. In this the Chicago Boys
closely followed Hayek’s thesis that it was only through influencing the ideas that prevail among
intellectual and elite circles that institutions can be changed. As Emilio Sanfuentes, one of the
Chicago Boys declared in 1980: “We set out to win elite opinion over to our position and to do this
we concentrated on the quality media”.465 This “quality media” were mainly Qué Pasa magazine
and El Mercurio.  The latter was the most important agent in spreading classical liberal ideas in the
country. And it did so with success. According to historian Joaquín Fermandois, El Mercurio has
been the most effective communication medium “in generating ideas and sentiments throughout
Chilean republican history”.466
 In 1967, the newspaper created a special section called “La Página Económica” – The
Economic Page. Its long term aim, as Fermandois explained, was to “reform from the base the
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intellectual categories by which reality was defined and to teach economics to the Chilean political
class”.467 In other terms, the newspaper owned by Agustin Edwards, head of one of Chile’s most
powerful economic groups at the time, sought to change the prevailing worldview among decision
makers.
But El Mercurio’s promotion of liberalism had started long before the creation of the Página
Económica. Already in 1947 the newspaper had begun publishing editorials criticizing the
excessive interventionism of the government in the economy and citing the economy of the United
States as an example to follow. 468This campaign in favor of classical liberalism became really
systematic in 1955, with the arrival of the Klein & Sacks mission.469 It is crucial to note that
Agustin Edwards had personally played a decisive role in convincing the government to hire the
Klein & Sacks firm. Julius Klein himself had already been in Chile some years earlier where he had
been honored by the local business community for having introduced a successful plan of monetary
stabilization in Peru. The Peruvian plan included a freeze on salaries, elimination of government
controls and of several food subsidies. Once the government decided to hire the Klein & Sacks
Mission, Edwards was personally assigned the task of going to the United States to settle the deal.
According to Sofia Correa, this marked the end of the populist phase of Ibañez’ government.470
The essence of the message that El Mercurio and the Chicago Boys wanted to make
hegemonic in the Chilean climate of opinion was made clear by the definition of economic
liberalism made by the same newspaper in 1962. According to El Mercurio, economic liberalism
was a “social-economic doctrine which sought to solve social economic problems based on four
central principles: private ownership of capital..., legitimate profit, the recognition that personal
interest was the irreplaceable engine of economic activity and a preference for freedom as a general
rule over government intervention”.471
In addition to the systematic ideological work through El Mercurio, Qué Pasa and the
Catholic University, in 1963 some Chicago Boys, with the financial support of Agustin Edwards
created the first classical liberal think tank in Chilean history. It was called Centro de Estudios
Socioeconómicos (CESEC).  The most important activity of the CESEC was the preparation of an
economic program for an eventual victory of Jorge Alessandri in the election of 1970. That was the
origin of El Ladrillo (a document known as “The Brick”) that started being prepared in 1969 and
was updated during the government of the Unidad Popular.  The first contributors were Emilio
Sanfuentes Vergara, Sergio de Castro, Pablo Barahona, Sergio de la Cuadra, Adelio Pipino, Juan
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Carlos Méndez, José Garrido and Armando Dussalliant. After Allende’s victory, a group of new
people including Juan Brown, Rodrigo Mujica, Álvaro Bardón, Juan Villarzú, José Luis Zavala,
Andrés Sanfuentes, José Luis Federico, Ernesto Silva, Enrique Tassara and Julio Vildósola joined
the list of contributors. All of them were specialists in economics and some of them were Christian
Democrats who opposed Allende’s government.
Heirs of classical liberalism: the Courcelle-Seneuil−Smith−Chicago connection
 “The Brick” was the founding document of the Chilean free market revolution. It was a
manifesto of the Chicago Boys that crystallized their economic thinking, their view on Chile’s
recent history and their social and political philosophy. An analysis of “The Brick” allows to
establish a striking similarity between the belief systems of Courcelle-Seneuil and classical
liberalism in general and those of the Chicago Boys. The diagnosis of the problems faced by the
Chilean economy made by the Chicago Boys in “The Brick” did not differ in some respects that
much from what classical liberals were arguing was needed in Chile from the second half of the
19th century onwards. Since the time of Adam Smith, classical liberals had essentially argued for
an end of protectionism. In the words of Smith:
Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free importation,
the different states into which a great continent was divided would so far resemble
the different provinces of a great empire. As among the different provinces of a great
empire the freedom of the inland trade appears, both from reason and experience, not
only the best palliative of a dearth, but the most effectual preventative of a famine; so
would the freedom of the exportation and importation trade be among the different
states into which a great continent was divided.472
“The Brick” also put a substantial part of its focus on protectionism attributing several
problems to the ISI system. The worst problems, according to this document, were a low economic
growth rate, excessive government intervention, scarcity of productive jobs, inflation, agricultural
backwardness and the existence of extreme poverty in large sectors of the population. The effects of
these problems said “The Brick”, were a deficient allocation of productive resources, a limited
development of the external sector, low growth of productive resources, harmful actions of
472 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 2, Edited by Edwin Cannan,
Methuen, London, 1904, p.35.
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powerful groups, constant shift in economic policy, bad use of political power and a deficit in food
supply.473 According to the neoliberals, the solution for Chile’s economic and social problems
consisted in a program based on a set of beliefs that view the market as a sort of natural force.
Economics in turn, was seen as the science that sought to understand that force. In the words of
Arnold Harberger:
The forces of the market are just that: They are forces; they are like the wind and the
tides; they are things that if you want to try to ignore them, you ignore them at your
peril, and if you understand that they are there, working their way, if you find a way
of ordering your life that is compatible with these forces, indeed which harnesses
these forces to the benefit of your society, that’s the way to go.474
 Chicago Boy Pablo Barahona would recall that at Chicago “there was a science so
understandable and important as physics or biology” and that this science could be used to design
economic policies that “tell people what is good and what is bad” from an economic point of
view.475 From the view that economics was a science, there followed an economic approach that
Milton Friedman would explain in the following terms: “in the discussion of economic policy
Chicago stands for the belief in the efficacy of the free market as a means of organizing resources,
for skepticism about government intervention into economic affairs, and for emphasis on the quality
of money as a key factor in producing inflation.”476 Based on this approach the authors of “The
Brick” advocated free trade, anti-monopolistic policies, prices liberalizations, tax reform, a new
pension system, normalization of agricultural activity, creation of capital markets and protection of
property rights in order to solve the Chilean economic and social crisis. The central belief behind
those policies was that the key to social prosperity was individual effort and not government
redistributive policies. In the words of “The Brick”: “The worker who thinks that because his
poverty is unfair it has to be solved by a government policy of income redistribution and not, at least
to an important extent, by his own effort and persistence, will be someone who reduces the creative
potential of the country”.477 Accordingly, despite the introduction of some social policies, the
government “always has to demand the maximum productive effort of all citizens”.478
473  El Ladrillo, pp.27-28.
474 Commanding Heights, Arnold Harberger, October 3, 2000.  Interview available at:  
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_alharberger.html Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
475 Interview to Pablo Baraona, CIDOC, Universidad Finis Terrae, Reference code CL-CIDOC-8-H.7-122377/1901-
Box  FGVC-2.
476 Milton Friedman, “Schools at Chicago”, The University of Chicago Magazine, August 1974, pp. 11-16.
477 Ibid., pp.35-36.
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The free market solution postulated in “The Brick” sought to compete on an ideological
level with the alternative doctrines. In order to achieve that, the Chicago Boys believed that it was
essential to confront these worldviews, especially the Marxist worldview, with a libertarian
worldview.479 The Chicago Boys thus fully believed that ideas were crucial to alter the course of
social-economic evolution. As Sergio de Castro wrote decades later: “the purpose of making the
document publicly known is to indicate that ideas have power; that these ideas have to be discussed
and convincing at the highest level and that it is the power of these ideas what impulses the
development of the country”.480For De Castro, it was the genuine commitment to the “libertarian
ideals” of “The Brick” that allowed to achieve real progress.481  According to Meller, the authors of
“The Brick” basically replicated the elemental model of Adam Smith.482Along the same lines,
French-Davis argued that the economic model of “The Brick” applied by the Pinochet regime was a
model “free from public interventions in the markets” with a “blind faith [in the idea] that the
market knows everything”.483
 This critique is no surprise. Like Courcelle-Seneuil, the Chicago School was indeed a direct
heir of Adam Smith’s classical liberalism. Friedman would recognize this fact arguing that the
Chicago model applied by Chile in the 1970s had been the same model Great Britain and the United
States had applied during the hegemony of classical liberalism in the 19 th century.484  In the 20th
century, the Chicago School did in fact become the main intellectual center for reviving Adam
Smith’s tradition. As Steven Medema observed, no other group in the 20th century has been more
fertile in expanding and developing Smith’s ideas than the Chicago School and no other group has
its name as strongly associated to Smith as the Chicago School.485
In his essay Adam Smith relevance for 1976 Milton Friedman noted how present Smith’s
philosophy was among Chicago economists and what the nature of that vision was:
479  Joaquin Fermandois, “Modernizacion, desarrollo, dictadura: el papel de Sergio de Castro”, Revista Estudios 
Publicos, No. 108, Santiago, 2007,  p. 293.
480 El Ladrillo, p.8.
481 Idem.
482 See: Vanessa Kaiser, En vez de una sola mirada, CAIP-RIL ediciones, Santiago, 2011, p. 58. According to Rolf
Lüders the economic model in “The Brick” “is not Adam Smith”, being closer to a social market economy. ( Kaiser,
En vez de una sola mirada, p. 81). Lüders has certainly a point for “The Brick” contemplated government measures
and redistribution in order to guarantee “equality of opportunities” and reduce poverty. However, French Davis and
Meller's argument about the confidence of the authors of “The Brick” in the free market or the Smithian model as
the best allocator and creator of resources is completely supported by a reading of the document. In short, the model
described in “The Brick” could be depicted as a classical liberal o libertarian economic model, with important
elements of a social market economy.
483 Ibid., p. 94.
484 See interview at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_miltonfriedman.html#10 Last
accessed: 28/06/2014.
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the market, with each individual going his own way, with no central authority setting
social priorities, avoiding duplication, and coordinating activities, looks like chaos to
the naked eye. Yet through Smith’s eyes we see that it is a finely ordered and
delicately tuned system, one which arises out of man’s actions, yet is not deliberately
created by man. It is a system which enables the dispersed knowledge and skill of
millions of people to be coordinated for a common purpose.486
The same approach had been promoted by Courcelle-Seneuil. The French professor had
translated Smith’s Wealth of Nations into French and had been commissioned by Gallium Library
to write a study on the Scottish economist.487 For him, Smith had rectified the ideas about wealth
demonstrating “with great superiority the division of labor and its power”.488 In addition Courcelle-
Seneuil argued that Smith had refuted “a number of mistakes” offering a much more superior theory
on money and banking.489 More important however, was the identification between both Chicago
and Courcelle-Seneuil’s methodological perspective especially because of their radical opposition
to the methodology defended by the German historical school and the promoters of structuralism
and protectionism in Chile. If the Chicago tradition understood the market as a sort of natural
phenomenon that had to be observed in order to draw conclusions about the right economic
policies, in the eyes of the French professor the functioning of the market and the role of economics
as a science was almost the same. In his article Political Economy, Courcelle-Seneuil argued that
economics was a positive science that investigated the causes of the wealth of nations and should
never indicate what “ought to be” in a moral sense.490 Likewise, in his Essays in Positive
Economics, which was mandatory for students at the Catholic University and a central pillar of the
education at Chicago, Friedman stated that “positive economics is in principle independent of any
particular ethical position or normative judgments...it deals with 'what is,’ not with ‘what ought to
be.’491Moreover, while Friedman argued that positive economics is, or can be, “an ‘objective
science’, in precisely the same sense as any of the physical sciences”,492 Courcelle-Seneuil
sustained that the economist “like the physicist proceeds by induction: he observes the facts and
concludes more or less general laws”.493
486 Milton Friedman, “Adam Smith Relevance for 1976”, Selected Papers No. 50, Graduate School of Business, The
University, of Chicago, pp. 16-17. Available at: http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/selectedpapers/sp50b.pdf Last
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491 Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics" in: Essays on Positive Economics, University of
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The remarkable similarity between Courcelle-Seneuil’s and Friedman’s methodological
approach goes even further. Both economists made the distinction between economics as a science
and economics as an art. According to Courcelle-Seneuil, considered as an art, economics seeks to
prescribe the mechanisms that enable to increase the wealth of nations.494 For that, it has to draw on
the conclusions obtained from economics as a science. It is the latter that “shows the way” but
never imposes it on anyone.495  In turn, Friedman argued that “normative economics and the art of
economics cannot be independent of positive economics. Any policy conclusion necessarily rests on
a prediction about the consequences of doing one thing rather than another, a prediction that must
be based −implicitly or explicitly− on positive economics.”496 Here positive economics is the
descriptive analysis of how an economy works using the tools of economic sciences while
normative economics consists in the recommendations that are elaborated based on those
descriptions. Thus for example, if the science of economics determines that an increase in the
money supply without an increase in productivity leads to higher prices and that is considered
undesirable because it affects the wellbeing of the people, than normative economics will answer
the question of what is to be done in order to control inflation. A standard Chicago recommendation
in this case would be to stop money creation by the central bank and cut government spending. In
short, Chicago economists first seek to understand how the economy works, which enables to make
predictions about what would happen under certain circumstances, and then they prepare policy
recommendations based on what is considered desirable. Friedman’s view that the methodology for
economics was basically the same that should be applied to natural sciences had been strongly
influenced by Karl Popper’s work The Logic of Scientific Discovery, where Popper developed his
falsifiability criterion. Moreover, Friedman personally discussed with Popper his views on
methodology when they met at the Mont Pelerin Society in 1947. The conversation according to the
Chicago professor, had “a good deal of influence” in the final version of his Essay on Positive
Economics.497 For Popper, sciences elaborate hypothesis that are then tested against empirical
evidence. If only one test proves the hypothesis wrong then no scientific law can be sustained. In
Popper’s words: “I shall not require that a scientific system shall be capable of being singled out,
once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can
be singled out, by means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical
scientific system to be refuted by experience.”498 It was the logic of seeing economics as a sort of
natural science that led Chicago Boy and Catholic University professor Ernesto Fontaine to argue
494 Ibid., p.277.
495 Ibid., p.281.
496 Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics", p.5.
497 Milton and Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1998,  p.215.
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that the economic achievements of Chile were due to “the triumph of economics as a science and of
the economist as a professional”.499
The empirical approach led both the Chicago Boys and Courcelle-Seneuil to believe that the
market improved the situation of society best when it was free from government intervention and
that government far from serving the general interest, usually tended to benefit interest groups and
restrict personal freedom. This line of argumentation is to be found in “The Brick” as well as in
Courcelle-Seneuil’s writings and is a central theme in classical liberal thinking. “The Brick” for
example argued that one of Chile’s central problems was that government intervention and
protectionism had resulted in the formation of powerful interest groups “whose action was in
conflict with the general interest”.500 As a result, economic success depended more on “political
patronage” than on “technical and entrepreneurial capacity”.501 According to Friedman, this
happened because “the self interest of people in government leads them to behave in a way that is
against the self interest of the rest of us”.502Thus, if in the market there is an invisible hand that
leads people who are seeking their benefit to serve the interest of the public, in government “people
who intend to serve only the public interest are led by an invisible hand to serve private interest
which was no part of their intention”.503 In his article Protectionism and Free Trade, Courcelle-
Seneuil made exactly the same case in a metaphorical way. Simulating a dialogue between a
merchant and a congressman on the subject of protectionism, the merchant schools the deputy on
what protectionism means in the following terms:
You are in charge of representing the interest of the French people: do not forget
them in order to favor private interests...I deeply lament that men like you, to whom
we have entrusted the defense of our interest, use the power that has been vested on
you to ask the ministers and the President of the Republic and your colleagues in
both chambers the faculty of giving to others part of our income.504
The merchant then added that there were two kinds of industries: the ones which survive
without asking anything from anyone and the ones which are incapable of sustaining themselves
499 Ernesto Fontaine, “El convenio U Católica U Chicago y sus repercusiones”, Conference given at the Students
Residence “La Cañada”, April 3, 1997. CIDOC, Universidad Finis Terrae, Reference code CL-CIDOC-14-L.5-
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and demand from the legislator to take away part of other people’s income in their benefit.505 The
merchant concluded with a statement that sums up perfectly the view of “The Brick”, Smith and
the Chicago School: “we ask to be protected from protectionists, we ask justice and equality for all.
We ask the gradual abolition of unjust privileges.”506
What both Courcelle-Seneuil and Friedman were defending with these reflections was the
so called “invisible hand” of Adam Smith. In other words, the idea that people by pursuing their
own interest in the market produce results that benefit society at large because the market is a
process of exchanges in which everyone who takes part in it benefits. The reason why they benefit
is that only those who create something of value for others can find someone else willing to
exchange that with them. Ludwig von Mises summarized this view in the following terms:
The profit system makes those men prosper who have succeeded in filling the wants
of the people in the best possible and cheapest way. Wealth can be acquired only by
serving the consumers. The capitalists lose their funds as soon as they fail to invest
them in those lines in which they satisfy best the demands of the public. In a daily
repeated plebiscite in which every penny gives a right to vote the consumers
determine who should own and run the plants, shops and farms. The control of the
material means of production is a social function, subject to the confirmation or
revocation by the sovereign consumers.507
In this perspective, interest groups are those who seek to extract rents through the coercive
powers of the state. Thus they do not have to engage in productive activities in order to satisfy the
needs and wants from others. They just have to lobby politicians and decision makers who have the
power of granting them privileges such as subsidies, market quotas, import quotas and regulations
that hinder the entrance of new competitors among others. Warning about this danger Smith wrote
that “the interest of the dealers . . . in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, is always in
some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public.”508 For Smith, “to widen the
market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers” and while widening the
market “may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public” narrowing the
competition “must always be against it” because, it can serve “only to enable the dealers, by raising
their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon
505 Ibid., p.268.
506 Ibid., p.270.
507 Ludwig von Mises, The Anticapitalist Mentality, Libertarian Press, Grove City, 1994, p.2.
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the rest of their fellow-citizens”.509 Therefore, continued Smith, the proposal of any new law or
regulation of commerce which comes from the order of those who live by profit, “ought always to
be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having been long and
carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the most suspicious attention.”510
Milton Friedman and the fragility of Chilean freedom
The first chapter has already explained what is to be understood by “neoliberalism”.
However, it may be useful to narrow down the explanation to understand better the Chicago Boys’
political philosophy and its connection to economic liberty. For this purpose it is necessary to
analyze the social thinking of the Chicago economist that most influenced the Chicago Boys as far
as economic and political philosophy is concerned: Milton Friedman. According to Manuel Delano
and Hugo Traslaviña, if Harberger was a mentor for the Chicago Boys, Friedman was their
“spiritual leader: a charismatic figure that knew how to connect theoretical issues with real life and
the most effective promoter of neoliberalism in the 1970s”.511 For professor and Chicago Boys’
critic Patricio Silva, Friedman’s best seller Capitalism and Freedom became the “manual” for his
Chilean followers.512 Along the same lines, Chicago Boy Dominique Hachette argued that
Friedman’s greatest influence was probably due to his non-academic works such as Free to choose.
In this book, said Hachette, Friedman explained his social and political vision making compatible
the relation between positivism, liberalism and democracy.513
Philosophically, Friedman’s view was not much different from Smith, Courcelle-Seneuil’s
and the general classical liberal approach. Economic freedom, thought Friedman, was part of
integral freedom so that any system which claims to protect freedom must per definition protect
economic freedom.514 This is the freedom to exchange, to create business, to work, to dispose of our
income and so on.  Friedman firmly believed that capitalism, understood as the private ownership of
the means of production and a competitive free market was a necessary but not sufficient condition
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511 Manuel Delano and Hugo Traslaviña, La herencia de los Chicago Boys, Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, Santiago, 1989,
p.15.
512 Patricio Silva, En el nombre de la razón, Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, 2010, p. 166.
513 Dominique Hachette, “La génesis de la Escuela de Chicago, fines de los cincuenta y de los sesenta”, in: La Escuela
de Chicago, Edited by Francisco Rosende, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 2007, p. 39. Hatchett’s
observation that Friedman was more influential through his non-academic works is also true for Chile. If Arnold
Harbeger was the fatherly figure for most of the Chicago Boys, from a purely philosophical perspective there is no
doubt that Milton Friedman was more influential than any other economics professor at Chicago. Apart from Free
to Choose, Friedman`s classical liberal philosophy was essentially laid down in his best sellers Capitalism and
Freedom and the Tyranny of the Status Quo.
514 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, p.8.
97
for both political freedom and democracy.515 Accordingly in Friedman’s view, the replacement of
economic freedom with central planning or a socialist system inevitably leads to the destruction of
political freedom and democracy. The reason is simple. Exchange in the market economy is a form
in which the different individuals freely collaborate in order to pursue their goals. It is a voluntary
form of cooperation in which coercion is absent from human relations. Friedman argues that this
system of cooperation enables people to create and provide for themselves the material means they
need in order to pursue their aims. And it does so in a way that keeps power disperse so that no one
can be subjected to the arbitrary use of coercion of another. In this system “the consumer is
protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other sellers with whom he can
deal”.516 Friedman says that if only one person – or the government – was able to sell food in a
given society, he would have the power to coerce the consumers because they need to eat and
would have nowhere else to go. In Friedman’s logic economic freedom becomes a necessary
condition for political freedom because it “enables people to cooperate with one another without
coercion or central direction” reducing the area over which “political power is exercised.”517 It is
necessary to develop this last argument somewhat more extensively given its importance for
neoliberalism. Like all classical liberals, Friedman defined political freedom as “the absence of
coercion of a man by his fellow men”.518 This means that no person con be forced to pursue ends
that are not her or his own.  In this view, economic freedom is a necessary condition for political
freedom because it is part of that sphere where individuals should not be coerced. This sphere
includes freedom of speech, freedom of movement, freedom of religion and so on. Friedman
endorsed what is known as “negative freedom” which is an idea of freedom that has its origin in
classical liberalism. As George Smith has explained, for classical liberals freedom means negative
freedom, that is to say, the absence of physical coercion and threats of coercion.519 In other words,
“one is free when one can act on one’s own judgment in pursuit of one's own goals, enter into
voluntary relationships with other people and dispose of one’s person and property as one’s sees fit,
so long as one respects the freedom of other people to do the same”.520 Accordingly, in the classical
liberal worldview, a system that protects freedom is one that reduces as much as possible the power
of coercion by any kind of authority or group. The dispersion of power is thus a crucial element for
freedom. In Friedman’s view, by taking away economic power from government and passing it to
515 Under political freedom Friedman basically understood the whole realm of personal liberties including freedom of
speech, freedom of movement and so on, whereas under democracy Friedman understood basically a means to
decide who is to hold political power. Sometimes however, Friedman does include democracy in the definition of
political freedom.
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the people, the free market enables “economic strength” to become a check to political power and
not its reinforcement.521 In Friedman’s words: “by dispersing power the free market provides an
offset to whatever concentration of political power may arise”.522 On the other hand, “the
concentration of economic and political power in the same hands is a sure recipe for tyranny”.523
Friedman’s major concern was the same that all classical liberals had, namely, how to
protect the individual from the abuses of government power and interest groups that extract benefits
through government. For Friedman, the free market system, by keeping property in the hands of the
people, contributes in a crucial way to keep power disperse. None of this can exist under a socialist
system argued Friedman. In such a system, government controls both political and economic power
and thereby replaces the voluntary arrangements of individuals by coercion. In addition it gives
government the power of life and death over people by controlling the supply of all the goods
people need to survive. Under such circumstances said Friedman, a democratic society is
undermined because according to Friedman democracy presupposes not the mere procedure of
electing politicians but also having a real chance of engaging in the public debate and opposing the
government. In Friedman’s words:
In order for men to advocate anything they must in the first place be able to earn a
living. This already raises a problem in a socialist society, since all jobs are under
direct control of political authorities. It would take an act of self-denial...for a
socialist government to permit its employees to advocate policies directly contrary to
the official doctrine.524
On the other hand, in a capitalist society said Friedman, it is only necessary to convince a
few wealthy people to launch an idea and promote a cause. In a socialist society said Friedman,
even if that was possible, raising funds for activism would not be enough because the government
controls the factories that produce the paper and the diverse materials necessary to spread the
message. Thus, in Friedman's view, in a socialist system that does not allow economic freedom,
dissent becomes practically impossible and political freedom an illusion.
In Friedman’s perspective, the Unidad Popular government, with its attempt to create a
centrally planned economy was a direct attack both on economic freedom and political freedom.
Since it sought to concentrate economic and political power in the same hands, in the eyes of
Friedman and the Chicago Boys it inevitably threatened to become a tyrannical regime.
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Accordingly, for Friedman the restoration of economic freedom after Allende’s government was
necessary but not sufficient to restore political freedom and a functioning democracy. Decades later
Friedman would claim that the free market reforms in Chile “had worked their way in bringing
about a free society.”525 What the Chicago professor meant with that expression was that without
the free market reforms and the new economic liberties Chile would have not been able to restore a
politically free and democratic society. Already in the mid-1970s, Friedman had warned the Chilean
public of the importance of economic liberty for political liberty and democracy. Invited by a
private foundation in April 1975, he spent six days in the country giving lectures and attending
meetings. One of the key lectures given by Friedman was called “The Fragility of Freedom” and
was addressed to students and professors of both the University of Chile and the Catholic
University.526 The lecture is crucial not only because Friedman criticized the military government
for curtailing individual freedoms, but because it offered an explanation in the purest classical
liberal tradition about the reasons why Chile had ended up destroying its democracy.527
In Friedman’s view, the problem with Chile was that personal freedom and in particular
economic liberty had been gradually strangled by government intervention since the early 20th
century. Friedman believed that government had to perform basically the functions that Adam
Smith had enumerated in his Wealth of Nations.528 This role was essentially limited to protecting
the fundamental rights of individuals from foreign and domestic aggressors, creating a court system
in order to enforce contracts and resolve disputes among individuals and providing some public
goods that the market would not provide. To these functions Friedman added that government had
to protect individuals who could not be considered “responsible” such as children and madmen.529
In Friedman’s eyes, a government that overextended its functions was not only a threat not only to
liberty but also to economic stability and social tranquility. In his view, this had been Chile’s
problem. In Friedman’s words: “The present state of Chile, in my opinion, is the end result of an
expansion in the role of government over the lives of the people”.530 Without any doubt, said
Friedman, the attempt to use the state to solve all sorts of social problems had been well-
intentioned, but had finally led to a “communist totalitarian” attempt that had ended up in a coup
and a military government that also denied liberties.531  
525 Interview available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_miltonfriedman.html#10 Last accessed: 28-06-
2014.
526 Friedman gave the same lecture some months later at the Brigham Young University. The version analyzed here is
the latter.
527 Ercilla Magazine reported on April 2, 1975, that Friedman had given this lecture at the Universidad de Chile.
528 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, pp. 28-33.
529 Ibid.,p.32.
530 Milton Friedman, The Fragility of Freedom, p.562. Available at: 
https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/BYUStudies/article/download/4927/4577 Last accessed: 28-06-2014.
531 Ibid., p.564.
100
The central question that had to be answered according to Friedman was the following:
“What is the explanation of the tendency for the attempt to use the political market to achieve noble
objectives to go awry and destroy our freedom?”532In order to answer the question Friedman, like
North, distinguished between the political market and the economic market. In both markets the
participants serve their own interest. In the political market, interest groups such as companies have
much more weight on the decisions made than voters. Thus, according to Friedman, it is not true
that in a political market people have identical influence on decision making. The fundamental
difference between both markets was that in the political market there was little relation between
what people vote for and what they get. Incentives, explained Friedman, are thus put so that the
general public does not really examine what it gets in exchange for their votes while organized
interest groups have all the incentives to get benefits from legislation. In the words of Friedman the
fundamental defect of the political mechanism is that it is a “system of highly weighted voting
under which the special interests have greater incentive to promote their own interests at the
expense of the general public”.533 In an economic market on the other hand, said Friedman, people
have a one-to-one relationship. No one can transfer the costs of his own decisions to others and
everyone can examine what he is getting in exchange for a dollar spent. Thus, in an economic
market there is true individual freedom because people always get what they want provided there
was no fraud. In addition, Friedman argued that unlike political markets in economic markets there
is an incentive for people to control that they get what they voted for with their money. Another
important distinction made by Friedman in his speech was that an economic market is characterized
by voluntarily cooperation while government acts through orders, that is to say, coercion. But
because reality is too complex, an economy run on orders by an authority cannot work. Using an
argument similar to Hayek’s on the use of knowledge in society, Friedman said that the authorities
would simply lack the necessary knowledge to achieve the same results a decentralized mechanism
like the market is able to achieve. Even worse, said Friedman, was the fact that the replacement of
the voluntary arrangement of individuals in the marketplace with government coercion would end
up by crashing personal liberties.  Thus, in Friedman’s view, a large welfare state not only
undermined individual freedom but also democracy because a vibrant market was a necessary
condition for a functioning democracy.  According to him, Chile had followed the “false road of the
welfare state”, which could only lead to “tyranny and misery and not freedom”.534
Some days after Friedman’s lecture on the fragility of freedom, the Chilean political
magazine Ercilla reported that one of the main conclusions of Friedman’s talk was that “individual
532 Ibid., p.567.
533 Ibid., p.572.
534 Ibid., p. 574.
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freedom was permanently under threat by the government and that all social programs that had been
developed to help the poor had ended up harming them and helping middle income groups and rich
people”.535 In an interview given to Qué Pasa magazine and published on April 3, 1975, Friedman
confirmed these views. When asked about his differences with Keynesian economist John Kenneth
Galbraith, Friedman responded that Galbraith believed in a society in which government played a
central role. He, on the contrary, promoted a society in which government was restricted to
guarantee peace, protect the individuals from coercion, provide a sound monetary framework and
create the rules for the functioning of a private economy. According to Friedman, Galbraith’s idea
of a welfare state would “inevitably degenerate into a centralized and collectivist state that would
destroy freedom”.536 Moreover, Friedman explained that the political mechanism was used to favor
interest groups that sought to extract rents through special privileges whereas, by enabling
competition, the market provided an effective check to the power of capitalists because it forced
them to develop new products at better prices thus benefiting the consumers.537 These ideas were a
substantial part of the set of beliefs behind the free market revolution made by the Chicago Boys.
At the time Friedman gave his lecture there were still many old-fashioned statist economic policies
that were still being applied by the military government. In one of his lectures, economics Professor
Arnold Harberger, who had come to Chile along with Friedman, argued that his diagnosis on the
Chilean economy remained exactly the same as in 1974.538 The main problem, he explained, was
hyperinflation caused by excessive government spending. He added that he was “sad” not to see
enough efforts to reduce the deficit, which was a crucial step for building a real social market
economy.539 Friedman made the same case declaring in his interview to Qué Pasa magazine, that
the Chilean economy at the time was not a free market economy but a “mixed economy where the
market economy does not prevail”.540
Both Friedman and Harberger presented their solutions for Chile’s main economic problems
at a time when Chileans were largely deprived both of political freedom and economic freedom.
Their message to the Chicago Boys and the Chilean public was that the restoration of economic
freedom and economic soundness was a necessary condition for restoring political freedom and
democracy. In a letter sent to the president of the Nobel Foundation Stig Ramel in 1976, reprinted
in the Wall Street Journal, Harberger explained: “we believe now as we did when we visited Chile,
that the restoration of political freedom is impossible without a restoration of economic health. As
535 Revista Ercilla, April 2, 1975.
536 Interview with Milton Friedman, Que Pasa , No. 206, April 3, 1975.
537 Idem.
538 Harberger’s conferences were published in: Fundación de Estudios Económicos, Cuatro momentos de la economía
chilena, Santiago, 1976.
539 Ibid., p. 97.
540 Interview with Milton Friedman, Qué Pasa  magazine No. 206, April 3 1975.
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we said in our public lectures, there is no easy road to that result, but there are better and worse
roads and scientific economic analysis has much to contribute to a wise choice”.541  Once the
economic reform had been made, Milton Friedman would directly advocate the transition to
democracy in Chile. At his arrival in Santiago in 1981 on the occasion of the Mont Pelerin Society
meeting in Viña del Mar, Friedman gave an interview to Ercilla magazine in which he declared:
I believe that a free economy is a necessary condition for a politically free society.
Unfortunately, this condition does not suffice.  Yet, I believe that a free economy will
be very difficult to sustain in the long run unless it is combined with a society that is
politically free.542
In a column published in Newsweek in 1982 entitled Free Market and the Generals,
Friedman would insist on the idea that political liberty was necessary for sustaining economic
liberty. In the article, the Chicago professor celebrated the fact that a military government like the
Chilean one had made free market reforms that undermined its own power. He called it a “political
miracle” and went on to warn that a free market system was incompatible with an authoritarian
government and that in the long run political liberty was a necessary condition for economic liberty.
In Friedman’s perspective, spaces of individual freedom given by the market would challenge
sooner or later the power of the military authorities leaving them two possible choices: reverse
course and go back to a state controlled economy, or give away their power to civilian authorities.
In Friedman’s words:
I predict that the free market policy will not last unless the military government is
replaced by a civilian government dedicated to political liberty −as the junta has
announced is its intention. Otherwise, sooner or later –and probably sooner rather
than later− economic freedom will succumb to the authoritarian character of the
military...I have long argued that economic freedom is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for political freedom. I have become persuaded that this generalization,
while true, is misleading unless accompanied by the proposition that political
freedom in turn is a necessary condition for the long term maintenance of economic
freedom.543
541 A full reproduction of the letter can be found in: Milton and Rose Friedman, Two Lucky People,  p.598.
542 Revista Ercilla, November 25-December 1, 1981.
543 Milton Friedman, “Free Market and the Generals”, Newsweek, January 25, 1982.
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 Friedman offered the same argument in an interview with Chilean magazine Cosas in 1982.
On that occasion Friedman argued that even though an authoritarian government could impose free
market reforms, in the long run authoritarianism and a free economy were not compatible. At some
point Friedman said, “the essential incompatibility between a lack of competition in politics and
competition in the market becomes evident”.544 He further argued that if the junta did not keep its
promise to restore democracy then the free market would end up by being destroyed. According to
Friedman, this would be nothing new in the Latin American context, where many dictatorships had
introduced economic reforms when they were desperate but then refused to reintroduce democracy
and opted for reversing the liberalization course. Friedman went on explaining that it was possible
to have a free market economy for some time under an authoritarian regime, but that the cultural,
sociological and philosophical foundations of the free market were in open “conflict” with those of
an authoritarian regime.545 Under an authoritarian regime said Friedman, “there is the idea that
things must be organized top down while in the free market the inverse is the case”.546 That
combination, said Friedman, could lead to an explosive social or political reaction and to the
frustration of the free market.
Interestingly enough, Friedman’s analysis that economic freedom required political freedom
in order to be preserved was fully coherent with Douglass North’s vision on the same subject.
According to North, “economic growth and the development of freedom are complementary
processes of societal development”.547 While economic growth creates the resources to support a
system of civil and political liberties, these reinforce economic freedom and economic growth. In
North’s words:
Economic growth provides the resources to support more complex societies and it is
unlikely to persist in the long run without the development of political and civil
liberties. A world of specialization and division of labor –the roots of economic
growth− is going to nurture democratic polities and individual freedom.548
North further argued that well specified and impartially enforced property rights, which are a
condition for economic growth, can only be protected from arbitrary confiscation when political
rights and civil rights are secure.549 Thus North’s theory seems to confirm the mutual dependence
544 See: Revista Cosas No. 149, June, 1982.
545 Idem.
546 Idem.
547 Douglass North, The Paradox of the West, p.1. Available at: 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4158/9309005.pdf?sequence=1 Last accessed: 28-06-2014.
548 Idem.
549 Idem.
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between economic freedom and political freedom alleged by Friedman.
The Chicago Boys on democracy and political liberty
There is little doubt that the Chicago Boys saw things as Friedman did. In their view, no one
who was interested in preserving democracy and political liberty could afford to ignore the
economic reality or despise economic liberty.  Like Friedman, they believed that it had been the
misinterpretation of economic reality by previous ideologies and the use of the political process to
expand the welfare state thereby restricting freedom that had led to Chile’s economic and
democratic failure. Their beliefs, as North allows to conclude, were not only the result of their
education at Chicago but also of their own experience under the ISI system.  In the words of “The
Brick”: “from the late 1930s Chile has increased a line of state interventionism” creating an
enormous “discretionary power” for institutions which use this power in an “abusive way”.550 In
particular the ISI system had been counterproductive because it had resulted in a “concentration of
productive resources”, which was “dammed to have low growth rates”.551 More importantly, as
Bardón pointed out, this expansion of government had also meant a “deterioration of the effective
exercise of personal rights, in particular freedom”.552
According to “The Brick” by promoting runaway government intervention, the
interventionist policies of the ISI system had undermined the economy leading to social conflict and
political instability. For the Chicago Boys, the result of statism had been a vicious circle in which
government intervention created economic problems that fed more radical ideologies, which in turn
expanded government intervention even further.553 In the words of “The Brick”:
There is no doubt that the deficient economic development of the last decades not
only has led to increasing tensions and frustrations but also has fed the growth of
political currents and ideologies that prevent the country from solving its problems in
an efficient way and in a framework of mutual respect among Chileans. The social,
economic and political crisis is evident....554  
And later “The Brick” insisted: “the anxiety for achieving more economic growth and the
550 El Ladrillo,.p. 29-30.
551 Ibid.,p. 32.
552 Álvaro Bardón, Elementos para elaborar un programa, 1983, CIDOC, Universidad Finis Terrae, Reference code
CL-CIDOC-14-L.10-122159/1983- Box: AG-7.
553 Ibid., p. 29.
554 Ibid., p. 22.
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failure in delivering it by the successive programs have paved the way for the Marxist
demagoguery”, which promised to “substantially improve the quality of life of the immense
majority of Chileans without affecting more than the rich”.555  Less than three years, continued
“The Brick”, had been enough for making evident the complete failure of the Marxist recipe.556
In the view of the Chicago Boys, the free market revolution, based on the science of
economics, was necessary not only to restore a functioning economy but also to create the
foundations for a viable democracy and political liberty. In a book assessing one decade of liberal
economic reforms under the military government (1973-1983), Chicago Boys Álvaro Bardón,
Camilo Carrasco and Álvaro Vial endorsed Friedman’s vision arguing that the evidence not only
proved that free market oriented countries had the highest living standards, but also showed a much
higher level of respect for the fundamental rights of the individuals than socialist countries. Like
Friedman, Carrasco, Vial and Bardón, explained that a system of free market institutions in which
government assumes a subsidiary role would also increase the respect for human rights and
personal liberties:
For the effective respect for personal rights, authentic liberty and equality before the
law, government interventionism becomes an almost impassable barrier. Personal
rights that appear in laws become pure formality when the obtainment of jobs is more
a political than an economic matter. If the state distributes jobs, goods, fixes quotas,
fixes prices, etc., arbitrariness that favors friends, relatives and people connected to
the political power becomes the rule while personal rights tend to disappear as
happened under the government of Salvador Allende.557
In the words of Bardón, Carrasco and Vial, economic liberty was a “necessary condition”
for political liberty. In the long run, they argued, economic liberty had “a very high probability of
influencing political liberty”, even though it was not a “sufficient condition for it”.558 Moreover,
economic liberty was a “value in itself” because it was part of integral liberty and was
“indispensable for an effective political liberty and the respect of the most fundamental rights” of
the individuals.559Accordingly, increasing statism was “incompatible with personal freedom and an
effective democracy” that required “decentralization and the respect for private property”.560 For
555 El Ladrillo.,p.28.
556 Ibid., p. 29.
557 Álvaro Bardón, Camilo Carrasco and Álvaro Vial, Una década de cambios económicos,  Editorial Andrés Bello,
Santiago, 1985, p.206.
558 Ibid., p. 218.
559 Ibid., pp.218-219.
560 Idem.
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the authors, in Chile this reality had been gradually forgotten by “the influence of socialist ideas
and the myth that government serves the interest of the whole of the community.”561
 The Chicago Boys claimed that Chile’s institutional evolution from the 1930s onwards had
made people more dependent on government and political parties, which in turn had become
instruments for serving interest groups.562 The same diagnosis had been made by the Klein & Saks
Mission two decades earlier. And just as the Klein & Saks Mission had observed, the Chicago Boys
warned in “The Brick” that this politicization of society had become the source of permanent social
conflicts and political instability, threatening to destroy the foundations of democracy. As a result,
the Chicago Boys believed that between the 1930s and 1973, despite formal appearances, the
Chilean democracy “was never functional to progress and personal liberty”.563 Accordingly, they
sustained that it was only by reducing the size of government that it was possible to create an
institutional framework that would put an end to an “anarchic system” that favored the “abusive use
of power” by interest groups.564 In the words of Sergio de Castro, the restoration of economic
liberty was “the only way to improve the quality of life and guarantee justice for all Chileans”.565
For the Chicago Boys, political liberty and democracy demanded that government became a
rule maker and an umpire along the lines classical liberals like Friedman and Courcelle-Seneuil had
advocated. This did not exclude the provision of a safety net for the very poor. It meant that the
main goal of the libertarian revolution was to maximize spaces of individual freedom by
dramatically reducing the scope of government intervention. This would lead to a depolitization of
society, giving power back from the government and interest groups to the people. Only thus could
the foundations for a viable democracy be set in place. As Bardón argued, a functioning democracy
could not be “imposed by decree”.566 It was necessary to liberalize “step by step” so that
“government gives its power away”.567 Otherwise, as Bardón himself explained in 1979, when
government controls everything, “when there is a presidential election what one is electing is a
dictator”.568 Along the same lines, labor minister José Piñera said that the structural economic
reforms promoted by the government sought to “introduce spaces of individual freedom unknown
to the Chilean people, transforming Chile into a country where reason prevails over dogmatism and
prejudices, and where individual liberty is the general rule and state intervention the exception”.569
561 Ibid.,  p. 204.
562 El Ladrillo.,p.32.
563 Álvaro Bardón, Elementos para elaborar un programa, p.1.
564 Ibid., p.30.
565 Sergio de Castro, Fundamentos del modelo económico mixto y moderno del gobierno de Chile, CIDOC Universidad
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Piñera added that it was necessary to “establish individual liberty in the roots of society”.570 The
Chicago Boys believed in the principle of decentralization in order to reduce the power of
government and increase individual freedom: “Professors should be in charge of the universities,
parents should take part in the administration of schools, individuals should integrate community
organizations, communities should contribute to define the general orientation of public hospitals,
etc.”571 Piñera explained that this was a “bottom up” democratization process that was essential for
reintroducing formal democracy: “It is only after a bottom up democratization process, which takes
away from government its absolute power eliminating several conflict sources for the state, that
modern democratic mechanisms to create the political leadership on top, can be operated”.572 In this
context, Piñera argued that the aim of the reforms was clear: “the big challenge for the government
is to make the last revolution; a libertarian one that will take away the power of government giving
it back to the individuals, thereby ending with all revolutions”.573
“The Brick” shared the same goal of restoring economic liberty as a necessary condition for
reintroducing a stable democracy and political liberty. Indeed, the first goal on the list prepared by
the authors was to “obtain a high and stable rate of economic growth within the context of a truly
democratic government, which ensures the full enjoyment of civil rights to majorities and
minorities”.574The authors echoed Adam Smith and Friedman arguing that the best way to solve
Chile’s economic problems was by allowing “the functioning of the impersonal markets without
bureaucratic discretion but regulated by competition and the existence of several controls,
incentives and sanctions”.575 In this free market system they added, government had to secure the
most comprehensive “economic liberty and economic equality for all citizens guaranteeing their
political liberty and political equality” the only limit being “the common or social good”.576 For that
it was necessary to “decentralize the economic system” disseminating the power concentrated in the
hand of political parties so that the community could have an effective participation and equality in
opportunities could increase. This decentralization argued “The Brick”, would “fraction and
distribute power transferring it from the top to the bottom”.577 As a result of this dissemination of
power, numerous activities would become “depoliticize” and ideological conflicts would not take
place within the government’s action.578
570 Idem.
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Constructing a libertarian and democratic society: Bardón’s memo to General Pinochet
and Büchi’s classical liberal government program.
One of the most telling documents with regard to the Chicago Boys’ project of creating a
free society both in economic and political terms was a memo prepared by Alvaro Bardón in the
early 1980s. The document entitled “Elements for Designing a Program” was written for General
Pinochet and its aim was to orient the military government on the course of action it had to follow
until the return of democracy in 1990. Bardón laid down the fundamental principles of British-
American liberalism. It insisted that a consensus had to be reached along the libertarian lines
proposed in the document so that a successful transition to a “regular government” could take place.
In the first part, the President of the Chilean Central Bank basically repeated the argument of
“The Brick” in that from the 1930s onwards Chile had followed a path of increasing statism that had
resulted in economic stagnation, high inflation and social instability. According to Bardón this over
expansion of government had affected personal liberties and distorted democracy because
government no longer represented the interest of the voters, and was instead captured by interest
groups. In Bardón’s words: “social conflicts were permanent and the power of the gremios in
collusion with political parties... distorted political participation and the allocation of resources
creating a sort of corporatist socialism”.579 This process had in turn led to increasing ideological
responses until it reached its climax under the UP government.
After listing the achievements of the military regime in one decade, Bardón went on to
explain which the pending challenges for the government were. According to Bardón the
government had to “open more space for a true exercise of personal rights, in particular
freedom”.580 In addition, the government had to continue the process of decentralization of power
and further modernize the economy in order to allow the development of the liberty necessary to
adapt to the radical changes that were taking place in the world. For Bardón, this goal required a
system of private property that was both extensive and massive.
The government also had to reassure that the social order would enable the “organization of
the people in a framework of the most extensive liberty”.581 Moreover, for Bardón the government
had to “reiterate that the political goal of the regime is to achieve a democracy without the vices of
the past, adapted to the new world, functional to development and respectful of personal
liberties”.582 This regime, insisted Bardón, was not corporatist. It aimed at constructing “a true
579 Bardón, Elementos para elaborar un programa, p.2.
580 Ibid., p.14.
581 Ibid., p.15.
582 Idem.
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democracy” by promoting an active and direct participation of the diverse groups and civil
organizations.583 In order to achieve this, Bardón argued that the military government also had to
“explain how the transference of power” from the military government to the newly elected
authorities was going to take place.584
With regard to terrorism, Bardón emphasized that the internal security forces had to be
organized in a way that could effectively fight terrorism “protecting individual rights and the
tranquility especially of marginalized groups of society”.585 Bardón added that among western
intellectuals libertarian ideas had been experiencing a comeback and that the Chilean government
could benefit by adopting those ideas in its fight against Marxism.586  
As far as concrete policies were concerned, Bardón suggested that private property should
be extended, arguing, like Friedman, that “the diffusion of property” enabled an “effective
liberty”.587 For this, the military government had to implement several reforms which, according to
Bardón, were necessary to apply this “democratic and libertarian philosophy” that saw the division
of power as an essential feature.588Accordingly, all restrictions to the creation of research centers,
healthcare centers, as well as prohibitions for television, radio and publications had to be
eliminated. Likewise, Bardón insisted that “several democratic libertarian” improvements could be
made such as eliminating restrictions for creating sports clubs, student federations, unions or any
other form of civil organization.589
Shortly before finishing the document, Bardón warned that the program of the government
for the coming years could by no circumstance be corporatist or fascist because that was not what
had been promised. In order to fight that stigma, the government had to “increase political
participation, enable the existence of political parties, favor liberty and personal rights and speak
about constructing a modern democracy”.590 Finally Bardón urged Pinochet to “decentralize power”
as soon as possible in a way that was “difficult to reverse”.  Bardón’s final remark in the memo
stated in no uncertain terms the philosophy behind the free market revolution: “This is all about
constructing a modern and libertarian society that is able to resist the radical and constructivist
ideologies that have dominated us”.591
The person in charge of projecting that libertarian and democratic society was finance
minister Hernan Büchi who ran for president in 1989. Along with Jose Piñera, Büchi had been the
583 Idem.
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most influential second generation Chicago Boy and the central architect of Chile’s rapid economic
recovery after the devastating 1981 economic crisis. The basic philosophy of Büchi’s campaign was
summarized in a brief document that was made available to the Chilean public under the title
“Cuatro tareas para avanzar en paz: lineamientos fundamentales del programa de gobierno de
Hernan Büchi”. (Four Tasks to Move Forward in Peace: Fundamental Guidelines of the
Government Program of Hernan Büchi”.) The document stated that at the end of the 20th century
mankind had “rediscovered” the “value of personal liberty as the most powerful engine of human
perfection and the principle upon which society should be organized”.592 According to the
document, thanks to this “libertarian revolution” several countries had been able to progress in
economic, social and cultural terms, which contrasted dramatically with the failure of collectivist
systems that opposed freedom.593 Socialism, argued Büchi’s campaign, not only created economic
misery but also led to the systematic violations of personal rights. The document went on
explaining the philosophical position of Büchi and his followers in the following terms: “we deeply
believe in personal liberty which is the source of individual and collective progress...we promote
the stability of the family, and the creation of an atmosphere of responsibility and individual effort,
of sobriety and respect for the individuals”.594 According to Büchi’s basic philosophy, personal
liberty implied “tolerance” which meant “the respect for different ways of thinking and acting.”595
Moreover, far from endorsing a purely economic approach to progress, Büchi’s campaign stated
that “the degree of development of every country should be measured by its respect to individuals”
more than by its material wealth.596  The document went on arguing that people had fundamental
rights that were “prior and superior to the state”. In this context, liberty was understood mostly in a
negative sense. According to the document, liberty “dignified” the individual because it entailed the
respect for fundamental rights such as the right of life, freedom of speech, property and political
rights.597
After stressing the value and meaning of liberty, Büchi’s program explained the origins of
the crisis that put an end the UP government. The explanation was that same that had been given by
Friedman, the authors of “The Brick” and several other documents written by the Chicago Boys.
According to Büchi’s program, the government had strangled individual freedom over the decades
making economic progress impossible, thereby undermining social stability, and eventually leading
to the breakdown of the economy and the democratic order. The lack of economic liberty had
592  “4 Tareas para avanzar en paz”, 1989, p.1. CIDOC, Universidad Finis Terrae, Reference code CL-CIDOC-14-M.2-
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brought about the destruction of political liberty and democracy, argued the document. In the light
of that experience, Büchi’s government would “construct a society that was politically and
economically free”.598This new democracy should by no means “sacrifice” the economic
achievements that had been reached because freedom was the only way to maintain prosperity and a
functioning democratic system.599
 Following “The Brick’s” diagnosis that democracy and political liberty could only be
sustainable if effective economic freedom and progress were achieved, Büchi argued that the
challenge was to combine and maintain all these elements in order to ensure peace and progress.
Accordingly, government power had to be strictly limited not only in economic terms but also in its
ability to affect personal rights. In the document’s words: “our project seeks to enlarge economic,
social and political liberty by creating the conditions which enable everyone to develop his
creativity and potentialities”.600 Education in values such as love, tolerance, austerity and
responsibility were essential for the proper cultivation of liberty argued the document.
Spreading British - American liberalism: the creation of the Centro de Estudios Públicos
and the Mont Pelerin Society meeting in Viña del Mar
As has been argued, Douglass North identifies ideas and ideologies as a major force of
institutional change. In Chile, two of the most important efforts made during the military regime to
provide the necessary intellectual base for the transition to a free and democratic society were the
creation of the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP) in 1980 and the celebration of the Mont Pelerin
Society (MPS) regional meeting in the city of Viña del Mar in 1981.  The meeting in Viña del Mar
was attended by emblematic figures of the neoliberal world such as James Buchanan, Hans
Sennholz, Milton and Rose Friedman, Gotfried Dietze, Arnold Harberger, Gordon Tullock and
Reed Irvine among others. The event was described by the editor of the MPS Newsletter Eric
Brodin as “the largest and one of the most successful regional meetings in the ten years in which
regional meetings had been held”.601
The initiative to celebrate the regional meeting in Viña del Mar came from Chile. It was
former senator Pedro Ibáñez and Chicago Boy Carlos Cáceres who contacted Friedrich von Hayek
in order to propose to him the idea of holding a meeting in Chile.  Ibáñez had been one of the
founders of the Adolfo Ibáñez Business School in Viña del Mar, a free market oriented institution
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whose dean at the time of the MPS meeting was Cáceres. In April 1978, Cáceres wrote a letter to
Hayek thanking him for having visited the Business School in November of 1977. Cáceres also
thanked Hayek for his invitation to attend the general MPS meeting which took place in Hong-
Kong in September of 1978. Cáceres wrote that he considered “that the topic to be discussed, ‘The
Order of Freedom,’ was of “extreme importance to what is going on in Chile and in the free world
in our days”.602 In the same letter, Cáceres informed Hayek that Ibáñez would make a formal
proposal to hold the 1980 general meeting of the MPS in Chile. On July 8, 1978, Ibáñez sent a letter
to Hayek telling him about his intentions to formally propose Chile for holding the MPS general
meeting of 1980 and asking him for his support at the Board of Directors of the MPS. At the time
Ibáñez wrote to Hayek, the discussion about a new constitution that would enable a transition to
democracy was at its height. In the letter, Ibáñez left no doubt about the importance of an MPS
meeting given the historical context of the country. Ibáñez explained to Hayek that there was “an
increasing debate on the new political institutions” adding that his ideas constantly emerged “as
frequent subjects of discussion.”603  For Ibáñez, an MPS meeting in Chile would be crucial to
provide intellectual support to the process of creating a free society: “I sincerely feel that there are
good valid reasons to consider Chile as the place for the 1980 meeting of the Society. Economic as
well as political developments in my country may be worth reviewing and analyzing on the
spot.”604
 As a result of Ibáñez proposal, the Board of Directors of the MPS decided to hold a regional
meeting in 1981 in Viña del Mar.  The local organizing committee was made up by Pedro Ibáñez
and Chicago Boys Carlos Cáceres, Rolf Lüders, Jorge Cauas, Pablo Baraona and Hernán Cortés.
Although Hayek did not attend the meeting, he visited Chile in April of the same year after an
invitation made by Jorge Cauas.  Cauas invited Hayek on the occasion of the foundation of the
Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP). The CEP was a think tank created by Cauas and other Chicago
Boys, economists and business people with the aim of promoting a classical liberal philosophy in an
effort to contribute to the construction of a free society along the lines of neoliberalism in Chile. In
its statement of aims, the CEP declared that it sought to diagnose “the problems related to
philosophy, politics, society and public affairs in order to facilitate the comprehension of the factors
that are decisive for the achievement and conservation of a free society...”605 It further declared that
“the values on which its work is grounded are those that enable the existence of the most extended
602 The letter is to be found at the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford, California 94305-6010,
under the title “The Mont Pelerin Society Records”, boxes 5-28. A photo of the letter and other original material
concerning the MPS meeting in Chile can also be found at: http://coreyrobin.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/vina-del-
mar-4.pdf Last accessed 28/06/2014.
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personal liberty within a society that lives in peace and harmony. The set of values that orient and
organize its work are therefore those in which the ideals of liberty are privileged”.606 The CEP
became by far the most influential think tank in Chilean history and a powerful engine in spreading
neoliberal ideas. In 2012 it was ranked among the 25 most influential think tanks in the world by
the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program of the International Relations Program of the
University of Pennsylvania.607  Until these days, the think tank declares that it “is a private non-
partisan non-profit academic foundation” that engages “in cultivating, analyzing, and disseminating
the values and principles on which a free and democratic order is based”.608
The creation of the CEP and the celebration of the MPS meeting were part of the strategy of
achieving intellectual hegemony by the Chicago Boys so that neoliberalism would become the
driving intellectual force behind institutional change even after the transition to democracy. After
the MPS meeting in Viña del Mar, Brodin reported that several participants had visited the CEP in
order to become better acquainted with the institution. Brodin described the CEP as “an institute
supported by heavy weights in classical liberalism” including “Sergio de Castro, Juan Carlos
Méndez and Jorge Cauas,” all of whom belonged to the group of the Chicago Boys.609 According to
Brodin, the CEP was concerned with “the lack of a sense of moral philosophy in the classical
tradition of Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments in contemporary economics”.610
The CEP’s ambition to influence the institutional transformation of Chile along the lines of
neoliberalism and classical liberalism was supported by major figures of the neoliberal world such
as Friedrich Hayek, Theodore Schultz, Karl Brunner and Arthur Seldon, all of whom became
members of the think tank’s board of directors.611 Of all the great names, Hayek was the most
important for the project. This is further indication that the Chicago Boys were not only interested
in economic liberalism. In March 1981 Cauas wrote to Hayek explaining   that even though the
economy was making progress thanks to the free market reforms, he and the group behind the CEP
were aware that much more had to be done in order to create the base for “the political order of a
free society”. With this last phrase Cauas was alluding to Hayek’s third volume of his work Law,
Legislation and Liberty, which was entitled “The Political Order of a Free People”.612 Cauas went
on to explain the importance of Hayek’s philosophy in the process of construction of a free political
system in Chile:
606 Idem.
607 See: http://www.cepchile.cl/1_4965/doc/el_cep_entre_los_30_think-tanks_top_del_mundo.html#.UiXPVNJgdNJ
Last accessed: 28/06/2014
608 See: http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/lang_1/base/nosotros.html Last accessed: 28/06/2014
609 Bodwin, “MPS Regional Meeting in Chile”, p.5.
610 Idem.
611 Bruce Caldwell, “Los cincuenta años de los Fundamentos de la Libertad”, in: Revista Estudios Públicos No. 120,
Santiago, 2010, p.45.
612 Ibid., p.44.
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We believe it is an extremely important enterprise in particular for Chile...the work
you have done in the last decades and which culminated with the publication of The
Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and Liberty, is without any doubt the
most important work in this sense and therefore it is natural that we see you,
professor Hayek, as our intellectual leader. We would feel honored to count on your
advice and support in this mission.613
In May 1981, Cauas visited Hayek in Freiburg asking him to become honorary president of
the CEP, a position that Hayek accepted. Some months earlier, Hayek had written to Carlos Cáceres
to ask for his opinion about Cauas and the CEP. Cáceres wrote a letter to Hayek dated October 10,
1980, where he answered that Cauas, who had been Finance Minister from 1975 to 1977, had been
in charge of “making the most important decisions to establish in our country a free economic
system in an environment that could be qualified as the most difficult since the 1930s”.614 Cáceres
accounted for the libertarian motivation of Cauas with the creation of the CEP as follows:
Since he returned to Chile Mr. Cauas has been concerned about the development of
an intellectual group which can support the basic ideas of a free social system. With
that purpose he has joined the effort of some academicians and businessmen...All of
them have decided to create the Centro de Estudios Públicos with the purpose of
researching and publishing the ideas concerning the fundamentals of a free society...I
share the concern of establishing in Chile an institute which could develop an original
set of ideas about the whole meaning of freedom in the social, political and economic
structure.615
As part of the coordinated  efforts to spread British-American liberalism, after the MPS
meeting in Viña del Mar, the CEP  published a selection of the papers presented at the conference
as a well as a lecture given by Hayek during his visit to Chile earlier that year. The papers presented
at the MPS meeting are of particular importance because they clearly sought to influence the
intellectual climate of opinion in Chile with classical liberal ideas of liberty. The same CEP
declared in the introduction of the book with the papers that the think tank was “sure that the essays
contained in this number will contribute to the extensive and sound debate on the ideas of
liberty”.616
613 Ibid. pp. 44-45.
614 Letter available at: http://coreyrobin.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/vina-del-mar-4.pdf Last accessed 28/06/2014.
615 Idem.
616 See: Centro de Estudios Públicos, Conferencia Mont Pelerin, in: Revista Estudios Públicos No. 6, Santiago, 1982,
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The essays selected for publication were Freedom of expression and misinformation in the
Western World by Reed Irvine, Introduction of Market Economies: The German Model compared
with the Chilean Model, by Wolfgang Frickhöffer, Democracy: Limited or Unlimited by James
Buchanan, The Growth of the Leviathan by Christian Watrin, The Chilean way to the Market
Economy, by Carlos Cáceres, The Morality of the Market System, by R.M Hartwell, Capitalism
under the test of Ethics, by Arthur Shenfield, The Foundations of Redistribution by Gordon
Tullock, A Monetary System for a Free Society, by Milton Friedman, Gotfried Dietze Democracy
and Proper Democracy, and Friedrich von Hayek’s conference in April 1981 at the CEP entitled
The Principles of a Liberal Social Order. These articles covered many of the most important topics
of classical liberalism all of which were of high relevance for the Chilean situation. Buchanan’s
reflection on the nature of democracy for example, came at a point in time when the new
constitution had recently been created and the transition to democracy was being discussed.
According to Karin Fisher, Buchanan’s paper provided theoretical support for the construction of a
limited democracy by the Chicago Boys.617  
For Buchanan, who along with Gordon Tullock visited Chile several times during the free
market revolution, the question was how to restrict democracy so that a society could function
enabling people to retain their individual liberties.618 The scope of government activity played a
crucial role in this context. According to Buchanan’s public choice theory bureaucrats are self-
interested motivated people that seek to maximize their own utility from their positions in
government. When this becomes clear then the only system that can ensure political equality619 is
one that tends to a minimal state that protects property rights and personal liberties and provides the
elements necessary for the enforcement of contracts.620 The opposite is a protectionist and
redistributive government in which collective decisions have winners ─takers─ and losers ─payers.
According to Buchanan, modern democracies, with massive transference programs and
protectionist legislations were in some middle point between both extremes. The protection of
personal liberties he insisted, can be best achieved with constitutional provisions that restrict the
scope of government to some well-defined activities even if this means restricting democracy. Only
thus can society be depoliticized and the market can play the role of efficiently allocating resources
and coordinating human activity.621
Buchanan’s ideas were of course in the classical liberal tradition. He himself recognized in
p.6.
617 Fisher, “The influence of Neoliberals in Chile, before, during and after Pinochet”, p.235.
618 James Buchanan, “Democracia: limitada o ilimitada”, Revista Estudios Públicos, No. 6,  Santiago, 1982, p.37.
619 Political equality as described by Buchanan is a situation in which all members of the community are equal before
the law and have equal saying in the process that changes the laws and constitution of the polity.
620 Buchanan, “Democracia: limitada o ilimitada”, p.42.
621 Idem.
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the paper published by the CEP that he was following the ideas of thinkers from the 18 th century
such as, Adam Smith, David Hume, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and Montesquieu.622
According to Buchanan, these thinkers and others had develop a healthy skepticism with regard to
governments and bureaucrats, which had led them to propose several constitutional controls over
their power. In addition, wrote Buchanan, these thinkers understood that it was the spontaneous
order of the market what was capable of coordinating human efforts in the context of a minimal
state thus offering a powerful check to the power of government. These classical liberals argued
Buchanan, understood that there was a political function of the market economy, something that
had been lost with time.
 Buchanan’s paper published by the CEP was complemented by two other papers that
addressed the dangers that democracy poses to individual liberty. One was Dietze’s paper on proper
and improper democracy and the other one was Watrin’s paper on the growth of the Leviathan. In
his paper, Dietze argued that the modern tendency towards liberalism emerged prior to the modern
tendency towards democracy and that democracy used to be an instrument to increase liberty.
According to Dietze, in the tradition of classical liberalism, “proper democracy serves for the
defense of the rights of the individuals against the power of government”.623Like Buchanan, Dietze
argued that the constitution’s role in this tradition was the limitation of the powers of government.
According to Dietze, from a classical liberal perspective, the more the liberty of individual is
guaranteed, the more proper is democracy. And this implied a strong and special protection of the
right of property without which democracy ceases to be proper. Socialists and fascist regimes were
plain democracies so long as they are structured upon the base of the popular participation
principle, but could not be considered proper democracies because there was no protection of
property rights and other individual rights.624In order to subsist, concluded Dietze, proper
democracies, or democracies as they were understood in the tradition of classical liberalism, had to
protect the rights of the individuals both from the government and from other individuals. Dietze
concluded that a liberal democracy required a constitution that protects democracy from its abuses
and self-destruction.625
Wratin’s paper made the same case as Dietze’s arguing that from ancient times the
democratic movements had had the objective of protecting individual liberties adding that history
was full of examples of democracies that had ended up destroying themselves.626 According to
Wratin, this was due to the fact that from Rousseau onwards democracy was no longer understood
622 Ibid., p.47.
623 Gottfried Dietze, “Democracia tal como es y democracia apropiada”, Revista Estudios Públicos No. 6, Santiago,
1982,  p.28.
624 Ibid., p.31.
625 Ibid., p.34.
626 Christian Watrin, “El crecimiento del Leviatán”, Revista Estudios Públicos No. 6, Santiago,1982,  p.55.
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as a means to guarantee liberty but as a form of government that idealizes the power of the majority.
It was this transition from a government of majorities to a tyranny what was the greatest threat to
free societies.627 Following Buchanan’s argument, Watrin sustained that a crucial distortion of
democracies in the western world was the expansion of the welfare state, which did not necessarily
serve the interest of the people. This tendency of government to grow, added Watrin, had the
potential of destroying individual liberties and democracy itself.628Accordingly, the only way to
ensure the subsistence of liberal democracies was to stop the growth in government activities by
creating constitutional arrangements. Constitutional rules that ensured liberal policies in commerce,
industry and research, a possible return to the gold standard and a reduction in government
redistributive activities along the lines of the German model of the social market economy were
some of the ideas proposed by Watrin in order to dismantle the welfare state.629
It was no coincidence that the CEP, a home to the Chicago Boys, should have chosen
Buchanan’s, Dietze’s and Watrin’s articles for publication. At a time when the nature of the new
democracy was being discussed and defined in the new Chilean constitution, those classical liberal
authors provided intellectual support for creating a type of democracy based on the classical liberal
view. The three authors promoted a prevalence of liberty, understood in negative sense, over
democracy and warned against the dangers of the welfare state both for personal rights and
democracy itself. With these ideas, the articles by Buchanan, Watrin and Dietze basically came to
reinforce Milton Friedman’s and the Chicago Boys’ views about Chile’s recent history and the
relevance of economic liberty for democracy and political liberty. The fact that Carlos Cáceres’
conference at the MPS in Viña was also chosen for publication confirms this motivation. In his
paper, Cáceres started with an explanation common to all Chicago Boys with respect to the causes
of Chile’s institutional and economic crisis in 1973. He argued that there had been a period of free
market economy at the beginning of the 20th century and that the Great Depression had led to an
“increasing intervention of government and ultimately the implantation of a socialist
regime”.630Dependency theory, explained Cáceres, had defined the new development model without
any regard for efficiency considerations. This had led to even more government intervention and the
use of discretionary power by state officials, which restricted economic and civil liberties. Cáceres
also blamed the Alliance for Progress, the Christian Democratic Party and ECLA for pushing
socialism even further with disastrous consequences for the economy and personal liberties.631
Finally, Cáceres explained, the UP government and its attempt to introduce a full scale centrally
627 Ibid., p.56.
628 Ibid., p.62.
629 Ibid., pp.65 ff.
630 Carlos Cáceres, “La vía chilena a la economía de mercado”, Revista Estudios Públicos, No. 6, Santiago, 1982  p.72.
631 Ibid., p.74.
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planned economy in a context of political violence and hyperinflation had led to the collapse of the
entire social system. According to Cáceres, along with the economic disaster, the UP government
had broken the central rules of a liberal democracy by violating the fundamental rights of the
individuals thereby paving the way for the military intervention.632 The new military regime, said
Cáceres, had assumed the task of reintroducing a market economy and a liberal democracy.
Cáceres went on making the case for limited democracy arguing that the new government
understood that an “unlimited democracy” sooner or later would sow the seeds of its own
destruction.633The new system envisioned by the government, had to be based upon a market
economy, a strong protection of property rights as well and the principle of subsidiarity of the role
of government. Democracy thus organized, concluded Cáceres, was not a mere procedure to elect
the rulers but a way of life that guaranteed personal liberties. For Cáceres, Friedman’s Free to
Choose, was the aim of the new democratic order incorporated in the Constitution of 1980.634
Along the same lines of Cáceres and even in more radical terms, Frickhöffer’s presentation
at the MPS in Viña del Mar, also published by the CEP, argued that it was undeniable even for a
democrat like himself, that before 1973 the Chilean democracy was “an abominable and antisocial
farce”.635 He argued that the authoritarian nature of Chile’s political regime allowed to make more
profound reforms than would be possible under a democracy. Frickhöffer compared Chile with the
Germany of Ludwig Erhard, who also made his drastic economic reforms in a context that was not
a parliamentary democracy.636  The inability to make the necessary free market reforms to correct
an unsustainable statist course was for Frickhöffer one of the central weaknesses of democracy. A
weakness that became a threat to personal liberty and democracy itself and that had to be eliminated
by constitutional restraints.
Conclusions to chapter III
Following North’s insight that reality feedback modifies beliefs and in turn the new beliefs
lead to institutional changes, this chapter has explained how new ideologies prone to the expansion
of government penetrated in Chile and contributed to change the liberal institutional framework that
had prevailed until the Great Depression of 1929. Along with the failure of the free banking system
the Great Depression was largely responsible for the decline of British-American liberalism and the
632 Ibid., p.81.
633 Idem.
634 Ibid., p.83.
635  Wolfgang Frickhöffer, “La implantación de una economía de mercado: el modelo alemán y el modelo chileno”,
Revista Estudios Públicos, No. 6, Santiago, 1982, p.89.
636 According to Frickhöffer, Erhard used the “golden opportunity” offered by the fact that Germany was occupied and
all that was needed was General Lucius Clay’s consent to make the reforms.
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rise of socialism, nationalism, fascism, protectionism and communism. Of all the institutions that
congregated intellectuals who sought to debunk classical liberalism, ECLA had the most decisive
influence on the intellectual and political spheres. With the explicit aim of putting an end to
Courcelle- Seneuil’s legacy, ECLA managed to lead Chile’s institutional evolution towards an
increasing role of government in the economy and social life. However, as this chapter shows,
liberalism, although weakened, remained present in Chile. The fact that in the 1920s and the 1950s
the Chilean government sought economic advice from American liberal economists indicates that at
least in economic matters liberalism remained an influential worldview. Both Edwin Kemmerer and
the Klein & Saks mission basically sought to revive Courcelle-Seneuil’s economic philosophy
through reforms that pointed in the direction of substantially reducing the scope of government
interference. The intellectual turning point in favor of liberalism would come in the 1950s with the
visit of the Klein & Saks mission and the agreement between the Universidad Católica and the
University of Chicago. In addition, El Mercurio started an aggressive campaign in order to promote
the liberal ideas imported from the United States. All of this shows that liberalism had started to
gain intellectual terrain in Chile decades before the Chicago Boys had the chance to make their
reforms. This revival of liberalism was largely a reaction against what was viewed as the poor
results of the ISI system and government intervention in the economy. It was again reality feedback,
as North allows to conclude, that led to the rebirth of what Anibal Pinto called “courcelle-
seneuilismo”. Also vital in this process of liberal revival was the role played by the Cold War. As
this chapter explains, the Chicago Boys were largely the product of the ideological clash between
American democratic capitalism on the one hand and Soviet socialism on the other hand. Moreover,
the joint program of the University of Chicago and the Universidad Católica was partly financed by
the American government and had the explicit aim of promoting American ideas of freedom that
could debunk ECLA’s dominance as well other collectivist doctrines. The historical context in
which the process took place was of extreme ideological polarization and increasing “political
disorder”. As North observed, political disorder leads to ideological responses among those who
fear that a revolution might take place. The perceived threat that Chile could turn into Cuban style
socialist regime played thus an important role in the radical endorsement of neoliberalism and the
American cause by the Chicago Boys. This version of neoliberalism, as “The Brick” and other
documents analyzed in this chapter show, included ideas of liberty and democracy in the classical
liberal tradition. Simply put, the Chicago Boys’ view was that a free economy and economic
development were a necessary but not sufficient condition for a functioning democracy and the
existence of political liberties. In other words, they believed, like classical liberals before them, that
without economic liberty, neither democracy nor political liberties could exist. Moreover, they were
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convinced that Chile’s democracy and liberties had been ultimately destroyed by the systematic
expansion of government that had taken place in the previous decades −an expansion that in their
opinion derived from mistaken ideologies and which had transformed Chile into a rent-seeking
society and what North calls a “Limited Access Order”. Thus, the Chicago Boys took over the task
of restoring economic freedom and economic stability as the priority, for in their view it was only
after an institutional framework favorable to economic liberty was established that democracy could
be reintroduced and political liberty be real. As this chapter shows, in all of this Friedman shared
identical views. Moreover, Friedman himself urged for the reintroduction of democracy in Chile
because he believed that the temptation of the military to reverse the economic reforms in order to
consolidate more power in their hands was a risk for the whole project of the Chicago Boys. Hence
Friedman’s statement that while economic liberty was a necessary but not sufficient condition for
political liberty, the latter was a necessary condition for economic liberty. Overall Friedman and the
Chicago Boys' views were grounded on the same economic philosophy promoted a century earlier
by Courcelle-Seneuil and earlier by Adam Smith. The similarity between both traditions becomes
clear when the ideas of the Chicago Boys explored in this chapter are compared to the ideas of
Courcelle-Seneuil and Andrés Bello presented in the previous chapter. The similarity between the
Chicago Boys' and Courcelle-Seneuil’s tradition becomes even more remarkable when the writings
of the French professor are compared with those of Friedman.
This chapter provides further evidence that the Chicago Boys were inspired by a
comprehensive classical liberal tradition that included ideas of democracy and political liberty when
analyzing the creation of the think tank CEP and the meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society in Chile.
As the previous pages show, the creation of the CEP by some of the Chicago Boys had the explicit
aim of spreading classical liberal ideas, that is to say, liberalism of British-American origin in all its
dimensions in order to provide intellectual support to the institutional reforms that were being made
at the time. The fact that Hayek accepted to become honorary president of the CEP indicates the
wider ideological nature of the CEP. The CEP’s ideological position, along the lines of British-
American liberalism was made clear in its statement of aims as well as in its publications. Among
the first publications were the conferences given at the Mont Pelerin Society meeting in Viña del
Mar in 1981, which was organized by many Chicago Boys and which addressed several of the most
important philosophical issues concerning a free society from a classical liberal perspective. Further
evidence of the influence of British-American liberalism on the reforms made during the free
market revolution will be analyzed in the next chapter which deals with the ideological sources
behind the most important legal document made under Pinochet’s military regime: the Constitution
of 1980.
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Chapter IV: Institutionalizing neoliberalism: Jaime Guzmán and “The Constitution of Liberty”
 The military Junta, Jaime Guzmán and the shift to American liberalism
There is no doubt that the Chilean military were not prone to liberalism. Like the idea of
reintroducing democracy, the free market revolution was the outcome of the influence of civilian
advisers. As we have seen, democracy and economic liberty were two inseparable parts of the
original plan of the Chicago Boys, the latter being the priority. It is important to note here that the
authors of “The Brick” many of whom were Christian Democrats, never imagined that the plan
would be used by an authoritarian regime. As Sergio de Castro explained: “I took over the task of
writing what we had agreed on. The following week we revised my notes and went on working
without having the slightest idea of the possible practical fate of what we were doing”.637Along the
same lines, Professor Patricio Meller, a critic of the Chicago Boys and opponent of the military
regime has pointed out that the authors of “The Brick” “did not believe that a military coup was
coming. Their purpose was to solve social problems from a different perspective”.638 But even if
some of the Chicago Boys had suspected the possibility of a military coup, it was impossible for
them to have foreseen whose side would the military take in the Cold War. As Vial observed,
Allende initiated his presidential term of office with the approval of the Army generals.  As for the
officers, not only did they not reject socialism, but they even showed affinity with it.639 Moreover,
Pinochet, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army by Allende himself, was a
complete enigma from an ideological point of view.640
The impossibility of foreseeing the practical fate of “The Brick” is also clear from the fact
that after the coup, the military regime opted for running the economy in the old Keynesian and
nationalist style. There was not even the shade of an idea among the army generals of introducing a
free market model, which in any case they did not know about and was even contrary to their
nationalistic mindset. What is more, many in the military opposed the implementation of the
reforms once the Chicago Boys were in government positions arguing that national security
required state control of major economic assets.641 Fernando Leniz, who became economy minister
637 Arancibia, Patricia y Balart, Francisco, Sergio de Castro, el arquitecto del modelo económico chileno, Editorial 
Biblioteca Americana, Santiago, 2007, p. 156.  
638 Kaiser, En vez de una sola mirada, p.58.
639 Gonzalo Vial, Pinochet, la biografía, El Mercurio-Aguilar, Santiago, Vol. 2, 2002, p. 150.
640 Constable and Valenzuela, p. 44 ff.
641 Ibid.,p.169.
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in 1974, said that he spent 90 per cent of his time trying to explain to the generals and the country
“what a free market was”, adding that “there was huge resistance”.642 It was only when it became
clear that the crisis could not be solved by persisting in the same statist policies that the Chicago
Boys were put in charge, not without resistance from many members of the military. The military’s
opposition to a free market philosophy was reflected in the declaration of principles of the Junta in
1974. Although the document already showed some liberal elements and a clear rejection of
socialism it nevertheless condemned American capitalism and the consumer society promoted by
the Chicago Boys:
The developed societies of the West...have evolved into a materialism that drowns
men spiritually and enslaves them. Thus the so-called “consumer societies” have
been configured in which it seems that the dynamic of development has dominated
the human being himself, who feels  empty and unsatisfied,  and longs for a more
humane and calm life.643
Advised by catholic intellectual Jaime Guzmán who would later endorse liberalism, the
Junta  declared that it rejected collectivism as well as “liberal individualism” adding that the
government had to provide the “social conditions so that all individuals could achieve their full
personal development”.644 The Junta’s decision to appoint a Christian Democrat, Raúl Saez, as
Chile’s first minister of economic coordination confirmed its statist bias. Saez had been finance
minister under the government of Eduardo Frei Montalva and strongly believed, along the lines of
ECLA’s philosophy at the time, that the state had to play a large role in the economy.645 It was with
the appointment of Jorge Cauas, an economist with post graduate studies from Columbia
University, as minister of finance that the situation started to change. Cauas’ appointment meant a
shift of power over economic issues from the economy ministry to the finance ministry.646 Even
though Cauas was a Christian Democrat, he shared the Chicago Boys’ position and became one of
the group. Cauas saw that the economy was not recovering. Instead, it showed an inflation of
375.9% in 1974, an enormous fiscal deficit and practically no growth.647 In order to get the
economy back on track the Chicago Boys advocated a radical free market therapy that would create
642 Idem.
643 Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile, March 11, 1974. Available at: 
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pain in the short run but would benefit the whole country in the long run. Cauas agreed while Saez
rejected this policy and submitted his resignation. Such shock therapy had also been Friedman’s
recommendation when he visited Chile in March 1975. In a conference given at the Diego Portales
building, Friedman argued that a gradual policy for controlling inflation and establishing the
foundations for a social market economy “made no sense” because “the patient could die before the
treatment worked out”.648 In a letter to general Pinochet after his visit, Friedman insisted that the
central challenges for Chile were inflation and the construction of a social market economy.649 As
far as inflation was concerned, Friedman explained that its main cause was excessive government
spending, which was financed through money printing. A gradual policy of reforms, wrote
Friedman, would not work given the magnitude of the problem. It had to be radical and accept short
term negative consequences in order to restore monetary soundness. The same radical approach was
suggested for the rest of the free market reforms. Friedman formulated an eight point program in
order to rebalance the economy and put an end to the rent-seeking system that in his view
characterized the Chilean economic model. The suggestions included a monetary reform, a dramatic
reduction of government spending, a halt to money printing as a way to finance government
expenditure, floating exchange rates, the elimination of obstacles to business and entrepreneurs,
price liberalization, labor reform and a policy designed to support the poorest members of society
while the treatment was implemented. Friedman concluded that “a shock program like this would
eliminate inflation in a matter of months and would also establish the necessary foundations for the
effective promotion of a social market economy”.650
Shortly after Friedman’s visit to Chile, Pinochet decided to go for the shock therapy,
appointing Sergio de Castro as finance minister. De Castro had been a second-rank adviser to the
government and had faced serious opposition. He had even been fired by Pinochet after an
argument over how to fix the economy, a decision the general decided to reverse after being
persuaded by his former finance minister Fernando Léniz.651 De Castro’s appointment as finance
minister in 1975 was a decision based on pragmatism and not ideology. Pinochet was not inclined
to the idea of a free market but de Castro had a plan, he was persuasive and the old formula was not
working. As Anil Hira argued, one of the reasons that explain why the Chicago Boys were able to
gain the support of “nationalistic and state oriented military men” was that they were the only group
648 See: “Milton Friedman en Chile: bases para el desarrollo económico”, Conference given at the Diego Portales
Building, March 26, 1975. In: Axel Kaiser, Jaime Belollio, José Piñera and Sergio de Castro, Un legado de libertad:
Milton Friedman en Chile, Edited by Angel Soto, Fundación Jaime Guzmán-Fundación para el Progreso, Santiago,
2012, p. 25.
649 See: Ibid., pp. 64-71.
650 Ibid., p.69.
651 Ascanio Cavallo, Oscar Sepúlveda and Manuel Salazar,  La historia oculta del regimen militar, Grijalbo, Santiago, 
1999, p.77.
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with a clear plan, a diagnosis of the situation and a clear idea of how to achieve prosperity.652 In
addition, they had a non-partisan approach that resulted appealing to the military because it offered a
depoliticized project of society that would move the country forward. Finally, they counted on the
support of the most influential civil adviser to the military regime: Jaime Guzmán.653 This last
aspect was decisive. Guzmán became one of the most influential conservative political and
intellectual figures of the 20th century in Chile.654 In 1966, at the Catholic University, Guzman had
founded the “gremialista movement” in order to oppose several reforms which sought the complete
transformation of the higher education system in Chile.655 The movement was made up by catholic
students who were equally hostile to Marxism and liberalism and saw their main inspiration in the
social doctrine of the Catholic Church. With the passing of time however, Guzmán and the
gremialistas accepted neoliberalism and played a crucial role in the Chilean economic revolution.
In fact one of the central figures among the gremialistas was Chicago Boy Miguel Kast, a key actor
in the free market revolution, who served as a nexus between both groups and who, from his
leading position in ODEPLAN (Office of National Planning) appointed several young liberal
professionals to assist the government in the implementation of the free market revolution.656 Apart
from their academic education at the Catholic University, both groups, the gremialistas and the
Chicago Boys, were the most ferocious opponents of socialism and the political model that had
prevailed in Chile from the 1930s to the 1970s.657 Their combined efforts provided Pinochet with
the intellectual and technical platform for a truly revolutionary institutional project. In all this
Guzman’s role was essential. As Belén Moncada argued, Guzman’s influence on Pinochet was
decisive for overcoming the nationalist and corporatist resistance to the free market revolution,
which arose within the military government.658  
Guzmán had not always been keen on economic liberalism. In his youth, he embodied the
typical conservative, authoritarian and corporatist right wing politician that had prevailed in Chile
since the Great Depression. Moreover, as a student, Guzman became the most outspoken proponent
of the corporatism of thinkers such as Alberto Edwards and Francisco Encina.659 Still in the late
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654 Renato Cristi/ Pablo Ruiz Tagle, La república en Chile, Teoría y práctica del constitucionalismo republicano, Lom, 
Santiago, 2008,  p.177.
655 On the history of the university reform in Chile see: Carlos Huneeus, La reforma universitaria, Corporación de 
Promoción Universitaria, Santiago, 1988.
656 On the colaboration between gremialistas and Chicago Boys to advance to free market project see: Carlos Huneeus, 
“Technocrats and Politicans in an Authoritarian Regime,  ‘The ODEPLAN’s Boys and the Gremialists in Pinochet’s
Chile”, Journal of Latin American  Studies, Vol.32, No. 2, May 2000, p.472. Published by Cambridge University 
Press.
657 Fontaine, Los economistas y el Presiente Pinochet, Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1988, p.103.
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Editores, Santiago, 2006, p.21.
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1960s Guzman would maintain a critical view with regard to classical liberalism. In 1969 he wrote
that the “amoral and purely economic foundation of liberalism with its night watchman state” had
led to socialism, adding that the postulates of individualism had “failed.”660 At the same time
however, invoking the Catholic tradition, Guzmán argued that the state had to be subsidiary because
men had an “ontological priority” which implied the respect of private property and the free
enterprise system.661  For Guzman, both were manifestations of human nature and a safeguard for
its freedom. At this stage Guzmán still endorsed what can be defined as “state capitalism”. A few
years later, Guzmán would fully adopt neoliberalism and integrate it to his Catholicism. Already in
1971 Guzmán had shown the beginning of his transition to economic liberalism in an article
published in Portada magazine. In the piece, Guzmán defined capitalism as an economic system
founded on the private ownership of the means of production, in which private enterprises account
for the largest part of economic activity. In this context the government has the role of regulating
the market in order to “guarantee and stimulate competition and not to prevent or distort it”.662
Guzmán went on making a defense of capitalism arguing that the social problems denounced by
socialists and Marxists did not derive from too much capitalism but from the fact that since the
1930s Chile had departed from a capitalist system, introducing an increasingly statist system:
If we observe the Chilean economic life from 1938 onwards we will conclude that far
from being ruled by uniform norms of general application, the Chilean economy —
agriculture, industry or commerce— has been damaged by an increasingly statist
legislation which replaced the automatic verdict of efficiency by the discretion of the
bureaucratized government official...Nothing then is more inaccurate than
assimilating the current economic system to competitive capitalism.663
For Guzmán this over expansion of government had undermined the stability of the whole
institutional structure. The power of government officials he argued, had put aside the market forces
in favor of demagoguery and the politicization of society transforming the government in the prey
for interest groups. According to Guzman there were thousands of unjust privileges granted to
interest groups.664 In North words, Guzmán viewed Chile as a “Limited Access Order”.
 Many of the concepts which Guzmán referred to in his article had their origin in the
660 Jaime Guzmán, El miedo, Síntoma de la realidad político social- chilena,  in: Arturo Fontaine Talavera, “Jaime 
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thinking of Milton Friedman, which he came to know through Emilio Sanfuentes, Carlos Urenda
and Hernán Cubillos, all of whom worked for the classical liberal think tank CESEC.665 Later on
Guzmán would seek economic advice with Sergio de Castro, José Piñera, Miguel Kast, Juan Carlos
Méndez and Ernesto Silva. The influence of this group of liberal economists would be crucial in
Guzmán’s transition from the corporatist views that were still to be found in the 1974 Declaration
of Principles of the military regime, to liberal capitalism. It is important to note that Guzmán
attended regularly the meetings in which the Chicago Boys discussed the policies proposed in “The
Brick”.666
Guzman’s shift to economic liberalism was accompanied by a similar evolution in his
political philosophy, which ultimately led him to adopt a pluralist and inorganic conception of
democracy, which brought him remarkably close to political liberalism.667
 Of all the classical liberal intellectual influences however, none was greater on Guzmán’s
thinking than Hayek’s philosophy.668 It was Hayek’s influence that would finally lead Guzmán to
the full adoption of economic liberalism and a classical liberal conception of democracy. Through
Guzmán and others, Hayek’s influence on the Chilean institutional transformation became decisive.
Particularly important was this influence on the 1980 Constitution, whose main architect was
Guzmán and which came to institutionalize the neoliberal political and economic model that
prevails in Chile until this day. Hayek’s influence was so great and openly admitted that the 1980
Constitution was called The Constitution of Liberty after Hayek’s book.669 To study somewhat in
more depth Hayek’s ideas is therefore crucial to account, as North would say, for the set of beliefs
behind the process of institutional change led by the Chicago Boys.
Hayek on institutions, liberty and the economic order
F.A Hayek has been described as the most consequential 20th century political thinker right
or left, and the most influential on policy makers and public opinion, leading to the triumph of
capitalism over socialism in the 1990s.670  Chile did not stay exempt from Hayek’s influence. In the
letter to Hayek commented in the previous chapter, former minister Jorge Cauas claimed that he
was the “natural intellectual leader” of the civil advisers to the military regime as far as political
665 Arturo Fontaine Talavera, “Jaime Guzmán, El miedo y otros escritos”, Revista Estudios Públicos, No. 42, Santiago, 
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philosophy was concerned and that his works The Constitution of Liberty and Law, Legislation and
Liberty, were essential for the neoliberal institutional project. We have also seen that Hayek became
honorary president of the CEP, the most influential think tank in Chile and intellectual home to the
Chicago Boys. During the military regime, his ideas were widely discussed among the Chicago
Boys, intellectuals and other civil advisers to the government. In a letter to Hayek on April 28, 1978
Carlos Cáceres would leave no doubt about Hayek’s relevance for the discussions that were taking
place: “On several occasions the President of the Republic as well as the members of the economic
committee, have made public statements acknowledging your comments about the Chilean
economy”.671
Before going directly into Hayek’s economic and political philosophy it is important to
stress that Hayek’s economic tradition, namely Austrian economics, had emerged as a reaction
against the German historical school of economics of Gustav von Schmoller and Friedrich List,
which had been extremely influential in Chile in the late 19th century and throughout most of the
20th century through the work of ECLA. As has been explained, these protectionist ideas had been
fought by Courcelle-Seneuil and his Chilean followers, but eventually became hegemonic and were
largely responsible for the decline of liberalism in Chile.
In the case of Germany, Hayek observed that the influence of the German historical school
had also led to the complete abandonment of the classical liberal tradition of British- American
origin. According to Hayek, the new class of intellectuals in Germany had a “complete dislike for
the practical conclusions of the classical English school”.672Along the same lines, Hayek’s mentor,
Ludwig von Mises, argued that after the hegemony of Schmoller’s doctrine, “there was no longer
any liberal thinker left in Germany”.673 To have a more accurate idea  of Schmoller’s philosophy
and its complete incompatibility with liberalism of the sort defended by Hayek, Friedman, Guzmán
and the Chicago Boys it is worth reproducing the following comment by Schmoller:
The state is the centre and the heart in which all institutions empty and unite…Above
all it exercises as legislator and administrator the greatest indirect influence on law,
671 The letter is available at: http://coreyrobin.files.wordpress.com/2012/07/vina-del-mar-4.pdf Last accessed: 
28/06/2014
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school according to Mises, was Schmoller`s position as adviser to the Prussian minister of instruction Friedrich
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and custom, on all social institutions; and this is the decisive point. The right man in
the right place, the great statesman and reformer, the far-seeing party chief and
legislator can here accomplish extraordinary things, not directly, not immediately but
trough a wise and just transformation of the economic institutions...Adverse opinions
forget that the state is and must be the leading intelligence, the responsible centre of
public sentiment, the acme of existing moral and intellectual powers, and therefore
can attain great results in this direction.674
Mises argued that the political consequences of Schmoller’s doctrines had been disastrous,
making Germany “safe for the ideas the acceptance of which made popular with the German people
all those disastrous policies that resulted in the great catastrophes” including the aggressive
imperialism, the hyperinflation of the 1920s and the Zwangswirtschaft of the Nazi regime.675 What
the historical school advocated in Mises opinion was “state socialism”, that is to say, a system of
planning managed by the aristocracy which would become the model for Bismarck’s welfare state
characterized by interventionist measures such as labor legislation, social security, progressive
taxation, trade protectionism, cartels and dumping.676 Bismarck’s welfare legislation was indeed
supported by Schmoller and other members of the Historical School, who had been working on the
intellectual foundations for social legislation.677 Moreover, Schmoller’s role as an intellectual force
behind the rise of the modern welfare legislation in the western world was so substantial, that
according to Nicholas Balabkins he can be considered the father of the welfare state.678 It is no
surprise that in trying to debunk those doctrines Hayek should have developed his theories in order
to revive the British-American liberal tradition of authors such as David Hume and Bernard
Mandeville.679  By any standards, Hayek was, in the words of John Gray, “the foremost
contemporary exponent of the liberal tradition”.680 His central aim was to debunk the idea that
central planning and social engineering, as was proposed by socialism, the German historical
school, new dealers, and the French rationalist philosophers, was economically possible or
compatible with individual liberty.681 Hayek’s main argument was that any attempt to control social
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evolution or the market by using rational planning must fail because the authorities that would be in
charge of designing the institutions and make the economic calculation do not possess the necessary
knowledge to achieve their aims. Furthermore, knowledge in society is of a practical nature and it is
disperse among the millions of individuals that interact while pursuing their own aims. It is worth
reproducing Hayek’s insight in this respect in his most influential academic article entitled The Use
of Knowledge in Society, in order to better understand the cornerstone of his economic theory as
well as the essence of his critique of socialism and rationalism:
The problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exist in integrated
form but solely as the disperse bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of
society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate “given” resources— if given
is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by
these “data”....it is a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any
of the members of society for ends whose relative importance only these individuals
know. Or to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not
given to anyone in its totality.682
 Hayek insisted that the market was a spontaneous order that enabled what North called
“adaptive efficiency” and did not need of central commands to operate. Prices, which can only exist
in a free market, transmitted the necessary information about demand and supply of goods enabling
the best use of resources.683 Accordingly, a market society is one which allows responsible free
people to make their choices and do as they wish without harming others.684 Socialism and freedom
are thus completely opposed.
The same as for North, for Hayek institutions such as language, money, private property
government and others, are mainly the product of social evolution, that is to say, the result of a
spontaneous process —in which the market plays a crucial role— that over time has selected the
most useful elements for improving society. To believe, as French Enlightenment philosophers and
thinkers like Schmoller did, that civilization is the product of rational planning is a fallacy.685
Unlike the French rationalist philosophers, the British thinkers, said Hayek, had understood
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that institutions and civilization were not a matter of rational design but of cumulative growth and
that the human mind itself had been a product of this evolutionary process.686 This difference had
practical consequences. The necessary use of coercion which according to Hayek central planners
would require to execute their plans, would prevent the spontaneous forces of society from
spreading out thereby hindering progress.  The same as for all classical liberals, for Hayek liberty
consisted in the absence of coercion and not in man’s ability to control his circumstances.687 By the
same token, coercion implied “both the threat of inflicting harm and the intention thereby to bring
about a certain conduct”.688 The use of arbitrary coercion had the effect of restricting individual
liberty and damaging the welfare of the community because it prevented each person from
increasing the social wellbeing by pursuing his own ends: “coercion thus is bad because it prevents
a person from using his mental capacity to the full and consequentially of making the greatest
contribution he is capable of to the community”.689
Hayek saw liberalism as a social philosophy that sought to understand the spontaneous
nature of the social process.690 Accordingly, his central concern was how to limit power, understood
as the capacity of forcing others to follow ends that are not their own. This is crucial to
understanding Hayek’s influence on Guzmán. Hayek’s political philosophy was the result of his
economic theory and epistemology.691 The same was the case with Guzmán. From Hayek’s
understanding of social progress and the market as spontaneous processes, it follows that a liberal
society is one governed by the rule of law. This means that “government in all its actions is bound
by rules fixed and announced beforehand which makes it possible to foresee with fair certainty how
the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s affairs on the
basis of this knowledge”.692  Under such a system every individual is free to pursue his aims in
peace and the only kind of equality which is just is equality before the law.693And since all
individuals are different by nature, equality before the law inevitably leads to inequality of
results.694From the former it follows that any pattern of income distribution imposed by government
would be contrary to the abstract and impersonal rules that characterize the rule of law and would
constrain individual liberty resulting in the loss of economic and social wellbeing: “the principle of
686 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty,  p. 51.
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distributive justice once introduced would... produce a society which in all essential respects would
be the opposite of a free society — a society in which authority decided what the individual was to
do and how he was to do it”.695 A social order based on claims of redistributive justice or social
justice argued Hayek, is opposed to a form of social order based on classical liberalism. In the latter
one, society is governed by rules of just individual conduct while the former places in the
authorities the duty of ordering people what to do.696 With its promotion of government
intervention the appeal to social justice has another consequence that proves highly destructive to
the political order:  the capture of government by special interests that have “learnt to employ the
open sesame of social justice” to claim benefits from government.697 For Hayek, the quest for social
justice was characteristic of the welfare state, which in some of his writings he viewed as the
successor of socialism and as a threat to personal freedom.698
The dangers of unlimited democracy and the case for “transitional dictatorship”
Essential to Hayek’s program of limiting government’s power are his ideas about democracy
and the constitution as an instrument to limit democracy. Following the classical liberal tradition,
Hayek argued that democracy was not an end in itself and that its goal was to protect individual
liberty. For Hayek, although usually in agreement with personal freedom, democracy can be also in
conflict with it leading to a dictatorship of the majority. This means that liberalism and democracy
are not the same. Liberalism has the aim of maximizing individual liberty, that is to say, limiting the
coercive powers of the state whether democratic or not, while dogmatic democrats only see a limit
in the decision of the majority. In Hayek’s words: “liberalism is a doctrine about what the law ought
to be, democracy is a doctrine about the manner of determining what will be the law”.699 The
opposite of democracy said Hayek, was authoritarianism, while the opposite of liberalism was
totalitarianism. According to Hayek, under certain circumstances, an authoritarian regime might
allow even more individual freedom than a democratic regime if the authoritarian leader restricts its
own power. On the other hand, a democratic regime can effectively become a tyranny if its power is
not constrained. For Hayek a crucial limitation for every true democracy was a capitalist society
that enabled an effective control over the rulers.700
In an interview with El Mercurio during his visit to Chile in 1981, Hayek developed these
ideas in full. His reflection is worth reproducing because it offered a theoretical justification for the
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military regime as a “transitional dictatorship”, an idea that was taken by Guzmán as well as the
Chicago Boys:
I would say that, as long-term institutions, I am totally against dictatorships. But a
dictatorship may be a necessary system for a transitional period. At times it is
necessary or a country to have, for a time, some form or other of dictatorial power.
As you will understand, it is possible for a dictator to govern in a liberal way. And it
is also possible for a democracy to govern with a total lack of liberalism. Personally I
prefer a liberal dictator to democratic government lacking liberalism. My personal
impression —and this is valid for South America— is that in Chile, for example, we
will witness a transition from a dictatorial government to a liberal government. And
during this transition it may be necessary to maintain certain dictatorial powers, not
as something permanent, but as a temporary arrangement... When a government is in
a situation of rupture, and there are no recognized rules, rules have to be created in
order to say what can be done and what cannot. In such circumstances it is practically
inevitable for someone to have almost absolute powers. Absolute powers that need to
be used precisely in order to avoid and limit any absolute power in the future. It may
seem a contradiction that it is I of all people who am saying this, I who plead for
limiting government’s powers in people’s lives and maintain that many of our
problems are due, precisely, to too much government. However, when I refer to this
dictatorial power, I am talking of a transitional period, solely. As a means of
establishing a stable democracy and liberty, clean of impurities. This is the only way
I can justify it —and recommend it.701
Along the same lines, in a letter to The Times in 1978 Hayek had argued that he had “never
contended that generally authoritarian governments are more likely to secure individual liberty than
democratic ones, but rather the contrary”, adding that this did not mean, that “in some historical
circumstances personal liberty may not have been better protected under an authoritarian than
democratic government”.702  Hayek further said that he had “not been able to find a single person
even in much maligned Chile who did not agree that personal freedom was much greater under
Pinochet than it had been under Allende”.703 In an interview with a Venezuelan journalist in 1981
Hayek referred to the Chilean case once again. Asked by the interviewer about totalitarianism
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Hayek responded: “Don’t confuse totalitarianism with authoritarianism. I don’t know of any
totalitarian governments in Latin America. The only one was Chile under Allende. Chile is now a
great success. The world shall come to regard the recovery of Chile as one of the great economic
miracles of our time”.704Like Friedman, Hayek was convinced that the Chicago Boys were making
an institutional transformation that would restore economic liberty first and democracy later.
Shortly after his first visit to Chile in 1977 he wrote that he had met “educated, reasonable and
insightful men, who honestly believe that the country could be returned to a democratic order
soon”.705 Thus, Hayek justified the Chilean military regime and the lack of civil liberties based on
two arguments: a) the alternative to Pinochet’s regime would have been a communist totalitarian
regime where liberty would have been even more affected,706 and b) the Chilean dictatorship was
transitional and sought to restore economic liberty and civil liberties and democracy. The use of this
justification by the Chicago Boys and Guzmán,  whether valid or not, is important because it
provides further evidence that the project of institutional transformation in Chile sought the
reintroduction of political liberties and democracy and was not reduced to economic reforms.
Moreover, the promise of the restoration of a free society along the lines of neoliberalism was more
than the justification of the Chicago Boys’ collaboration with an authoritarian regime: it was the
base upon which the same regime based its legitimacy before the public at the level of discourse.
It is necessary to stress at this point that the idea of transitional dictatorship and the notion
that a dictator might be more respectful of individual liberty than a totalitarian democracy, was
already present in the classical liberal tradition before Hayek. In fact Hayek was not the only one
who defended this idea in the 20th century. Following the teachings of John Stuart Mill and
Benjamin Constant, Isaiah Berlin made the same case as Hayek for the potential conflict between
freedom and democracy and the eventual need for a transitional dictatorship. In Berlin’s words,
individual liberty is not inviolable because “abnormal conditions may occur in which even the
sacred frontiers” of liberty “may have to be disregarded if some sufficiently terrible alternative is to
be averted”.707 Berlin went on in the same terms as Hayek arguing that it is “precisely because we
regard such situations as being wholly abnormal, and such measures abhorrent, to be condoned only
in emergencies so critical that the choice is between great evils” that we recognize that “under
normal conditions, for the great majority of men at most times in most places these frontiers are
sacred”.708  In this context, Berlin insisted that just as democracy “may in fact deprive the individual
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citizen from a great many liberties which he might have in some other form of society, so it is
perfectly conceivable that a liberal-minded despot would allow his subjects a large measure of
personal freedom”709Berlin not only thought of this as a theoretical plausibility but as a historical
reality.
 It is very plausible that Hayek elaborated his own theory about transitional dictatorship
based on John Stuart’s Mill’s insight on the subject. Hayek was after all a Mill scholar and probably
one of the most knowledgeable about Mill’s work among his contemporaries. Moreover, Mill is the
thinker with whom Hayek has more often been associated and despite his critical judgment of
Mill’s intellectual evolution, Hayek considered Mill in his main work The Constitution of Liberty,
as one of the greatest classical liberal thinkers citing him more than any other author.710 It is no
coincidence then that Hayek’s case for a “transitional dictatorship” closely resembled Mill’s
reflection on the subject. In his Essays on Politics and Society the British philosopher argued in a
straightforward way:
I’m far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigency, the assumption of absolute
power in the form of temporary dictatorship. Free nations have, in times of old,
conferred such power by their own choice, as a necessary medicine for diseases of
the body politic which could not be got rid of by less violent means. But its
acceptance even for a time strictly limited, can only be excused, if like Solon or
Pittacus, the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in removing the obstacles
which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom”.711
Moreover, Mill further sustained that
however little probable it may be, we may imagine a despot observing many of the
rules and restraints of constitutional government. He might allow such freedom of
the press and of discussion as would enable a public opinion to form and express
itself on national affairs. He might suffer local interest to be managed without
interference of authority by the people themselves...Were he to act thus, and so far
abdicate as a despot, he would do away with considerable part of the evils
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characteristics of despotism.712
Mill also wrote on the dangers of majority rule, which Hayek warned against several times
and which became a central concern for the Chicago Boys. In his famous work On Liberty, Mill
argued that in a democratic republic “the people who exercise the power are not always the same
people with those over who it is exercised” and that the will of the people “practically means the
will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority or those who succeed
in making themselves accepted as the majority”.713 Mill went on to say that the people could desire
to “oppress a part of their number” which was a good reason for limiting the power of the majority.
In Mill’s words: “The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none
of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community...in
political speculations the tyranny of the majority is now included among the evils against which
society requires to be on its guard”.714
Hayek had shared many of these ideas personally with Pinochet when he met him during his
first visit to Chile. On that occasion, Hayek told the general that unlimited democracy could
develop forces that led to the destruction of democracy. Pinochet listened carefully and asked
Hayek to provide him with documents he had written on the issue.715 The issue of limited
democracy was essential in Hayek’s work and became also a main concern of the Chilean
reformers.  Following a long-established classical liberal tradition which seemed confirmed by their
own experience, the Chicago Boys and Guzmán believed that a constitution had to introduce
restraints to the ability of politicians to serve interest groups if a sound economy and a sustainable
democracy were to be preserved in the long run. In other words, the ability of redistributing wealth
and intervene in the economy had to be restricted. It is interesting to note that Hayek’s ideas for a
constitution of this sort were summarized in an article published by the CEP in the same issue
dedicated to the papers of the MPS in Viña del Mar. The article was entitled “Principles of a Liberal
Social Order” and has been considered crucial in the effort of the military regime to institutionalize
neoliberalism in Chile.716 The article is important from a philosophical perspective because it
complements other works of Hayek’s and makes it clear that the ideas of neoliberalism applied in
Chile have a British-American origin. As Hayek explained in the piece, liberalism was a set of
beliefs that defined a  political order as had been conceived in England by Old Whigs and thinkers
such Adam Smith, David Hume, Edmund Burke, T.B Macaulay and Lord Acton. Hayek insisted
712 Ibid., p.74.
713 Ibid., pp.231-232.
714 Ibid., p.232.
715 Farrant, Mcphail and  Berger, “Preventing the “Abuses” of Democracy: Hayek, the “Military Usurper” and 
Transitional Dictatorship in Chile?”, p. 520.
716 See: Friedrich Hayek, “Los principios de un orden social liberal”, Revista Estudios Públicos No. 6, Santiago, 1982.
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that this conception of individual freedom had become the base of the American political tradition
and that it was essentially opposed to the French idea of liberalism which was constructivist and
rationalist leading to the expansion of government powers. Then Hayek explained his famous
distinction between liberalism and democracy, arguing that they were complementary but could
also be in opposition. Liberalism he wrote, derived from the discovery of a spontaneous order
which enables social progress without a central authority. This presupposed the existence of rules of
just conduct that protect a sphere of private activity and which must be enforced by the government.
A free society is one which is ruled by abstract norms, that is, laws that do not impose specific
courses of actions on people but which establish the scope of individual responsibility. What is
needed said Hayek, is the rule of law, that is to say a set of rules which limits government power. In
this context the redistribution of wealth under the concept of social justice is incompatible with the
spontaneous order because it seeks to achieve certain results determined by the arbitrary will of the
authority. The aim of an economic order in a free society cannot be, according to Hayek, to
guarantee a certain income to specific groups. A welfare economy is therefore a mistake and
incompatible with the spontaneous order. Along these lines, in Law, Legislation and Liberty, Hayek
argued that never in the whole history “were governments so much under the necessity of satisfying
the particular wishes of numerous special interests as it is true of government today”.717 He added
that a democratic omnipotent government would have no choice but satisfying the demands of
multiple special interest groups. In order to prevent this corruption process, Hayek argued that “all
government, especially if democratic, should be limited”.718 The Austrian professor explained that
this had been a central concern of classical liberal thinkers and of the framers of the American
Constitution. About a century earlier, John Stuart Mill had made the same case arguing that one of
the greatest dangers of democracy lay “in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the
danger of class legislation; of government intended for (whether really effecting it or not) the
immediate benefit of the dominant class, to the lasting detriment of the whole.”719 Mill added that
“one of the most important questions demanding consideration, in determining the best Constitution
of a representative government, is how to provide efficacious securities against this evil.”720
Hayek’s effort in the third volume of Law Legislation and Liberty was precisely to provide
what he called a “model of an ideal Constitution” in order to provide the security Mill thought
necessary for avoiding the degeneration of representative institutions. In the introduction to the
three volume edition he wrote that, like Montesquieu, the framers of the American Constitution had
sought to introduce institutional safeguards to protect individual freedom and that this attempt had
717 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty,  p.99.
718 Idem.
719 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. XIX, Essays on Politics and Society, Part 2, p. 110.
720 Idem.
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failed due to a new conception of democracy according to which “the will of the majority on any
particular matter is unlimited”.721 Hayek’s aim with Law, Legislation and Liberty was precisely to
revive American liberal constitutionalism, which he believed did no longer enjoy the support it had
had in past times and had been replaced by an increasingly interventionist system based on a set of
beliefs which favored the use of democracy for satisfying the needs of interest groups.
Guzmán's reception of neoliberalism
Jaime Guzmán knew Hayek’s theories well and thought, like Hayek and Friedman, that
economic liberty was the base for democracy and all other liberties. In 1981 Guzmán personally
met Hayek in order to interview him about his intellectual work. The interview was published under
the title “The force of freedom” in Realidad Magazine and was divided into five parts: market
economy, government and redistribution, law and positivism, evolutionism and constructivism,
Hayek’s ideas and the Catholic Church, and democracy and government limitation.722 In the
interview, Hayek declared to be in favor of a minimum safety net for the very poor but insisted that
the role of the law was to protect individual freedom. Guzmán specifically asked Hayek about the
meaning of the concept “abstract rules” to which Hayek replied that an abstract rule did not impose
specific obligations on individuals. Instead these rules “must be applicable under unknown
circumstances to unknown people”. When government creates rules that are applicable to specific
individuals, these rules ceased to be laws because they are no longer protecting individual freedom.
Hayek also insisted that private property was essential to progress and that institutions and values
were not the result of a rational design. Constructivism said Hayek to Guzmán, led directly to
socialism. In the final part of the interview, Guzmán asked Hayek about democracy, to which
Hayek answered that democracy had originally been invented in order to limit the power of
government and protect individual liberty. Hayek added that democracy was indispensable in order
to get rid of bad governments but unfortunately it had degenerated under the illusion that
democratic control would suffice to limit the power of government. Normally, continued Hayek,
democracies were not really the rule of the majorities but of well-organized interest groups that
came together in order to obtain privileges.
 Influenced by Hayek, Guzman incorporated individual freedom understood in a classical
liberal sense, as the central value of his institutional project. Moreover, if the program of classical
liberalism as Mises put it, could be summed up in the protection of private property, then there is no
doubt that Guzmán was a classical liberal. According to Cristi, Guzmán’s constitutional project was
721 Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty,  p.1.
722 See: Interview from Guzmán to F.A. Hayek, in: Revista Realidad, No. 24, May 1981.
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similar to that of the American Founding Fathers, having as its main goal the protection of private
property from redistributive policies.723 As Cristi has explained, Guzmán’s concept of private
property as a relation between the individual and the object rather than a subjective right puts
Guzmán in the individualistic tradition of John Locke and Robert Nozick.724 Along the same lines
Belen Moncada argued that Guzmán saw in the principle of economic liberty, which he introduced
in the 1980 Constitution, “the base and support of all other liberties and a true example of the
possibility of social participation of the individuals outside the scope of action of political
parties”.725
Guzmán of course had also been strongly influenced by the recent Chilean experience.
Reality feedback, as North would say, was crucial in defining Guzmán's ideology. Socialism, he
argued, necessarily meant the destruction of freedom:
If all production and economic activity of a nation is in the hands of the state then the
source of living of almost all citizens is directly given to the arbitrary will of the
political authorities. To pretend under such circumstances that a regime of individual
liberty, of political liberty, of liberty of expression and civic action can exist, is a
strange inconsistency that history shows as such in every step.726
In 1981 Guzmán celebrated Henry Kissinger’s praise of Chilean progress arguing that in
Latin American history it was not easy to find military regimes that had preserved an economic
system based on the private initiative.727 Such a system said Guzmán using Hayekian terms, was
based on several impersonal and competitive market rules. Guzmán further explained that the free
market system introduced in Chile had a fundamental difference with all other Latin American
military regimes. In most of other Latin American countries, even if initially free market reforms
had been made, eventually they had been undone by the “statist mentality of the military”, who had
ruined the development chances of their countries. The Chilean government was far from following
that logic because it had, in Guzman’s words a “strong faith” in a system of a free market economy
and was determined to make an institutional transformation in order to reintroduce democracy.728
In 1982, when Chile was suffering the consequences of a harsh economic crisis, Guzmán
defended the free market system arguing that under the UP government Chile was heading to a
723 Ibid.,p.18.
724 Idem.
725 Belén Moncada, “Autoritarismo y participación: el pensamiento político de Jaime Guzmán”, Anuario Filosófico
XXXVI/I, Universidad de Navarra, 2003, p.486.
726  Arturo FontaineTalavera, Jaime Guzmán, El miedo y otros escritos, p.299.
727 La Segunda, November 27, 1981.
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Marxist totalitarian regime and that after the collapse of democracy a new economic system based
on freedom had enabled a recovery with unprecedented achievements.729 The same year Guzmán
insisted that the government had assumed the obligation of reintroducing a “new, stable and
effective democracy that serves an integrally free society”.730 Guzmán warned that there were
“fascist” groups close to the government that did not want to reestablish democracy. Fortunately, he
said, these groups had been defeated and democracy was going to be reintroduced.731
The defense of economic liberty and a sound economy as a condition for the transition to
democracy and as justification for a temporary dictatorship would be a permanent subject in
Guzmán’s writing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, Guzmán declared once again that the
military regime’s main goal was the reintroduction of democracy. He argued that the government
had no choice but to create a new constitution in which the transition to democracy was defined
because, otherwise, the stability of the government itself would be at risk.732 Thus Guzmán was
alerting that the military regime could claim legitimacy only if it admitted its transitional nature.
However, this transition had to be made when the new institutions for a functioning democracy
were ready and, more importantly, when a sound and free economy had been achieved. In
Guzman’s words:
I believe we have to continue moving towards democracy...In my opinion we don’t
have yet the conditions for the reintroduction of a stable masses democracy...I take a
look at the world and see where the stable democracies are. And there is only serious
and stable democracy in those countries where the people have achieved a standard of
living that makes them become engaged with a democratic regime and the system of
life that this regime favors...as long as there is not a sufficient degree of economic
development there can be no stable democracy of masses.733
   
 This view on the importance of economic growth and economic liberty for democracy was
common to all neoliberals and had been stressed systematically by Hayek and Friedman. It led
Guzman to argue that the return to democracy in Chile could be possible only in the second half of
the 1980s, once the economic objectives had been achieved and the new institutions for democracy
had been designed. To anticipate the reintroduction of democracy, said Guzman, would be
“suicidal”.734 First the new constitution had to create a “new democracy” free from the “impurities”
729 La Segunda, January 2, 1982.
730 La Segunda, March 2, 1982.
731 Idem
732 Interview with Revista Cosas, No. 83, December 6, 1979.
733 Idem.
734 Idem.
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that had led the old Chilean democracy to “favor totalitarianism and statism instead of liberty” and
“demagoguery”, and “social injustice” instead of “progress and justice”.735Once the new
constitution was finally approved in 1980 and neoliberalism had been institutionalized, Guzmán
publicly reiterated the commitment of the military government to the restoration of democracy.736
He argued that the content of the new democracy had been defined along with the new democratic
institutions and that no one could doubt any longer the intentions of the government to undertake
the transition to democracy.737 The democratic project however, depended directly on the economic
one. Appealing to a straightforward classical liberal logic, in 1983 Guzmán explained the centrality
of the free market for the reintroduction of democracy and political freedom in Chile:
The free economic system has shown worldwide that it is the most effective to create
development and employment...its existence is also a necessary condition for a strong
political liberty, which is inherent to the democratic goal constitutionally
approved...to fight against socialism and statism is therefore to defend the whole path
of liberty  assumed by Chile in 1973...738
As this quotation makes it clear, Guzmán believed that economic liberty was the priority and
that civil liberties and democracy, although important, could only be introduced once economic
freedom was reestablished. Again, this was an implicit justification of the absence of democracy
and the restriction of political liberties with the need to consolidate economic liberty. Far from
being inconsistent, this was to a large extent the logical result of the classical liberal worldview
applied to the concrete situation of Chile and its recent history. There is no doubt that Guzmán and
the Chicago Boys had the intention of restoring democracy once economic liberty had been
institutionalized and the new political institutions had been designed. Moreover, this intention
existed from the beginning of the military rule. Indeed, Guzmán had been one of the main brains
behind the Junta’s Declaration of Principles of 1974, which stated that the military regime had a
transitional nature: “the military Junta will yield the political power in due time to those that the
people have elected in universal, free, secret and informed suffrage.”739The document did not set a
deadline arguing that it was impossible to foresee the time that the reconstruction of the country
would require. By the late 1970s however, it was defined and established in the 1980 Constitution
that the authoritarian government would come to an end in 1990.
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736 See: Revista Ercilla, December 31, 1980.
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http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Declaración_de_principios_del_gobierno_de_militar Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
141
Crucial to the analysis of the neoliberal influence on Guzmán are not only his idea that the
military regime was “transitional” and therefore acceptable as long as it sought to restore economic
freedom and at some point civil liberties and democracy, but also his definition of democracy. Like
Hayek who, following a long classical liberal tradition that was opposed to the French rationalist
liberal philosophy, had argued that democracy was not an end in itself and could turn against
individual freedom, Guzmán declared that “democracy as a form of government is not an end in
itself. It is only a means to achieve liberty, security and progress”.740 This was the same notion of
democracy as that of the American Founding Fathers. As Holcombe explains, “the founders did not
intend for government policy to be democratic. Rather the role of democracy was very limited and
was intended to be a means to an end.”741 In this tradition, Guzmán argued that democracy “does
not necessarily lead to freedom as a way of life”, as Chile’s recent history had clearly shown.742
Attacking the implications of Rousseau’s political philosophy, Guzmán argued that there was no
such thing as the “will of the people” but only different individual wills that could not be trusted in
an unlimited manner.743 It was therefore necessary to develop the institutional mechanisms in order
to limit democracy so that it would not degenerate into a threat to individual freedom and
democracy itself. Guzmán insisted that the task of the new constitution was to clean the Chilean
democracy of the evils that had led the country to the “verge of totalitarianism, to complete social
personal chaos and insecurity and to an economic and social set-back unprecedented in our
history”.744 The new institutions repeated Guzmán, had the aim of fighting totalitarianism and
statism ─meaning the welfare state— subversion and terrorism as well as fighting against
demagoguery, which was an “internal cancer of democracies” that made them infective to achieve
progress. In a passage that best reflected the reception of neoliberalism by Guzmán and the
centrality of economic freedom for his institutional project, he made an argument which is worth
reproducing entirely:
Personal liberty is not only threatened by totalitarian systems. Current reality teaches
us that an excessive intervention of the state in the economy…constitutes a more
subtle but not less grave and dangerous threat to personal liberty. Therefore a set of
new institutions conceived to serve liberty and progress has been created in order to
strengthen a free economy, without which political democracy can end up by being
an empty formula without any real content or at least without any libertarian content.
740  Arturo Fontaine Talavera, Jaime Guzmán, El miedo y otros escritos, p.332.
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D o not forget that the way chosen by the Unidad Popular to terminate political
freedom was to first strangle economic freedom. State control over the citizens’
stomach after a short period of time brings with it control over their will. To
consolidate an economy were the state guarantees impersonal rules of the game and
ensures the efficiency of a competitive system, but does not invade the scope of
action that can be taken by private individuals...is simply to strengthen
constitutionally the base for an economic system inextricably linked to a free society.
It is unnecessary to stress that the respect for private ownership of the means of
production, distribution and commercialization is a cornerstone of a free economy.745
In 1980 Guzmán would come back to this idea explaining that the government had the
purpose of achieving a complete social, political and economic transformation in order to
reintroduce democracy. According to Guzmán, the democratic commitment of the new
constitution and the key to the success of the new democracy would be “the extension of the
fruits of economic success and the consolidation of individual freedom which the social
modernizations entail”.746  In 1982 he would insist on this idea: “A serious, efficient and stable
democracy requires the previous achievement of sufficient integral development of the country
so that the spiritual and material fruits reach all the citizens, thus involving all Chileans with the
democratic system.”747 This necessarily implied that democracy had to be limited with
constitutional constraints in order to prevent politicians from endangering the free economic
system by engaging in massive redistributive policies. In an interview in 1986, five years after
the constitution had been approved in a referendum, Guzmán declared once again that
demagoguery was “a cancer of democracy” and that “the constitutional mission is to prevent
demagoguery as much as possible”.748 The Constitution of 1980 said Guzmán, clearly
established a “free economic system based on private ownership of the means of production and
the initiative of particular individuals as the engine of economic activity within the framework
of a subsidiary state”.749 Guzmán explained that there were several rules in the constitution
guaranteeing those principles, including one which prohibited the state from arbitrarily
discriminating in economic matters, a problem that according to Guzmán was a typical of statist
economies. The ability of government to engage in economic activities and change the
economic model was also severely restricted. According to Guzmán “in the former constitution
745 Ibid., p. 336
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747 Jaime Guzmán, “El sentido de la transición”, Revista Realidad, No. 38, July, 1982.
748 La Nación, March 11, 1986.
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a simple law was enough to transform Chile into a collectivist country” while with the new
constitution “that is impossible because its norms prevent it. It would take a constitutional
reform in order to transform Chile into a collectivist country”.750In addition, the Constitution set
limits to the president to “prevent the abuses in which he may be tempted to incur”.751
The same year Guzmán wrote an article rejecting any comparison between the Chilean
experience and the case of Spain under Franco, confirming his full endorsement of a neoliberal
economy. Guzmán’s main argument was that Spain under Franco had followed a corporatist
economic system “essentially different from a pluralist democracy”.752 Corporatism, which
Guzmán himself had endorsed in the past, was now described by Guzmán as a “failure” and a
“mask for a fascist state” or “an impossible fantasy”.753 Unlike Spain, continued Guzmán,
making once again the case for the necessary relation between economic liberty and democracy,
Chile had introduced a free market system and especially a “pluralist democratic regime”,
which reflected its own tradition.754 This ideological pluralism was however limited, which
shows another crucial classical liberal influence on Guzmán’s thinking. In 1982 Guzmán wrote
that in order to serve liberty, a democracy had to rest on a social consensus and that it was
necessary to prevent the threats to that consensus coming from terrorism, totalitarianism,
demagoguery and “socializing statism”.755 Accordingly, the Chilean constitution not only
institutionalized a free economic system that could only be changed by a constitutional reform,
but in its Article 8 it also declared unconstitutional all totalitarian political parties or groups that
threatened to destroy the democratic system, attempted to promote class warfare or sought to
introduce a totalitarian regime. Thus, the Constitution established a protected democracy, which
as Jorge Vergara noted, was inspired in the conception of instrumental democracy of authors
such as Karl Popper, Friedrich Hayek and Joseph Schumpeter.756 Guzman’s justification for
protecting democracy was the following:
 Definitely, a first impulse leads to wish that it is not necessary to establish limits to
ideological pluralism through legal rules because those limits should be
spontaneously respected by all members of the community as a result of a basic
consensus...but when this is broken by the rise of doctrines that attack this basic
consensus...it becomes indispensable to set limits to the function of political
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pluralism precisely in order to ensure that it subsists and is not destroyed by
installing a totalitarian regime.757
 Guzman’s defense of Article 8 clearly followed the logic of Popper’s famous paradox
of tolerance which he formulated in his major work on political philosophy, The Open Society
and its Enemies:
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend
unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend
a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be
destroyed, and tolerance with them. – In this formulation...we should claim the right
to suppress them if necessary even by force; for it may easily turn out that they are
not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument....We should therefore
claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should
claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we
should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, in the same
way as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or to the revival
of the slave trade, as criminal.758
The fact that Guzmán followed Popper and Hayek on this aspect is further proof of his
adoption of neoliberal or classical liberal ideas. Indeed, as Daniel Stedman Jones, has explained,
along with Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom and Mises Bureaucracy, Popper’s work The Open
Society and its Enemies, was one of the three central books in the rise of neoliberalism.759 These
three authors believed, as Jones put it, that individualism was “central to the Anglo-Scottish-
American Enlightenment tradition of economic and political thought” and that this liberalism was
not only opposed to socialism but also to the New Deal type of liberalism.760
The Chilean “Constitution of Liberty”
If Hayek’s effort in his work The Constitution of Liberty was to revive Adam Smith’s
classical liberalism and offer a guide to policy-making761 so that the ideas of limited government
757 La Nación, March 11, 1986.
758 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol 1, Roudledge, London, 2009, p. 293.
759 Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe, Hayek Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics, pp.43-44.
760 Ibid., p.44.
761 See: Irwin Stelzer Introduction to Hayek’s The Constitution of Liberty, Routledge, Abingdon, 2006, p.xii.
145
that had been the driver of the American Revolution would once again prevail, then the Chilean
Constitution of 1980 was fairly called “The Constitution of Liberty.” Without any doubt the
Constitution of 1980 was the one which received more influence from classical liberalism in
Chilean history. Specifically, its aims were to prevent a repetition of the UP experience, to limit
leftwing and populist projects and to protect the neoliberal economic model from any possible
attack.762
As has been argued throughout this work, to a large extent the adoption of neoliberalism in
Chile was the result of the reality feedback offered by Chilean history prior to the military regime.
The Chilean Constitution of 1925 had been extremely weak in the protection of economic liberties
enabling the expansion of government since the 1930s to the early 1970s.763 According to many
scholars previously cited, throughout these decades the state had suffocated the private sector by
creating numerous public services in order to satisfy social needs.  Hyperinflation, a state that
controlled 80% of economic activity and systematically engaged in price fixing as well as massive
trade restrictions were some characteristics of this time. The lesson delivered to the framers of the
new Chilean Constitution by history had been, in the words of Professor Eduardo Soto-Kloss, that
the only way to preserve personal freedom and progress in a society was by limiting state
interventionism.764 Accordingly, the Chicago Boys and the framers of the Constitution saw no
future for democracy or political liberties if economic liberties were not guaranteed. In the words
of professor Roberto Guerrero, who advised the Constituent Commission, it seemed “evident that
if a democratic system wants to be established it is necessary to constitutionally guarantee the right
to freely develop any kind of economic activity...economic liberty is a substantial part of a
democratic system because it enables the exercise of other rights that a democratic system
guarantees to the inhabitants of a country”.765 Therefore, the aim of the new economic institutions
was to “preserve a fundamentally libertarian society in which the individuals are free to decide
their destiny with limitations only in so far as they affect the integrity and well-being of
others”.766And this could only be achieved by decentralizing power and establishing the
subsidiarity principle of state activity in the economy so that government could not engage in
those activities which can be developed by private individuals. All of this, said Guerrero, was
762 Paul W. Drake, Ivan Jakšić, El Modelo Chileno: Democracia y Desarrollo en Los Noventa, Lom, Santiago, 1999,
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766 Ibid., p.83.
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framed within the rule of law, “that is to say a legal order of objective and impersonal character
whose norms equally obliged rulers and governed”.767
To prevent a similar experience from being repeated in the future, the new constitution in its
article 19 paragraph 21 guaranteed “the right of every individual to develop any economic activity
which is not contrary to morals, public order or national security...” The Constitution went as far as
establishing the right to economic liberty as a natural individual right, which was prior and superior
to the state.768 The same paragraph established a second guarantee for private enterprise and
economic liberty prohibiting government to engage in economic activities unless a special high
quorum law authorized it and always being subject to the same laws private enterprises were
subject to. Thus, there could be no special advantage for the government’s economic activity.
Along these lines, paragraph 22 of the same article established the non-discriminatory treatment
obligation that the state and its organisms have to give in economic matters to private individuals
and businesses. This rule put an end to special benefits and privileges historically granted by the
state to interest groups. In addition, paragraph 23 guaranteed all individuals the liberty of acquiring
all kinds of goods while paragraphs 24 and 25 strongly guaranteed property rights.
These paragraphs were the cornerstone of the so-called “public economic order” of the
Chilean Constitution which, as Jaime Bassa and Christian Viera noted, had in Hayek’s economic
and social philosophy its main intellectual influence.769 Given this classical liberal influence, the
constitution followed a negative idea of liberty, whose main expression was economic liberty and
the free market.770 As a result of the new regulation inspired in these ideas, the economic rights or
so called “negative rights” could be legally defended against the interference of any public
authority or private person.771
The centrality of economic liberty for the whole constitutional project led by Guzmán can
clearly be seen in the registers of the sessions of the Constituent Commission. In one of the initial
sessions the president of the Commission, Enrique Ortúzar, remarked that the new constitution had
to strongly protect private property and encourage private initiative in economic matters because
private business was “the great engine of a nation’s development” and it was “a guarantee for
freedom”772Moreover, Ortúzar declared that private property was “the foundation of all public
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liberties”.773In the following session, the Commission insisted that the new Constitution had to
protect private property because it was “the essential base for all other liberties” explaining that
“economic control is the means to achieve political control”.774 In some of the latest sessions,
commissioner Alicia Romo explained that the constitution had conceived of the public economic
order as a set of rules that were crucial to modern life because economic policy determined “in a
substantial and absolute way the basis of the liberty of an individual” and was prior even to the
legal foundations of individual liberty.775 Romo added that the constitutional restriction of state
activity in the economy and the consolidation of the guarantee of free private initiative in
economic matters was an expression of individual liberty that the constitution protected.776 By the
same token, Guzmán urged the Commission to guarantee private initiative in economic matters as
the natural and preferential way of a community to prosper and develop.777
There were of course other intellectual influences on the Chilean Constitution of 1980 such
as natural law and the catholic philosophy. All of them contributed to the ideological pluralism of
the Constitution. What marked a distinction between the 1980 Constitution and its predecessors
was the substantial incorporation of a classical version of liberalism. As Bassa and Viera argued,
the classical liberal worldview was based on ideas such as Hayekian anti-rationalism,
epistemological skepticism, the impossibility of a universal idea of common good and an
evolutionary approach to institutions, laws and traditions.778  This is the set of beliefs that lies
behind the strong protection of private property and the idea of limited democracy that was
institutionalized in the constitution. But the constitution also incorporated classical liberalism in
other fundamental norms that recognized individual liberty as a principle that did not admit other
limitations than those which are necessary to safeguard liberty itself.779  Thus, for the 1980
Constitution equality meant that there could be no artificial distinctions made by law between
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26, 1973. Available at: 
http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/constitucion_politica/Actas_comision_ortuzar/Tomo_I_Comision_Ortuzar.pdf Last 
accessed: 28/06/2014.
775 Actas Oficiales de la Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República, Sesión 384, 
Wednesday June 14, 1978. Available at: 
http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/constitucion_politica/Actas_comision_ortuzar/Tomo_XI_Comision_Ortuzar.pdf Last 
accessed: 28/06/2014.
776 Idem.
777 Actas Oficiales de la Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República, Sesión 388, Tuesday,
June 27, 1978. Available 
at:http://www.bcn.cl/lc/cpolitica/constitucion_politica/Actas_comision_ortuzar/Tomo_XI_Comision_Ortuzar.pdf 
Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
778 Bassa and Viera, “Contradicciones de los fundamentos teóricos de la constitución chilena con el estado 
constitucional: notas para su reinterpretación”, p. 147.
779 Mario Cerda, Origen de algunos principios básicos de la institucionalidad política establecida por la constitución
de 1980, in: Revista de Derecho, No. 212, Universidad de Concepción, Concepción, 2002.  p.8.
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people.  This idea of equality is purely moral and does not in any way mean material or economic
equality. It rather means that all individuals are an end in themselves and are free to pursue their
own happiness free from arbitrary coercion.780 That was also the idea behind the American
Declaration of Independence, which was in fact one of the historical antecedents of this part of the
Chilean Constitution.781
It is worth bearing in mind that Guzmán, like Hayek and Courcelle-Seneuil, rejected the
idea that democracy and equality of material opportunity were related. He argued that the most a
democratic society could aspire to was that no one fell below a minimum living standard —an idea
also defended by Hayek and Friedman— but that beyond that limit inequality would arise because
it was inherent to human nature  as could be seen both in capitalist and socialist societies.782
With regard to democracy, understood in the classical liberal tradition, the acts of the
Constituent Commission made it clear that its restoration was a central goal of the Constitution,
showing once again that ideas of democracy were present in the Chilean free market revolution.
Already in the first session the members of the Commission declared that the objective was to
restore a new democracy that had to be “modern and clean of the impurities that had favored the
action of its enemies”.783The inevitable and paradoxical result of this transitional plan was that the
Constitution did to some extent limit Pinochet’s power. As Professor Robert Barros concluded in
one of the most comprehensive studies made on the Chilean Constitution of 1980: “contrary to the
established view that dictatorships stand above the law and are structurally incapable of being
subject to institutional constraints, the dictatorship in Chile is a case of an autocratic regime being
bound by a Constitution of its own making”.784 According to Barros, one of the central reasons for
this was the fact that the power in Chile was not held by Pinochet alone but shared by the four
branches of the Armed Forces, each of them wanting to prevent the others from concentrating
power. Chile would be thus, in Barros’ words, a case where “institutional limits upon
nondemocratic power can be viable forcing us to rethink a long tradition in the analysis of political
power”.785
 Barros’ explanation of the institutional limits that the Chilean military government put
upon its own power is supported by historical documents.  At the first session of the Constituent
780 Idem
781 Idem.
782 Actas Oficiales de la Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República, Sesión 10, Thursday
October 25, 1973. Available at: http://actas.minsegpres.gob.cl/aocencpr/fch_capitulo.asp?codigo=Cap%EDtulo
%201,%20Bases%20de%20la%20Institucionalidad# Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
783 Actas Oficiales de la Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República, Sesión 1. Available 
at: http://actas.minsegpres.gob.cl/aocencpr/fch_capitulo.asp?codigo=Cap%EDtulo%201,%20Bases%20de%20la
%20Institucionalidad# Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
784 Robert Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship, Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p.1.
785 Idem
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Commission, the members proposed a decree that stated that the dictatorship would be transitional
having a precise goal: to “reconstruct the country morally and materially” in order to establish new
institutions and a “new democracy” free from the vices that had led to its destruction.786 As the
same Barros noted, “from its inception the members of the Constituent Commission took it for
granted that the purpose of a new political Constitution of the Republic was to structure a
representative, democratic, republican form of government with explicit constitutional guarantees
protecting individual rights”.787 Moreover, according to Barros, none of the members sought to
break away from Chile’s traditional democratic principles.788 On the contrary, the commissioners
had not understood the crisis under the UP government as a failure of the general principles of
democracy but as a failure of particular institutional mechanisms.789
It was to a large extent the internal push for power between the different branches of the
Armed Forces that shared the direction of the government in the form of a Junta that finally
enabled the civil advisers of the military regime to put forward an institutional transformation that
eventually restored economic freedom and democracy. As Barros noted, the Constitution, closed
the debate about the duration of the military regime by specifying “the contours of a post military
regime and a timetable for its realization”.790 As a result, Pinochet was “abiding by known
impersonal rules even though these rules had frustrated his ambition to remain president”.791  The
outcome of this process was that Pinochet was forced to “leave the table after the people said No”
in the referendum of 1988.792 In short, if as Fareed Zakaria observed, Pinochet did “lead his
country to liberal democracy”793, it was because the transition to democracy came almost as an
inevitable consequence of the constraints established by the 1980 Constitution.
The idea that the military government, under the influence of the Chicago Boys and the
members of the Constituent Commission had created the institutions necessary for a transition to
democracy and that the promise of the transition could not be ignored by the regime, was also
shared by the political opposition. Before the referendum none other than Clodomiro Almeyda,
one of the central figures of the UP government, declared that he was “rationally optimistic” about
the Chilean future because he thought that the military regime was going to materialize the
786 Actas Oficiales de la Comisión de Estudios de la Nueva Constitución Política de la República, Sesión 1.
787 Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship, Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution, p. 220.
788 Ibid., p 221.
789 Idem.
790 Ibid.,p.179.
791 Ibid., p. 312.
792 Idem.
793 Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad, W. W. Norton & Company,
New York, 2007, p.95. A liberal democracy  is one in which not only elections take place but one in which
fundamental rights and spaces of individual freedom are in fact respected mostly as a result of institutional
arrangements that prevent the abuse of power.  See also: Shalendr Sharma, Achieving Economic Development in the
Era of Globalization, Routledge, New York, 2007, p. 43.
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referendum established in its “fraudulent constitution”.794 According to Almeyda, the No
alternative would obtain an “overwhelming” victory.795 Along the same lines, also before the
referendum, socialist leader Ricardo Lagos sustained that because the transition to democracy had
been fabricated by the military regime he did not believe that Pinochet would be able to ignore the
very institutions that he himself had created.796
For the Chicago Boys the Constitution had also a strategic objective. As Barros noted, by
allowing themselves to be subject to limits, the military Junta “successfully imposed upon Chile a
complex institutional framework that protects private property and bolsters parties defending the
status quo...”797 Barros’ conclusion on the Chilean process is particularly enlightening from an
institutional analysis and historical perspective:
We can no longer presume that authoritarian regimes cannot make use of law and
limiting institutional devices to structure and stabilize their domination...
Constitutional constraints on political power are not incompatible with a
nondemocratic authoritarian rule. If this is the case we need to reconsider many of
our assumptions about law and constitutionalism. For if legal institutional restrains
can coexist with nondemocratic power, the operation of the law and
constitutionalism must be reposed independent of their presumed exclusive affinity
with democracy.798 
A decisive factor in restraining the dictator’s power is the set of beliefs that inspire those
who are making the rules of the game. In the Chilean case, British-American ideas of liberty were
largely responsible for an institutional design that put limits to authoritarianism and enabled the
restoration of not only economic freedom but also political liberties and democracy. This does not
mean however, that those who collaborated with the Chilean dictatorship have no potential political
or legal responsibility for the human rights violations that occurred during their time as advisers to
the military regime. This issue remains an open debate, which is beyond the scope of this work.
794 Interview by Florencia Varas and Monica Gonzalez, in: Chile, SI-NO, Ediciones Melequías, Santiago, 1988, p. 43.
795 Idem.
796 Ibid., p 105.
797 Barros, Constitutionalism and Dictatorship, Pinochet, the Junta and the 1980 Constitution, p.323.
798 Ibid.,p. 325.
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Conclusions to Chapter IV
Jaime Guzmán was what North describes as an actor “able to make the rules of the game”. He had
the crucial task of creating a new Constitution that would provide an ironclad shield to the
economic and institutional project of the Chicago Boys. Guzmán’s ideology is therefore extremely
relevant from an institutional perspective. As this chapter shows, to a large extent Guzmán followed
an approach along the lines of British-American liberalism. It becomes clear from the reading of
Guzman’s writings that he fully shared the view that economic liberty was the base for all other
liberties and that its restoration was a necessary condition for the restoration of democracy and
political liberties at large. As explained in Chapter I, the view that economic liberty was a necessary
condition for other liberties was typical of the British-American classical liberal tradition and was
also endorsed by Courcelle-Seneuil and the Chicago Boys, as shown in Chapters II and III. In other
words, like all classical liberals, and after evolving from a statist position, Guzmán promoted
essentially a negative idea of liberty, which automatically led to the limitation of government
interference on the economy and social life. The most important influence on Guzmán’s later
thinking was Friedrich Hayek. This is of crucial importance because Hayek was the leading
intellectual in the British-American classical liberal tradition in the 20th century.  This means that
through the influence of Hayek on Guzmán, classical liberalism found yet another way to define
Chile’s institutional evolution in the direction of British-American liberalism, particularly via the
1980 Constitution.  In addition, Hayek’s theory offered a justification for the Pinochet regime that
was also grounded on the classical liberal ideas of democracy and freedom. This justification was
used by Guzmán, who argued that democracy could not be reintroduced until economic liberty and
economic development were consolidated. It is important to stress, however, that this justification
of dictatorship in times of emergency put forth by Hayek, Mill and Berlin, did not vindicate crimes
such as those committed under the Pinochet regime.  From a classical liberal perspective, it was not
necessarily the lack of democracy that was incompatible with the institutional project of the
Chicago Boys and Jaime Guzmán, but the lack of respect for fundamental rights. Moreover, the
notion that democracy was a means to preserve liberty and not an end in itself was Guzmán’s
justification for an authoritarian regime that was seeking to restore economic liberty and a
democracy free from what were considered the impurities of the past. Guzmán believed that these
impurities had allowed democracy to become corrupt and to reduce economic freedom, thereby
affecting all other liberties and ultimately leading to the destruction of democracy itself.  Also, in
Guzmán’s thinking, the Cold War logic was decisive. The classical liberal explanation for the
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advancement of socialism through an increasing reduction of economic liberty until no freedom at
all remained had convinced Guzmán of the need for a free economy and a limited democracy.
Otherwise, he believed, Chile would go back to socialism, as had happened with the socialist
revolution of Allende. Like Friedman and the Chicago Boys, Guzmán was convinced that socialism
had had a chance in Chile because of decades of failed economic policies that had paved the way
for populism and more radical statist experiments. The idea of a limited democracy and a deep
skepticism about rational planning and the centrality of a free economy were crucial pillars of
Guzmán's constitutional project. As this chapter shows, the individualistic philosophy of Guzmán’s
constitution and its concern for the protection of negative liberty and private property closely
resembled the constitutional project of the framers of the American Constitution. This is further
evidence of the presence of American ideas of freedom and democracy in the Chilean free market
revolution.
That ideas of democracy in the classical liberal tradition were part of Guzman’s
constitutional project is not only clear in the case of Guzman himself, but also in that of the other
members of the constituent commission. The documents analyzed in this chapter show that from the
beginning they had conceived the authoritarian regime as transitional. Authoritarianism was thus
seen as a means to create a new institutional apparatus that allowed the introduction of a limited
democracy as well as a free economic system that could ensure its survival. In other words,
authoritarianism proved useful to create a set of rules and institutions that would set the foundations
for a social, economic and political order along the lines of British-American liberalism.  Probably
the most striking aspect of this process of institutional change is the fact that Guzmán's constitution
did indeed serve as a limitation of Pinochet’s power. A clear manifestation of this is that after being
defeated at the referendum of 1988 Pinochet stepped down and democracy was reintroduced. If
North is right about the interplay between beliefs and institutional change, then the reintroduction of
democracy and political liberties in Chile in 1990 was at least to a considerable extent the result of
the set of beliefs that inspired the new institutions created by Guzmán and the Chicago Boys. These
beliefs, as explained in Chapter II, were part of Chile’s intellectual and institutional tradition. The
next chapter will provide further evidence of the influence of this branch of liberalism on the
intellectual foundations of the Chilean free market revolution.
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Chapter V: José Piñera and the promotion of American liberalism
 
Piñera and Economía y Sociedad on liberalism and fundamental rights
Among all the Chicago Boys no one wrote more about the Chilean institutional
transformation and its connection to British-American liberalism than José Piñera. Given his
intellectual background, his fame as the most radical among the Chicago Boys, and his influence
on the Chilean public opinion through his numerous writings, it is useful and necessary to dedicate
a special chapter to Piñera’s intellectual contribution to the Chilean free market revolution.  Piñera,
who obtained his PhD in economics from Harvard, publicly declared to have been inspired in his
work by classical liberal thinkers such as the American Founding Fathers. Moreover, Piñera’s first
choice for a research topic for his dissertation at Harvard was on the American Founding Fathers, a
project he could not materialize because his professors wanted a more standard dissertation.799
With regard to the main intellectual influences on his thinking Piñera wrote:
In my four years in Cambridge, not only did I deepen my knowledge of economics
and other social sciences, but I immersed myself in the exhilarating climate of
freedom of American society. In search of the ultimate causes of the success of
America, I became a passionate admirer of the Founding Fathers, and their two great
legacies to the world: the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
Republic. I also found great inspiration in the works of thinkers of liberty such as
John Locke, Adam Smith, Frederic Bastiat, Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, Ludwig
von Mises, and Milton Friedman.800
  Piñera became labor minister in 1978 after having impressed the Junta with an original
analysis of Chile’s economic potential. Later on he also became minister of mining which is a key
799 See:  “El valor presente de los Founding Fathers” Economía y Sociedad, December 19, 2001. Available at: 
http://www.josepinera.com/articles/articulos_eys_valor_presente_de_los_padres_fundadores.htm Last accessed: 
28/06/2014.
800 José Piñera, “How the Power of Ideas can Transform a Country”, Available at: 
http://www.josepinera.com/articles/articles_powerofideas.htm  Last accessed: 28/06/2014. As will be shown, 
several documents and writings of Piñera during the 1970s and 1980s confirm his classical liberal worldview.
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position in a country that derives its main income from the exploitation of natural resources. More
importantly, Piñera was the only Chicago Boy to create a magazine with the aim of spreading
neoliberal ideas. The magazine was called Economía y Sociedad (Economy and Society) and was
widely read by the Chilean economic, academic and political elites. As this chapter will show,
Economía y Sociedad was Piñera’s main platform for making the case in defense of the transitional
nature of the military regime and the centrality of the free market revolution to achieve democracy.
It was also a platform for criticizing the government for not restoring civil rights and for crashing
other personal liberties. It must be pointed out however, that even if Piñera actively engaged in the
defense of a free society both in economic and political terms, most of Piñera’s criticism to the
military regime on human rights issues were made after he had left his position in the government
and his job as free market reformer had been accomplished. This is further indication of the
centrality that economic liberty has over all other liberties in the neoliberal tradition. In the words
of Piñera himself “with the fruits of his labor man conquers that amount of private property and
economic liberty which is the base of his social and political liberty”.801  Of course, there can also
be a pragmatic dimension to the decision of advocating for other individual liberties after leaving
the government. It is not unlikely that Piñera would have lost his job and would not have been able
to make the radical reforms he intended to, had he publicly criticized the military government
during his time as minister. At any rate, Piñera remained a central figure in Chilean public life
throughout the military regime, achieving great influence on the Chilean political, academic and
economic leadership through his writings and opinions. Without any doubt his ideas and particular
contribution formed part of the set of beliefs that influenced political events and institutional
development in Chile during the 1980s. A statement such as the one made by former United States
ambassador  to Chile  from 1977 to 1982, George Landau  in El Mercurio, should be understood in
this framework. Referring to the free market revolution, the Chicago Boys and the human rights
problems, Landau wrote:
I was the ambassador of the United States in Chile during the years in which these
projects were developed. Despite the fact that I had serious conflicts with the
government with regard to the Letelier case, I want to stress that I was a first line
witness of how Jose Piñera and this group of economists of solid liberal convictions
transformed Chile into a free society, fighting for liberty, democracy and the rights of
the individuals under the most adverse internal and external conditions.802
801 José Piñera, “Trabajo y libertad”, La Tercera, April 25, 1983.
802 George Landau, “El otro día decisivo”, El Mercurio, August 8, 2008.  
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 Indeed, throughout the 1980s Piñera and Economía y Sociedad actively engaged in the
defense of individual rights against the abuses of the military regime arguing that these rights were
inherent to any free society and that they had been guaranteed by the Constitution. Useful to
understand the philosophical background of this engagement is an article Piñera would write on
human rights in 1991. In the piece, Piñera declared that the discussion on the subject of human
rights could not be avoided. According to him, no one should think again that human rights and
individual liberties were merely formal prerogatives of the individuals that could be taken away by
government decisions or by the actions of other groups.  For Piñera, this was the central lesson of
liberalism: “liberalism teaches us that the best way to recognize the dignity of a person is to
vindicate his liberties.”803 In Piñera’s view, human dignity understood by classical liberalism
entailed “freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom to work,
freedom to entrepreneurship, freedom of education...”804 In short, said Piñera, liberalism defends
the right of everyone “to live according to his own opinions”.805 This idea of human dignity
required “an effective control of the abuses against the individual from the concentrated powers of
society: government, monopolies, groups with collectivist pressures, circumstantial majorities with
their arbitrary wishes”.806 Accordingly, authority had to be subordinated to the individual and not
the other way around. For ensuring these rights, a system of separation of powers was necessary, in
which the authorities that abused power could be punished both in civil and criminal cases. Finally,
Piñera sustained that human rights could not be defended with abstract concepts. The challenge
was not to protect “the people” but to protect each individual providing real people with the legal
and material tools so they could defend themselves.807
This view on human rights was consistent with Piñera’s engagement in the defense of civil
liberties since the late 1970s. Piñera’s classical liberal approach to this issue was best reflected in
an article authored by London School of Economics professor Maurice Cranston, which was
endorsed and reproduced by Economía y Sociedad in 1985 reflecting the magazine’s position on
the subject. The article was entitled “¿Qué son los derechos humanos?” (What are human rights?)
and was a radical defense of a negative version of human rights that entailed economic freedom at
its core. According to Cranston, John Locke had been the father of the concept of natural rights
such as life, liberty and property, achieving great influence in England and the United States.808
803 José Piñera, “Derechos humanos: y el futuro cuándo?” Revista Hoy, June 1991. Available at: 
http://www.josepinera.com/chile/chile_ddhh_futuro.htm Last accessed: 28/06/2014.
804 Idem.
805 Idem.
806 Idem.
807 Idem.
808 Maurice Cranston, ¿Qué son los derechos humanos?, Economía y Sociedad, September 1985, p.33.
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For Cranston the cause of natural rights had been damaged by German intellectuals who had
argued that they were not individual rights but collective or national rights. By the late 19th century
the influence of these ideas had led to the disappearance of natural rights form the intellectual
world. According to Cranston, after the experiences of the first half of the 20th century, the United
Nations passed a declaration of human rights that again revived the tradition of natural rights.
However, Cranston warned that under the pressure of socialist countries the UN had also
incorporated social and economic rights such as the right to social security, home, health care,
proper income and so on. These rights were not only unattainable but implied a negation of natural
rights because it was reducing rights to the category of ideals. While human rights admitted no
exceptions and had to be respected everywhere, ideals are no more than wishes. In Cranston’s
words: “the effect of a declaration of human rights overloaded with social and economic rights
consists in taking out the civil and political rights of the morally compelling camp and bringing
them to the world of utopic aspirations. To understand a right nothing is more important than to
recognize that it is not an ideal”.809Real human rights continued Cranston, did not need a
justification for their existence: they were inherent to human nature.
Throughout the 1980s there were several publications where Piñera and Economía y
Sociedad defended personal liberties along the lines of Cranston's classical liberalism. In these
writings is possible to distinguish three main concerns in regard to human rights violations by the
military regime: a) forced exiled, b) freedom of speech and freedom of information, and c) the right
to life and personal security. Social and economic rights were rejected even though a limited
redistributive role of government was acknowledged. It is useful to examine briefly the sort of
defense made by Piñera and Economía y Sociedad of human rights in order to understand the
tension between the classical liberal worldview and the Chilean authoritarian government as well as
to provide further evidence with regard to the presence of ideas of political liberty and democracy
in the free market revolution.
A)  Forced exile
One of the most recurrent punishments that the military regime applied to political
opponents was forced exile. For the people expelled from the country this meant leaving home,
family and property behind, as well as a prohibition to return until the authorities allowed them to
do so. In 1982, in the newspaper La Tercera Piñera criticized this government policy arguing, that
“men should not be deprived of the right to live in his motherland”.810 Piñera further argued that
809 Ibid., p.35.
810 José Piñera, “Dios nació en el exilio”, La Tercera, November 15, 1982.
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Chile was different to the communist regimes that blocked their borders so that people could not
freely leave, adding that even the most radical adversaries of the military regime wanted to come
back to Chile. After the government decision to allow the exiled to return in 1982, Piñera argued
that it was “the best news of the year” celebrating the fact that opponents to the military
government such as Andrés Zaldivar, Jaime Castillo and Eugenio Velasco could return to Chile.
Again in La Tercera but this time in 1986, Piñera would come back on the topic of forced
exile, which the government had reintroduced.  On that occasion Piñera demanded that the
government should end this policy “immediately”.811 The former labor minister explained that in a
free society every person had the right to be judged by an impartial court in a due process of law
and that the sanction of exile was “incompatible with a free society given its intrinsic cruelty”.812
For Piñera, the people most affected were the families of those outcast by the authorities, which
introduced an element that made “civic friendship” in society “impossible”.813 Also in 1986 in
Economía y Sociedad, Piñera would make the same case for the end of forced exile. He argued that
the punishment was a “shame” and that the government should renounce to use the faculty of
“administrative exile” provided by the Constitution.814 He went on to say that the courts should
challenge the government actions by accepting habeas corpus as a way to protect people from
possible arbitrary actions by the government. In August of the same year the editorial of Economía
y Sociedad warned that the main problem of the military regime was credibility with respect to
human rights and the transition to democracy, arguing that it was necessary to regain credibility in
the eyes of the United States and the developed world. In order to achieve that, the magazine
sustained that the government had to allow the installation of independent TV networks and other
media that could watch and denounce the government on human rights abuses.815
B) Freedom of speech
Like all classical liberals, Piñera attributed enormous importance to freedom of speech and
information. It is to this right that Piñera dedicated most of his writings. In Piñera’s view, a free
press and freedom of speech were essential to control government power from outside and
therefore crucial to protect individual liberties. No open and dynamic society could work without
the free flow of information. In an article entitled “The Open Society” after Karl Popper’s famous
work on totalitarian philosophies, Piñera argued, like Hayek and Friedman, that knowledge was
811 José Piñera, “Fin al exilio”, La Tercera, August 18, 1986.
812 Idem.
813 Idem.
814 José Piñera,  “Fin al destierro”, Economía y Sociedad, July 1986, p.10.
815 Economía y Sociedad, August 1986, p.8.
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dispersed among all individuals in society.816 The more complex a society was, the more limited
was this knowledge. The advantage of a free society was that individuals could share their ideas,
opinions and particular knowledge so that society could select the best combinations. This process
required the existence of critique and analysis: “critique and the freedom to contribute with new
ideas or objections to useless ideas allow society to correct many mistakes and adapt to the
future”.817 Following this line of analysis, Piñera argued that societies best progressed by the free
play of their spontaneous forces and not by the dictate of an “enlightened elite”.818 In a passage that
closely resembled Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand, Piñera argued that “the interaction of
free men, each one with his own contribution, produces in a free society results that are superior to
those that could have been imagined by a single person or group with knowledge that is by
definition limited”.819 Piñera was thus making the same case Hayek had made in favor of
epistemological skepticism and limited government. In Piñera’s words: “collectivist
societies...where individuals are subordinated to the State or the nation are in reality societies
where groups of people have centralized power in order to impose their own limited vision...These
are societies distorted by the monstrous arrogance of those who believe to have access to reason or
truth...In these societies not only does tyranny rule but also inefficiency”.820
 One of the first concrete critiques of repressive government policies was made by Piñera in
1982 after the government’s decision to censor books.  On the occasion, Piñera argued that the
decision showed a “paternalistic conception of the development of the social body” that was
grounded in the fear of confronting different ideas.821 Piñera denounced that those who censored
believed to be in the possession of “absolute truth” which was nothing but a “myth” to hide their
“dogmatism”.822 In a free society, continued Piñera, there was no such form of previous censorship
because it was not the role of government to protect people from the books that could be
dangerous. It was through public debate that those books could and should be neutralized and not
through the use of government coercion. Piñera further explained that in a free society the real
problem was not to “suppress with efficacy what is considered undesirable but to develop
sufficient energies so that the greatest perversions produce the smallest damage”.823 A free society
entailed “sustained trust in the mechanisms of the open debate, in the right to disagree and in the
value of tolerance”.824 On the contrary, censorship assumed that the people were not mature
816 José Piñera, “La sociedad abierta”, La Tercera, August 26, 1985.
817 Ibid., pp.151-152.
818 Ibid., p.152.
819 Idem.
820 Idem.
821 “Previa, discrecional, inapelable”, Economía y Sociedad, September 1982, p.14.
822 Idem.
823 Ibid.p.,15.
824 Idem.
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enough to distinguish between what was good and wrong. Moreover, for Piñera, the government
was again acting in an unconstitutional manner for it deprived the people from the ability to make
their own choices. In addition, said Piñera, it was counterproductive because it weakened the
capacity of society to react against dangerous ideas.
For Piñera, another unjust consequence of the logic of censorship is that it transformed the
writer into a sort of ideological sniper, thereby making all writers suspicious of a possible crime.
On top of that, the necessary controls for implementing censorship were “humiliating” for all
writers. For these reasons, Piñera claimed that the “abolition of prior censorship was an
imperative” arguing that history showed that censorship usually became a source of abuse.825
In 1983 Piñera once again defended freedom of expression, which he thought was being
abusively suppressed by the military government. Piñera referred to the pressures made by
government officials on newspaper editors to prevent them from publishing certain types of
information.  Piñera declared that it was his “moral duty to defend these liberties”.826 He argued
that there was press censorship in Chile, which was contradictory with the fundamental rights
established in the Constitution of 1980 created by the same military government. He denounced the
attempts of censorship as foolish and added that “those of us who promote integral freedom see
freedom of speech as an essential pillar of a free and civilized society”.827 Piñera warned the
government that the truth would eventually prevail and that the attempts to hide it would only
undermine its legitimacy.
Along the same lines, in 1985 in Economía y Sociedad Piñera published an article entitled
“Una libertad vital” (A Crucial Liberty) in which he denounced that freedom of speech was
“severely limited” in Chile making public debate extremely difficult.828 In a line of argumentation
that would be a constant during the 1980s, Piñera rejected the arguments restricting freedom of
expression to make the fight against terrorism effective, arguing that the government had gone too
far with restrictions that prevented public debate and open criticism. For Piñera, these measures
deprived society “of their most important tool of intellectual discipline” and the best source of
information “for the adoption of good decisions not only in the political sphere but also in the
economic and social spheres”.829 Piñera went on listing the restrictions imposed by the government
on freedom of information, explaining that they constituted a “control exerted by a small group of
people over the vital liquid that moves society: information”.830 Piñera concluded his article with a
set of recommendations to the government in order to restore freedom of information. Among them,
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he demanded to put an end to censorship of a Chilean left wing magazine called Hoy; to modify the
law that prohibited to inform and talk without prior authorization about topics considered
“politically relevant”; to put an end to the pressure exercised by some ministers on the media
through government propaganda; and to ensure independent management of the state television
channel in order to get ready for the transition to democracy.
A few months later in an article entitled “No más censura” (No More Censorship) Piñera
argued that the country could “no longer live without the oxygen that is freedom of speech”.831
Piñera further argued that Economía y Sociedad clearly disagreed with the “anti-liberal prejudices
of Hoy magazine” but insisted that according to a coherent position with the principles of liberty
“no government official” had “the right to determine a priori what a publication can say”.832
Piñera’s defense of the right to free speech of political opponents was based on the belief that prior
censorship violated “one of the fundamental principles of a free society”.833 He added that the
military government was different from Marxist governments such as the one in Nicaragua and
therefore should not fall “into the temptation of silencing opinions and news that a given censor
considers inconvenient for the 11 million Chileans to know”.834  Measures such as decree number
1,217 which established that the media could inform on “politically relevant issues” subject to prior
authorization by the government were, according to Piñera, “draconian” and could be used at any
time to censor any medium. In Piñera’s view there was “no justification” for the censorship that the
Chilean people were suffering, which not only was “restricting the intellectual debate” but also
hindering the construction of the necessary civic friendship to live in peace.835
Piñera once again referred to the issue of freedom of speech at a meeting organized by the
National Press Association in June 1985. In his presentation, Piñera argued that there was no more
difficult task for a society than having a successful transition from an authoritarian to a democratic
system. What was needed to succeed, argued Piñera, was a sort of “Magna Carta that limits the
action of the state” by establishing “fundamental rights, key economic liberties, private property,
freedom of speech” and mechanisms to prevent the rise of totalitarianism.836 For all that, the role of
a free press was essential. A free press in Chile, explained Piñera, could only exist under the
following conditions: a) full enforcement of constitutional guarantees; b) effective law that
established sanctions to the abuse of information; c) a free journalism that did not force journalists
to join unions in order to be able to work; d) autonomy of the media, which meant  no government
ownership of media; e) free access to all communication media, and f) a reduction in the economic
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power of the state. This last point is crucial to analyze the way in which economic and political
liberty were intertwined in the worldview of classical liberalism. Along the lines of Friedman,
Piñera explained that  the power of the government to control the materials necessary to produce the
newspapers, to fix the prices of the products that the media can sell or buy and to regulate the
commercial activities that allowed the media to work, were all forms in which government could
exercise a de facto censorship. For those reasons, according to Piñera, a “social market economy
contributes powerfully to the existence of a free press”.837 Finally, Piñera concluded that the
enormous influence that the state still had on all aspects of the life of the citizens was the
consequence of the hesitation of the different sectors of society to advance to a “regime of integral
liberties which is the only one capable of guaranteeing development and pluralism”.838
C) Right to life and security
The most critical article with regard to human rights abuses was published by Piñera in
Economía y Sociedad in 1986. The article addressed an incident in which some members of the
military forces had burned two people who were planning a terrorist attack. The case was called
the “quemados” —the burned— and became a major scandal in the Chilean media. In his
intervention, Piñera argued that the “inexplicable incapacity” of the military government to
guarantee respect for fundamental rights was undermining “its ethical value and chasing away its
supporters”.839 Piñera continued:
why do more than 3,000 Chileans still remain in exile? Why is terrorism being
hunted down in the shantytowns with massive raids that hurt the dignity of the
hundreds of thousands of people that live there?  Whose idea was it to send young
conscripts with camouflage and combat uniforms to watch their own countrymen?840
Piñera concluded that it was “incomprehensible” that a government with such an incredible
record on economic reforms could not understand that such “persistent” human rights violations
were not acceptable, urging it to adopt substantial measures to solve the problem and guarantee the
respect of fundamental rights for all Chileans.841
 Unsurprisingly, Piñera had to face the reaction of the government which, through the state
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owned newspaper La Nación, accused Economía y Sociedad of confusing the public with regard to
the “quemados case”. Responding to a leader in La Nación that made those accusations, Piñera
reiterated that the government was incapable of guaranteeing human rights, adding that among the
Chilean military there were “bands of assassins” who acted with impunity and were responsible for
the killing of several people.842
In August 1986, in La Tercera Piñera would again address the “quemados case” arguing
that it was unacceptable that the case remained in “obscurity and impunity”.843 He added that lies
destroyed any possibility of achieving the civic friendship that Chile needed for constructing
peace. In Piñera’s view, lies would prevent the restoration of trust within Chilean society, which
was the reason why the authorities had to discover the truth and make it public.844
With regard to other fundamental rights, also in 1986, Piñera would make the case to end
the states of emergency because they were not effective in fighting terrorism and consistently
restricted fundamental rights such as the right to assemble, to mobilize, to be informed and to enter
and leave the country.845 The government, according to Piñera, was undermining constitutional
stability by not protecting fundamental rights. In Piñera’s words: “Why should Chileans feel loyal
to the Constitution when the chapter which is most important to them —the chapter on
fundamental rights— which protects their liberty and gives them security that they will not be
subjected to abuses is not being applied?” 846 Along these lines Piñera, criticized those judges who
were ruling that habeas corpus claims could not be filed under a state of exception. He added that
the restrictions imposed on freedom of expression made impossible the emergence of a press that
could “watch over the power and the political debate”.847
Another important article with regard to the fight against terrorism and the protection of
human rights was published by Economia y Sociedad in July 1987.The piece argued that terrorism
sought to discredit the legal institutions so that it could destroy the foundations of a civilized order,
warning that when the intelligence services acted brutally they became themselves agents of
subversion by destroying the confidence of the people in the institutions.848 This in turn made of
society an easy prey for totalitarianism. Therefore, it was crucial that the military rulers should
understand that terrorism should be fought with “the most complete respect for the rights of all
Chileans”.849 According to the article, Chile needed better intelligence services that could deal with
terrorism without destroying the confidence of the public in the government institutions. Moreover,
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for Economía y Sociedad, intelligence services should “not be a source of danger for human rights
but their defender; the last shield of the open society”.850
In 1987 the editorial Economía y Sociedad argued that the Pinochet government was not
going to win the referendum of 1988 if it continued to undermine its support by persisting in
policies that violated human rights.851 Some of the most important deficiencies of the government,
argued the magazine, were the concentration of political power and the absence of checks and
balances.852 According to the magazine, the government had now an opportunity to correct this in
order to gain credibility. Among the measures recommended by Piñera was the elimination of the
article of the Constitution that enabled declaring a state of exception due to the perturbation of
internal peace. According to Piñera, this measure would put an end to forced exile as well as
reestablish habeas corpus and enable the free functioning of newspapers and magazines. Piñera
insisted that a well-functioning economy was not enough for achieving all the support necessary to
win the election of 1988 and that political liberties were essential.853 Accordingly, the government
also had to lead the transition to democracy making sure that no violations of fundamental rights
took place.854 In addition, the transition to democracy needed a consensus about essential values
among the ruling elites and the civil society. In the words of Economía y Sociedad:
Civil society has to do an indispensable task in order to make possible a democratic
political order which is stable and effective: to reach an agreement about the basic
rules of the game that will lead the economic social and political development of the
country...it seems that this consensus should at least include...rights that are inherent
to human nature such as the right to life, freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression and due process of law...855
The magazine included the right to private ownership and economic liberty making it very
clear that so-called “social and economic rights” such as the right to a home provided by the
government were not part of the list of negative rights. Moreover, Economía y Sociedad warned that
a government that assumed the role of providing for the people in their necessities could easily lead
to weakening personal liberties.856 Economia y Sociedad was thus once again promoting a negative
idea of liberty along the lines of classical liberalism, rejecting one of the central premises of the
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welfare state.
Economia y Sociedad on democracy, government and liberty
As has been pointed out, Economía y Sociedad assumed the role of influencing society,
especially the ruling elites. The magazine openly declared that its task was “to persuade” and
“become a useful instrument for the decision-making of businesses and also for the civic decisions
of private individuals and the authorities.”857 In the case of the authorities, the magazine argued that
“public responsibilities have to be inserted in a body of ideas about the individual, society and the
state, which recognized the essential values of collective life and the priorities that must orient
them”.858
The reading of the magazine created by Piñera provides yet another proof that a
comprehensive version of classical liberalism —with a social market economy component— was at
the heart of the free market revolution. All the central ideas of classical liberalism, such as the rule
of law, a limited government, limited democracy, negative liberty, property rights, the spontaneous
nature of progress, the inconvenience of the welfare state and the efficiency of the market are to be
found in the magazine. Like “The Brick” and the Constitution, a special emphasis was put on the
connection between economic freedom, democracy and political freedom. As the third issue
published in 1978 explained, the new military government had three essential commitments:
freedom, reason and democracy. As far as freedom was concerned, a crucial point made by
Economía y Sociedad was that the process of disintegration of the Chilean democracy and economy
had started long before the UP government. Just like “The Brick” had done years earlier, Economía
y Sociedad argued that for decades, government power had expanded increasing the scope of public
decisions.859 In the words of the magazine:
The pace at which the state expanded, its increasing intervention in spheres that are
not of its concern, the diversified volume of services that became  dependent on it,
the vast amount of resources and the number of jobs it came to control are features
that describe what it seemed an unstoppable movement towards socialism.860
Thus, in the eyes of Economía y Sociedad, statism had restricted private initiative and
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seriously “jeopardized individual freedom”.861 It had also destroyed the “basic pillar of democracy
—freedom— leading to serious economic inefficiencies”.862 As a consequence, the sphere of
decisions that individuals could make without the involvement of the state was dramatically
reduced while the power of the authority became substantially greater.863 Consequentially, for the
magazine, Chile had not only gradually destroyed individual freedom but also become a rent-
seeking society where government was the “great distributor of rents and favors”.864 The military
government had to reverse that situation if it wanted to restore the soundness of the economy and a
functioning democracy.  In a speech given by Piñera and reproduced in Economia y Sociedad, the
former minister argued that the contribution of economic freedom to the establishment of a true
democracy was a fact that was no longer debated in western nations that had been able to combine
progress, liberty and democracy.865 It was evident he added, that when government fixed prices and
salaries, controlled major enterprises and hundreds of thousands of jobs and granted thousands of
privileges, there could be no real democracy. Under such a system, the fight over political control
was a fight over the control of people’s lives. In this context, said Piñera echoing Friedman,
“economic liberty is much more than a mechanism that allows... the efficient allocation of resources
and maximizes productive growth. Economic liberty is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a
true democracy and a free society.”866Therefore, economic liberties such as the right to engage in
productive activities, the right of free association and equality before the law had to be
guaranteed.867 At the same time Piñera considered private property as the base for individual liberty
and progress. If John Adams argued that “the moment the idea is admitted into society, that
property is not as sacred as the laws of God... anarchy and tyranny commence”868 Piñera declared
that “when private property is confiscated individual liberty becomes an illusion and progress
comes to a halt”.869 In this logic the success of a process of political liberalization was measured by
the degree of negative liberty that it achieved: “the success of a process of political liberalization
can be measured by its potential to reduce state power so that in basic matters society can develop
independent from the political color that is in power”.870For Piñera, only when society was
depoliticized would it be stable and the economy could prosper.871
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 In the eyes of the magazine, economic liberty required that public decisions should be
restricted to their own spheres so that property was “dispersed” and private individuals had “a wider
area for their initiatives”.872 What the military government had to construct, said the magazine, was
“a society that is more free, stronger and less dependent on the decisions of the authority”.873 For
that, free economic institutions were essential and had to pursue the following aims: a) material
progress and security of the Chilean people; b) securing economic liberty in order to construct a
libertarian society; c) ensuring justice both in its individual and social dimension.874 All of this,
claimed Economía y Sociedad, had not been promoted by the Chilean economic model existent
prior to 1973. On the contrary, the magazine argued that even though many of the statist policies
responded to a desire of achieving justice, they had instead been the source of much injustice
leading the state to serve interest groups and thereby abandoning the poor. Therefore, the new
economic institutions  had to be inspired in the following four principles: a) The subsidiarity of the
state, which implied a “recognition of free private initiative and private property on the one hand,
and state responsibility for satisfying the basic needs of the population and regulating the economy
on the other hand”; b) equality before the law; c) rationality in public decisions allowing technicians
to define economic and public policy; and d) participation of the citizens so that political decisions
reflected the value judgment of the people.875
 Of all of these principles the one most stressed by Economía y Sociedad was the
subsidiarity of the state. In the view of the magazine, it was this principle that guaranteed the
economic freedom on which all liberties in society depended. As the magazine argued, upon the
correct understanding and application of the subsidiarity of the state rested “the best defense of a
free society” because statist excesses were “one of the most dangerous threats to western
democracies...”876 Moreover, the magazine argued that the correct interpretation of the subsidiarity
principle and its consolidation in constitutional rules was “the most powerful defense against
runaway statism”.877 Statism was in turn opposed to a principle which according to Economía y
Sociedad was essential to Chilean culture: freedom.878 For the magazine, it was freedom as well as
the stability of the economic and democratic system that demanded that the new institutions created
by the military government did not intervene in the spheres of the individual initiative. Otherwise
they would become dependent on the political system leading to the politicization of society and to
increasing conflicts within the political class. One year before the referendum of 1988 Economía y
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Sociedad argued that just like Margaret Thatcher had done in Britain, the military government in
Chile had made a “neoliberal revolution” that sought to return to the individuals “those spaces of
freedom taken away by bureaucracy and statism”.879  For Economía y Sociedad, London and
Santiago concentrated on recovering “the liberties in that sphere where socialism usually
confiscates first: the market”.880   
The second commitment of the military government, according to Economía y Sociedad was
with reason. This idea was inextricably linked to the concept of limited democracy that was at the
core of the free market revolution.  The magazine argued that a distinction had to be made between
value judgments and technical judgments. On technical issues such as public policy and the
economy, it was the experts on the social sciences that had to make decisions unless the public was
well informed; otherwise individual freedom would be restricted and collectivism would arise.881
This was a clear justification for institutional constrains on politicians and thereby on the
democratic principle. The magazine went as far as arguing that a mechanism had to be considered
so that certain decisions were not made by politicians but by experts: “It is beyond doubt that the
complexity or confidential nature of certain decisions make unthinkable its public debate. In some
cases, when the decision is primarily technical, it could be submitted to these commissions of
experts”.882 What was required was that the Constitution laid down the principles of the free market
model and designed “the mechanisms which canalized the contribution of experts and the will of
the people in a genuinely democratic way”.883 In turn, the new economic institutions had to be
designed so that they would “make sure that public decisions respond to a national commitment to
freedom, reason and democracy”.884 In other words, democracy had to be limited in order to protect
the free market economy which was seen as the base for a functioning democracy and all other
liberties.
In a rather unconvincing way, the magazine claimed that it did not advocate a technocracy,
because all values and ideological positions were not determined by experts but by society. Experts
should only recognize the scientific truths and be responsible for issues such as monetary policy,
subsidies, taxes and others. The aim of this strategy of limiting democracy, according to the
magazine, was to avoid the politicization of issues that were crucial for the wellbeing of the
population thus preventing populism, demagoguery and eventually the destruction of the economy
and the political system, as had recently happened in Chile. What Economía y Sociedad was
promoting in other words, was a tradition that put experts in the position of defining public and
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economic policy taking away the ability of politicians to engage in massive redistributive policies.
In this the magazine followed the distinction made by Courcelle-Seneuil and Friedman between
economics as a science and morals: “The economic field presents the clearest example of the
distinction between moral and technical judgments. The latter must be made based on technical
considerations, which requires the establishment of formulas that effectively canalize the
contribution of experts providing rationality to public decisions”.885
 Instead of damaging democracy, in the view of the magazine this limitation to the
democratic principle would strengthen it by preventing the harmful effects of the politicization of
technical decisions. The commitment to democracy constitutes a “fundamental principle of the
Chilean society”, 886said the magazine. This required universal suffrage in order to give equal value
to the preferences of all citizens. However, the magazine insisted that the commitment to
democracy was subordinated to a free economic system.  According to Economía y Sociedad, “a
new balance between the power of the state and the individual” by separating technical from moral
decisions and by developing the “democratic procedures” necessary for the generation of political
power had to be reached. All of this had the aim of constructing a “stable political model for a
society that seeks liberty, justice and progress”.887
 As has been argued in this view, economic liberty was the base for the whole organization
of society and a necessary condition for prosperity, civil liberties and even democracy. In 1982, the
magazine would leave no doubt about the importance of economic freedom and limited government
for the whole institutional project.888 The new economic model argued the magazine, sought four
objectives. The first one was to give a new value to private initiative and private enterprise, for
which both the respect for private property and the reduction in the size of government were crucial.
The second one was to select the free competitive market as the main allocator of resources, an idea
that had been essential to classical liberalism since Adam Smith. Also following classical liberal
ideas the magazine declared that the third objective was to liberalize trade enabling the use of the
competitive advantages of the Chilean economy. And finally, the fourth objective was to establish a
state that acted according to the subsidiarity principle. In addition several major free market reforms
and changes to social policy had to be made.  According to the magazine, this new social model
sought to make compatible “justice with efficiency and personal freedom”.889
The severe economic crisis of 1981 did not diminish the support of Economía y Sociedad to
the free market revolution. On the contrary, it made it stronger. Even if the magazine criticized
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some proponents of the neoliberal economic model for being too orthodox in facing the crisis, it
nevertheless argued that the government had to stay on its liberalization course. It further declared
that businessmen and workers were the wealth creators and that everything that was said against
this idea was “illusion and demagoguery”.890 It warned against the reemergence of socialism and
populism which was taking advantage of the difficult situation of the country. According to
Economia y Sociedad, statism could only offer a future of “mediocrity, poverty, coercion and
discrimination” to the Chilean people.891Besides maintaining the liberal economic system, the
magazine argued that the biggest challenge for the government was to “evolve towards the
democratic objective”.892 The transition to a new democratic system that was strong enough to
endure the attacks of totalitarianism and communism was according to the magazine “the most
solemn commitment of this regime”.893 The magazine harshly criticized the doubts that were arising
among sectors of the military that were questioning the need to return to democracy and a free
society.894 According to Economia y Sociedad, there was no clarity with regard to the definition of
freedom. The magazine made its classical liberal position clear once again arguing that personal
liberty had been gradually destroyed by the welfare state that seemed very attractive to the
population.895 Accordingly, liberty could only prevail if the state retreated to the activities that were
of its concern. Only thus “every individual could be the master of his own destiny in all aspects of
life”.896 For the magazine, there was not enough awareness that a welfare state gradually but
inevitably led to “an overextended organization that ended up being the great employer” thereby
destroying liberty.897  In the words of the magazine:
To pretend that in such a regime a significant sphere for the enjoyment of political
liberties is possible is an instance of naiveté that Trotsky himself refutes in his
writings: in a country where the only employer is the state, dissent means death by
slow starvation. The old principle ‘he who does not work shall not eat’ is replaced by
another: he who does not obey shall not eat.898
The threat that Economia y Sociedad saw in the welfare state followed the same logic of
neoliberals like Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan and classical liberals like Courcelle-Seneuil, Edmund
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Burke and Thomas Jefferson. Neoliberals believed that if not stopped in time a welfare state would
lead to socialism. The welfare state, wrote Hayek in the preface to the 1976 edition of The Road to
Serfdom, had taken the place of classical socialism with its larges schemes of wealth
redistribution.899 Despite its gradualism, the results of the welfare state, according to Hayek, would
be almost the same as classical socialism.900 In such a system, argued Hayek also citing Trotsky,
there would exist “a complete monopoly of employment” giving the state unlimited power of
coercion”.901 Along the same lines Economía y Sociedad declared that Chile could not afford to
“renounce its path towards liberty”.902 Instead it had to renew its “faith in true liberalism” and invite
all people who believed in freedom to work for the fulfillment of the pending tasks. This idea of
freedom, stressed the magazine, did not only include economic freedom but “all implications of the
concept of freedom”.903
The intellectual origins of the free market revolution according to Economia y Sociedad
One of the most telling aspects of Economía y Sociedad with regard to the ideas it sought to
spread, has to do with the thinkers and intellectual tradition that the magazine explicitly recognized
as the antecedents of the free market revolution. A very enlightening episode in this respect
involved Arturo Fontaine Talavera, who was close to Jaime Guzmán and would later become the
director of the CEP, and Mario Góngora, one of Chile’s most eminent conservative historians and a
follower of Oswald Spengler. The exchange between Fontaine and Góngora is important because it
reflected the ideological and political differences between neoliberals who were making the free
market revolution and conservatives who were opposing it. It was another chapter in the old conflict
between nationalist and corporatist forces and the liberal forces that were following Courcelle-
Seneuil’s tradition.
In an important book, Góngora complained that under the military regime liberalism and its
“anti-statist” bias had completely replaced the traditional notion of the state in Chile.  Góngora
linked this statist tradition to Edmund Burke and Oswald Spengler. According to Góngora, as a
result of the neoliberal ideas, there was no longer a state that defined the Chilean identity or served
the “common good”. In the words of Góngora, “the subsidiarity principle of the disciples of Milton
Friedman’s school has become almost the only principle.”904 Góngora correctly identified the core
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of the new beliefs that were defining Chile’s institutional evolution. If the state had always played a
central role in Chilean society, said Góngora, “now the tendency of privatization is expanding and
the belief that economic liberty is the base for political liberty and ultimately of all liberties is being
postulated by members of the economic team...”905 For Góngora, the 1980 Constitution had done
much to consolidate the neoliberal worldview, eliminating ideas like state education that had their
origin in the statist tradition of Chile. Like his nationalist predecessors Encina, Subercaseaux and
Fuentealba, who attacked Courcelle-Seneuil’s liberalism, Góngora went on criticizing the free trade
policies of the Chicago Boys accusing them of harming the national industry. Interestingly enough,
Góngora addressed one of the crucial aspects of Douglass North’s institutional analysis. He argued
—mistakenly as we have seen— that because neoliberalism was alien to Chilean culture it would
not endure the passing of time: “Neoliberalism is not a product of our society as it is in England,
Holland or the United States. It is a top down anti-statist revolution in a nation that was formed by
the state...Is liberalism compatible as an idea with the planning of a liberal system in a country in
which this idea is not incorporated into its tradition?”906 Citing Friedrich von Hayek and his thesis
that constructivism does not work because institutions evolve over time, Góngora concluded that
neoliberalism would not prosper in Chile. Thus Góngora was accusing the Chilean reformers of
following a socialist method of rational planning, completely ignoring the Chilean cultural heritage.
On an intellectual level, Góngora’s critique using Hayek’s and Edmund Burke’s arguments
was potentially devastating to the efforts being made by the Chicago Boys. Based on a cultural
approach and taking the ideas of two main liberal referents, Góngora was predicting nothing less
than the failure of the free market revolution. It is no wonder that Economía y Sociedad extensively
responded to Góngora in order to defend the institutional transformation that was taking place in
Chile. One of the replies to Góngora’s critique came from Gonzalo Vial, another eminent
conservative historian who nevertheless was close to the Chicago Boys’ ideas. Vial reminded
Góngora that historically the Chilean state had been captured by oligarchs who exploited it to their
own benefit.907 For Vial, the Chilean state that Góngora viewed as the protector of the common
good had never existed. Justifying the economic reforms, Vial argued that the government had to
help the very poor and not interest groups as it had done throughout Chilean history.908
Arturo Fontaine’s response was far more important from a philosophical perspective
especially given the fact that Fontaine was himself part of the group contributing to the free market
revolution. He entitled his critique of Góngora’s work “A Disturbing Book”. The first thing
Fontaine did was to put into question Góngora’s thesis that the state had formed the Chilean nation
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through several wars and its permanent presence in social life. For Fontaine, this could also be said
of almost all states in the world, including liberal ones like England or the United States, so this
could not be a reason to sustain that neoliberalism would fail in Chile.909 Then Fontaine added that
contrary to what Góngora seemed to suggest, Edmund Burke was a liberal in the tradition of Adam
Smith and that he had made a fundamental mistake in putting him on a same level with Oswald
Spengler, who belonged to a collectivist tradition. Unlike Spengler, Burke never promoted the idea
endorsed by Góngora of a state with separate personality and “above the class and interest conflicts
of society”.910
 For Fontaine Góngora’s argument that liberalism had no cultural heritage in Chile directly
ignored that “during the 19th and 20th centuries liberal political and economic philosophy had more
importance in Chile than Thomism or Spanish traditionalism”.911According to Fontaine, Góngora
offered no evidence that the notion of the state in Chile in the 19 th century was incompatible with
liberalism. Fontaine further argued that Góngora was wrong when he said that neoliberalism, like
socialism and the Prebisch doctrine, were utopias. According to Fontaine, modern liberalism was a
realistic approach, which made it the best model for the Chilean society.912
After a reply by professor Góngora, in the following edition of Economía y Sociedad,
Fontaine further developed his arguments in defense of the free market revolution. He insisted that
Burke did not belong to the same tradition as Spengler, suggesting that Burke was a liberal in the
tradition of Friedman and his Chilean followers. Fontaine cited several passages of Burke to
support his point. Among them was Burke’s famous work Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, in
which the British thinker argued that “to provide for us in our necessities is not in the power of
Government. It would be a vain presumption in statesmen to think they can do it. The people
maintain them, and not they, the people.”913 Thus, insisted Fontaine along the lines of Hayek who
considered Burke a central figure of classical liberalism, Burke was an anti-statist. By putting Burke
in the same tradition as Spengler, Góngora had confused the tradition of the Chicago Boys with that
of collectivist doctrines.
Some time later, Economia y Sociedad would publish an opinion again referring to
Góngora’s thesis. According to the magazine it was true that the free market revolution was a “re-
foundational act”, but it was not comparable  to the rational planning that had been intended by
Christian Democrats with the so called “revolution in liberty” or by the UP with the socialist
909 Arturo Fontaine Talavera, “Un libro inquietante”, Economía y Sociedad, June,1982, p.22.
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revolution.914 Economia y Sociedad argued that the libertarian revolution of the Chicago Boys had
resulted as a necessity from the complete destruction of the country caused by statist ideologies. Its
challenge was to create “a new economic and social order that through the liberalization of society
dramatically increases the scope of individual liberties and reduces the excessive power of the state
enabling a stable, democratic and integrating future”.915  Using Hayek’s terminology, the magazine
added that the Chilean democracy had not been interrupted so that some “Manchesterian
economists” could fulfill their dream of having the price of bread being determined by supply and
demand laws, but to prevent Chile from going down the “road to serfdom” followed by Cuba.916 It
concluded with the following remark directly citing Hayek:
The path to freedom is full of obstacles and it is extraordinary difficult when a
country has go down the road to serfdom described by Hayek. Even though the
project of constructing in Chile a free economy and a free society is still valid, its
consolidation and concretion will take time...., time for creating a true culture of
freedom that supports in the mind of the Chilean people those values and conducts
that are required...917  
In this context, the magazine argued, following Friedman’s thesis of Chile’s “political
miracle” and Hayek’s case for a transitional dictatorship, that the Chilean experience showed that
“authoritarian regimes are capable of giving away substantial amounts of power in the social and
economic sphere in order to accomplish a project of a free society”.918 It added, however, that it was
exceptional that a “neoliberal experience” should have taken place under a military government.919
The defense that Economía y Sociedad did of the Chilean free market revolution citing
classical liberal authors was persistent over time and  it included the justification of particular
reforms such as the privatization of social security with classical liberal philosophy. This reform
made by Piñera was described by Economía y Sociedad as a great triumph of individual liberty over
statism. According to the magazine, in Chile the old Bismarckian social security system had
crushed individual liberties, becoming the philanthropic ogre denounced by Mexican Nobel laureate
writer Octavio Paz in his essay El ogro filantrópico.920 The privatization of social security had
changed this situation by “extending the margins of individual freedom and by creating a sentiment
914 “El desafío chileno”, Economía y Sociedad, January 1983, p.7.
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of adhesion to the social system”.921 Moreover, Piñera’s emblematic reform, said the magazine,
eliminated the discretionary power and the corruption of the system constructing “effective
safeguards to prevent the corrosive action of totalitarianism”.922 Because every worker was the
owner of his retirement money the new system had a “commitment with personal effort and a
responsible management of the economy”.923 Along the lines of North’s thesis that the feedback
offered by reality changes belief systems, the magazine argued that the prevailing statist ideas and
values had been partly changed thanks to economic reforms in areas such as social security, labor
law, mining and others: “it is not a political crime anymore to praise the private enterprise, it is not
a sin anymore to value the market and it is not shameful any more to plea for a reduction in the size
of government.”924 Thus, the liberal reforms had put an end to many prejudices and ideological
biases by opening the people’s minds to the policies that had achieved “development in freedom in
western nations”.925
For the magazine, Chile had followed the United States where economic liberty had
been understood as the basis for all other liberties and democracy. In 1983 the magazine reproduced
and endorsed a speech given by the American ambassador to Chile, James Therberge, on the
occasion of the American Independence Day.926 The piece is telling because the arguments
Therberge put forth to explain the success of the American democracy were firmly grounded on
classical liberalism and were  almost identical to those the Chicago Boys were making to support
their own reforms.  By reproducing Therberge’s speech Economía y Sociedad was not only
promoting its own political and intellectual agenda but also explaining the intellectual origins of the
free market revolution, linking it directly to the American tradition of political and economic
freedom.
According to Therberge, one of the central reasons why democracy in America had endured
the passing of time was because it had been limited.927 This meant that government did not
massively engage in redistributive policies. In Therberge’s view, negative liberty was essential for
the well-functioning of democracy:
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We enjoy a democracy that still limits the scope of activities of the state and its great
bureaucracy. The innate American mistrust in state power  and in fact in any great
concentration of power whether public or private is one of the strongest defenses
against the establishment of the Leviathan state, the most oppressive of all state
tyrannies.928
The ambassador warned however, quite along the lines of Friedman, Hayek and the Chicago
Boys, that in the last decades the government had expanded with the aim of providing for the
wellbeing of the people. This increase in the role of government, said Therberge, “constitutes a
potential threat to liberty in so far as it controls and regulates more and more of the life of society
and the life of the individual”.929  Therberge went on explaining  that not only a free press and
private property had been crucial for America, but also the fact that many liberties such as to join or
not to join a union, did not depend on the will of any bureaucrat. Democracy and liberty were in the
roots of American society because government and politics did not get involved. Thus, in the
ambassador’s view, the American society was a depoliticized society. And a depoliticized society
had been exactly the aim of the Chicago Boys.
Therberge continued saying that an omnipotent government could emerge from the
antiliberal reaction that presented itself as “progress” and  sought to destroy the legacy of the
Founding Fathers.930 For Therberge, the Founding Fathers had understood that human nature is
selfish and that social conflict is inevitable, a vision also shared by the Chicago Boys. Accordingly,
the American Constitution sought to limit the power of government. Therberge further said that
civil liberties and democratic elections could be used to destroy freedom. Democracy could lead to
the destruction of democracy by the use that antiliberal and pro-totalitarian groups like communists
made of it.931 As we have seen, this was also a standard argument of the Chicago Boys and Jaime
Guzmán in order to limit democracy.
In its editorial of July 1986 Economía y Sociedad picked up Therberge’s ideas arguing that
the American Founding Fathers were aware of the weakness of human nature. This had led them to
limit the abuses of power by creating a set of institutions that guaranteed individual liberty. In the
words of the magazine, the United States had been a role model democracy because it had
“defended political and economic liberties”.932 Economía y Sociedad further argued that the fact that
the Declaration of Independence with its new concept of representative democracy was drafted the
928 Idem.
929 Idem.
930 Idem.
931 Idem.
932  “Cien años de libertad”, Economía y  Sociedad, July, 1986, p.7.
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same year of publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and its free market intellectual
revolution, symbolized the inseparable relation between political liberty, economic liberty and
democracy.933 For the magazine, Chile’s tragedy had been that unlike the Americans, its leadership
had not understood the relationship between economic and political liberty. This had ultimately led
to the collapse of democracy in 1973. The magazine celebrated the economic reforms of the
military regime but criticized it for crushing individual liberties such as freedom of expression. It
also criticized the American political leadership for encouraging statism in Latin America via
foreign aid programs like the Alliance for Progress.934
Another interesting defense of the Chilean free market revolution directly using classical
liberal thinkers was made by the editor of Economía y Sociedad, David Gallagher. In a very long
article dedicated to the 40th anniversary of Hayek’s best seller The Road to Serfdom, Gallagher not
only explained the intellectual origin of Hayek’s liberalism but it directly applied it to the Chilean
case. According to Gallagher, in The Road to Serfdom, Hayek had made clear the connection
between economic liberty and political liberty and showed that any system which seeks collective
results tends towards totalitarianism.935 He added that Hayek’s thinking was “now more valid than
ever before”, explaining that one of Hayek’s greatest philosophical contributions had been to
distinguish between false and true liberalism. For Gallagher, true liberalism had inspired the
glorious British revolution of 1688 and the American Constitution.936 This tradition rejected the
power of human Reason to design progress and was therefore essentially skeptical. In Gallagher’s
view, institutions evolved over time and knowledge was disperse in society. Only the spontaneous
order could lead to real progress, which implied a limited government and individual freedom
understood as the absence of coercion.937 The place where knowledge was used and exchanged was
the market. Thus, a free economy was inseparable from free people and progress.938
 False liberalism held the complete opposite view, wrote Gallagher. It had its origin in the
French revolution, particularly in Rousseau. Its pretense of knowledge inevitably led to the
dismissal of traditions and established institutions and to the attempt to construct a new order based
on rational design. This in turn could only lead to collectivism and socialism, a path that looked
attractive because of its promises of triumph over necessities. This path was reinforced by the pride
of intellectuals who could not tolerate the idea that society could progress without their commands.
According to Gallagher, among the most ferocious critics of this rationalist liberal tradition were
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Edmund Burke and Alexis de Tocqueville, both of them classical liberals in the tradition of
Hayek.939 For this tradition, added Gallagher, it was not possible to achieve certain collective results
if freedom was to be preserved.940 The quest for equality, for instance, would lead a society to
“reduce the multiplicity of individuals” and because not all individuals would agree on common
aims, coercion would be necessary. Only the market system was compatible with multiple aims said
Gallagher. Gallagher went to say that this collectivist path had been followed by Chile until the
destruction of the society under the Unidad Popular regime.941 Moreover, Gallagher reminded his
readers that Hayek had warned against the threat of redistributive policies for personal liberty and
democracy. In a highly critical observation about the welfare states which was typical of neoliberals
Gallagher said:
In reality, modern democratic governments are more powerful than the monarchies
that classical liberals denounced in the past. The separation of power, an invention of
classical liberals, has not been enough to limit the discretionary power of
governments...in these last decades the uncontrollable discretionary power of the
state apparatus has been dominated in many countries by pressure groups that have
extracted from society enormous wealth transference in order to protect their
interests.942
The solution, said Gallagher, was to return to Hayek’s idea of the rule of law and a
Constitution which entirely prohibits redistributive policies with the exception of those for the
people that cannot compete in the market. These constitutional ideas said Gallagher “are completely
valid for current Chile” urging to make the Constitution even stronger against the possible abuses of
democracy.943 Gallagher concluded sustaining that the liberal vision of Hayek, Burke, the American
Constitution, Lord Acton and others, was the only plausible vision for society because it accepted
men as they were.
Along the lines of Gallagher’s article, Economía y Sociedad published an extensive piece by
former Christian Democrat senator and Harvard economist José Musalem Saffie, in which he
praised “neoliberalism” as the form of organizing society. According to Musalem, neoliberalism
was “the most creative and elaborate doctrine in the last fifty years”.944 Referring to an essay by the
French classical liberal intellectual Guy Sorman, Musalem argued that liberalism was defeating
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social statism. Neoliberalism he argued, was progressive and gave the individual priority over the
state. Musalem recognized the origins of the Chicago Boys’ neoliberalism in classical liberalism,
which he claimed had gained more rationality and had included a preoccupation for the poor thanks
to Hayek’s work.945  In this context, wrote Musalem, “free enterprise is not an end in itself; it is the
most democratic form of association to combine liberty, prosperity, efficacy, solidarity and
economic progress”.946For Musalem, these were the ideas behind the Chilean reformers who
believed that the liberal solution consisted in “reducing the state to make the individuals and the
nation greater”.947 Crucial for Musalem was that neoliberalism in his view, did take care of the poor:
“for the new liberalism there is a duty of solidarity in front of problems such as poverty, which has
to arise from the people, from business and from the government”.948 In addition, according to
Musalem, this new liberalism conceived of liberty as an integral entity, which included the
protection of human rights. This had clearly not been the case under the military regime even
though Economía y Sociedad was trying to influence in order to change repressive policies.
Piñera’s defense of American liberalism in the aftermath of the military regime
Piñera’s defense of American ideas of liberty is not only to be found during the time of the
free market revolution but also from the 1990s onwards. To examine his intellectual work after the
return of democracy in Chile is important in order to confirm that the set of beliefs that inspired him
during his time both as an adviser to the military regime and as a public intellectual during the
1980s was indeed British-American liberalism. The study of these materials, mostly books, papers,
and publications in Economía y Sociedad, after 1990 show a remarkable intellectual consistency
throughout time. A recurrent theme was the justification for the military coup of 1973. According to
Economía y Sociedad, it had been this event that had prevented the consolidation of a Marxist
totalitarian regime in Chile.949 The liberalization process that took place later continued to be
presented as an important contribution to the defeat of communism, not only in Chile, but
worldwide.  Along the same lines, economic liberty still played the primary role in the historical
analysis. The free market revolution had, in the words of the magazine, been “the most important
cause” of the return of democracy in Chile.950 The magazine insisted that unlike the previous
democracy, the new Chilean democracy was free from the sources of conflict that had destroyed the
old one: “the opening of wide spaces for an effective economic and social freedom generated the
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indispensable complement for political freedom preventing the new democracy from falling into
another crisis”.951 In this context the free market revolution was presented as the result of the power
of ideas, specifically as the result of a deep belief in the idea of freedom. All the reforms,
recollected Economia y Sociedad, faced ferocious opposition within and outside the military
government. This left the Chicago Boys no other option than becoming public intellectuals in order
to influence the climate of opinion. In the words of the magazine: “the economists became speakers,
editorialists, panelists in debate programs on the radio and even commentators on the news of some
TV channels”.952 Thus Economía y Sociedad was once again acknowledging the importance of
ideas and intellectuals in the institutional evolution of Chile. And these ideas, as Piñera would insist
ever since, were those of classical liberalism.  A telling article in this respect was published by
Piñera in the Cato Journal in 2003. In the paper, Piñera argued along the lines of Douglass North’s
approach in attempting to provide an answer for the differences in economic and political
performance between Latin America and the United States. According to Piñera, to a large extent
the success of the latter was due to the institutions created by Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
John Adams, Alexander Hamilton and the rest of the Founding Fathers, which had been inspired in
classical liberal beliefs.953 Their greatest intellectual and institutional legacies according to Piñera
were the American Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Federalist Papers and the Declaration of
Independence. Like Hayek’s argument that Latin America had failed because it had modeled its
institutions after the French rationalist tradition, Piñera argued that Latin America’s tragedy was
that instead of “founding fathers” it had had “founding generals” that did not value individual
liberty, as they were closer to the Spanish centralizing tradition.954 As a result of this set of beliefs,
the region lacked the institutions and principles necessary to build democracies and economies that
served individual freedom. The Chilean free market revolution, suggested Piñera, had been an
exception to this by following an American liberal philosophy that had enabled economic prosperity
as well as the return to a functioning democracy.  Piñera insisted that many of the problems of Latin
America were due to the existence of unlimited democracies. He stressed that freedom was a
greater value than democracy, quoting Alexis de Tocqueville’s dictum that democracy has always
to be on its guard against popular despotism. In Piñera’s words the tragedy of Latin America had
been that “the tyranny of the majority has led again and again to excessive government
interventionism, and invasive policies and actions”.955Confirming the instrumental vision of
democracy of neoliberals and classical liberals, Piñera argued that democracy was a means to
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adopting decisions where collective decisions were needed, but that it should exist to serve
freedom, which implied that government powers had to be limited.956  Failing that, majorities could
easily create institutional instability by changing economic and social policies at will.  Following
Locke, Piñera argued that to be legitimate the majority rule had to be “limited by a constitutional
framework that protects life, liberty and property.”957 Only in that case would democracy and liberty
be compatible. Moreover, for Piñera, “the lesson of history is that a free economy and civil society
cannot prosper without limited government and rule of law”.958In Piñera’s view, the United States,
unlike Latin America, had been successful largely because it had a limited government and a rule of
law that followed what F.A Hayek had called “The Constitution of Liberty”.959
 As can be seen, long after the free market revolution had taken place, Piñera still saw the
philosophical foundations of the reforms in the American tradition of freedom. This ideological
consistency is also confirmed in other works. In a book published in 2002 explaining the reforms
to the mining law, Piñera argued that only a regime of private property was compatible with a free
social order and that the control by the state of companies had failed because it had prevented the
development of the creative forces of society.960 Piñera argued that there was an intimate relation
between private property and freedom citing one of John Adams’ remarks in his Defense of the
Constitution of 1787 to support his claim.961  He recalled that for John Adams private property had
to be as sacred as the laws of God if tyranny and chaos were to be prevented and added that the
Chilean democracy had collapsed precisely because the institution of private property had been put
into question by projects like the agrarian reform of the 1960s.962 Citing the French classical liberal
economist Frédric Bastiat, Piñera went as far as to argue that these confiscatory measures had been
nothing but legalized robbery.963 In Piñera’s view, the principle of private property introduced in
the economy and in the mining sector after the nationalization of the mines, had enabled the
formidable expansion of the economy and the reconstruction of the social order along the lines
demanded by John Adams.964
  Similarly, Piñera argued that the philosophy that had inspired the privatization of social
security had its roots in the American tradition of individual liberty. In his best seller on the social
security reform Piñera wrote that in the previous social security system, inherited from the
Bismarckean model, freedom did not exist and monopoly was the rule. Like Mises, Hayek and
956 Idem.
957 Ibid. p. 413.
958 Ibid., p.414.
959 Idem.
960 José Piñera, “Fundamentos de la ley constitucional minera”, Economía y Sociedad, Santiago, 2002, p.16.
961 Idem.
962 Idem.
963 Idem.
964 Idem.
181
neoliberals in general, Piñera had a critical opinion of Bismarck. In his eyes the German
Chancellor had not only created the militaristic state that had produced two world wars but also the
gigantic welfare state that was threatening to bankrupt the western nations.965 In an essay entitled
Bismarck versus Franklin, Piñera argued that the age of Bismarck had been the same as that of
central planners like Marx, Comte and Saint Simon.966 In his view, a complete different philosophy
was represented by Benjamin Franklin and the American Founding Fathers. According to Piñera,
Franklin had seen that “the individual is not a passive data point for central planners, but the source
of initiative, creativity, and individuality”.967 Moreover, Piñera remarked that Franklin had
understood the extraordinary power of compound interest, which was one of the characteristics of
the Chilean private social security system. Thus, according to Piñera, Chile had been the first
country in the world to put away the Bismarckean legacy by making of individual liberty the
cornerstone of the new social security system. For Piñera, the new system put an end to
“enlightened planners” putting instead the individual choices of the Chilean workers at the center
of the system.968 Piñera said that this meant the beginning of a new era, the era of individual
responsibility based on personal and private capitalization accounts. For Piñera, this was a way of
dismantling the welfare state, preserving individual freedom and securing an economically sound
pension system. In Piñera’s view, all that was in the purest spirit of the American Founding
Fathers: “Chile’s new social security paradigm, anchored in personal retirement accounts, captured
Franklin’s virtues of individual responsibility and ownership, savings and thrift, wealth creation
through the miracle of compound interest, and passing a legacy onto the next generation”.969 In an
interview in 2004, Piñera would insist on this idea. Asked about the social security system in the
United States he declared: “What I advocate is to replace the current system for one rooted in
individual responsibility that is fully coherent with the ideas of Thomas Jefferson and the other
Founding Fathers”.970He criticized Franklin Roosevelt for having introduced the Bismarckean
system in the United States, which he considered alien to the American culture.971The Chilean
private social security system, he suggested, was much more in the American tradition not only
because it was economically more sound but because it was an “act of faith in the liberties of
individuals and in the wonderful things they can do when they are free.”972 As a final warning,
Piñera argued that if this private social security system was to endure the passing of time, it was
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necessary to follow Jefferson’s advice that liberty demanded eternal vigilance.973 This implied that
individuals had to remain always suspicious of political power and its attempts to distort the
system. Like Hayek, Friedman, Mises, Mill and many others, Piñera called for an active
engagement in the battle of ideas arguing that ideas were the most powerful instrument for
changing society.974
Conclusions to Chapter V
Among the Chicago Boys, José Piñera was by far the most actively engaged in the public
debate to promote the philosophical foundations of the free market revolution. His numerous
writings and Economía y Sociedad, the magazine he founded in the late 1970s aiming at
influencing the Chilean ruling elites, provide useful material to have a better understanding of the
ideas behind the institutional project of the Chicago Boys and people like Jaime Guzmán. As this
chapter shows, Piñera and Economía y Sociedad permanently linked the free market revolution to
American ideas of liberty and classical liberalism in general. While Chapter I of this work
explained that British-American liberalism endorsed a negative conception of liberty with all its
institutional implications and Chapters II, III and IV showed that this vision had been promoted by
Courcelle-Seneuil, the Chicago Boys, Hayek, Friedman, and Guzmán, the evidence presented in
Chapter V confirmed that the tradition of negative liberty was the main driving force behind the
free market revolution. Despite the fact that some redistributive role was given to the state, overall,
Piñera and Economía y Sociedad rejected the social rights and New Deal type of liberalism and
defended instead the proposition that economic liberty is the base of all other liberties. Piñera also
promoted a limited democracy, a strong protection of property rights and a depoliticized society. In
short, the whole intellectual project of Piñera both as a reformer and as a public intellectual was
about limiting the power of government in all spheres. These and the other elements analyzed in
this chapter allow to conclude that a comprehensive version British-American liberalism found
another channel to become part of the intellectual foundations of the free market revolution
through Piñera’ s contribution as a policy maker and as an intellectual.  Coinciding with the
Chicago Boys, reality feedback, which for North is crucial in defining beliefs, was one of the
central reasons for Piñera’s promotion of the neoliberal worldview. In particular the Cold War and
Chile´s institutional evolution under the ISI system and socialism contributed to this ideological
reaction. For Piñera and Economía y Sociedad the progressive strangling of economic freedom had
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led to the destruction of democracy and political liberties under the UP government. Also in this
aspect, Piñera and Economía y Sociedad showed remarkable consistency with “The Brick”,
Friedman`s views on Chile, Guzmán justification for his so-called “constitution of liberty” and the
worldview of the Chicago Boys at large. Piñera´s intellectual engagement included a strong
defense of human rights once he left office. It is interesting to note that Piñera himself linked the
defense of negative rights such as freedom of expression, life, due process of law, and others, to a
classical liberal worldview. Critique of the military regime for violating these rights was
systematic throughout the 1980s, indicating that the ideas of political freedom broadly understood
were indeed part of the concern of José Piñera and other actors of the free market revolution who
wrote for Economia y Sociedad. This by no means exempts those who collaborated with the
military regime from the potential political, criminal or moral responsibility for the abuses that
took place under the regime. It simply shows that ideas of freedom beyond economic freedom
were indeed a concern of people like José Piñera and others who were pushing for the construction
of an integrally free society along the lines of British-American liberalism. Equally important in
this context, was Piñera`s and Economia y Sociedad´s engagement in the reintroduction of
democracy. This chapter again shows that through Piñera and the magazine, democracy was part of
the philosophical foundations of Chile's free market revolution. Like all the Chicago Boys,
Guzmán and Hayek, Piñera conceived of the authoritarian regime as a transitional period which
was necessary to restore a functioning economy and the institutions for a limited democracy that
would not degenerate into collectivism by undermining economic liberties. The many articles of
Economía y Sociedad analyzed in this chapter also show that the magazine saw in thinkers such as
Hayek, Edmund Burke, Karl Popper and the American Founding Fathers among others, its
intellectual forerunners. Particularly Piñera linked the free market revolution to what he viewed as
the libertarian philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams and Alexander
Hamilton. Even though Piñera made this connection especially after democracy had been
reintroduced, it becomes clear from the analysis of his previous writings and the publications of
Economía y Sociedad that from the late 1970s to the 1990s the intellectual driving force behind
Piñera and Economía y Sociedad was largely a comprehensive version of liberalism rooted in the
British-American tradition of negative liberty.
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Conclusions
This work has followed a long tradition that considers ideas as a major force of historical change.
Thinkers so diverse as John Stuart Mill, John Maynard Keynes, Max Weber, Milton Friedman and
Friedrich Hayek have belonged to this tradition. Specifically, this work has delved into the Chilean
experience applying the theoretical framework developed by Douglass North, who has explored in
depth the impact of ideas and beliefs in the process of economic and institutional change. This study
has found that the Chilean free market revolution of the 1970s and 1980s was a comprehensive
institutional transformation inspired in a classical liberal worldview which was not reduced to pure
economic liberalism.  In Chile, the Chicago Boys applied a theory of society that included ideas
about the role of government, individual freedom, the nature of progress, the function of the law,
justice, and the limits of democracy, among others. The ideology behind this process of institutional
transformation goes under the somewhat misleading name of “neoliberalism”, which essentially
refers to a modern version of the classical liberalism of British-American origin developed mainly
in the 18th and 19th centuries. In following this tradition the Chicago Boys were inspired in their
reforms by one of the main intellectual traditions that lay behind the American Revolution. In other
words, the free market revolution of the Chicago Boys was an “American revolution” that was
crucial for the construction of a free society both in political and economic terms. As this work has
argued, in the 20th century the two most powerful organizations created with the aim of reviving the
classical liberal tradition of British-American origin were the Mont Pelerin Society in Europe and
the Chicago School in the United States. Both organizations were directly related to the Chicago
Boys. In the creation of both the MPS and the Chicago School of Economics, Friedrich Hayek
played a decisive role.  Hayek himself explained that his aim was the revival of the classical liberal
ideas that had led to the American Revolution. This set of beliefs were not only present in the
Chilean free market revolution through the work of the Chicago Boys but also through Hayek’s
direct influence on the Chilean process of institutional change. Indeed, Hayek personally supported
the free market revolution by visiting Chile, meeting with General Pinochet and his advisers and
accepting the position of honorary president of the think tank Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP).
The fact that the Chicago Boys were followers of a classical liberal tradition explains why the
overall philosophy behind the process of institutional transformation in Chile sought basically to
reduce the power of government. Beyond any doubt, liberty was essentially understood in a
negative sense, that is to say, as the absence of arbitrary coercion of one man over another. In this
perspective, economic liberty was seen the base for all liberties. Following this worldview, the
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Chicago Boys believed that progress was fundamentally the natural result of the spontaneous forces
of the market and not the product of a rational design by experts or central planners.
Consequentially, they rejected socialism as well as Keynesianism, fascism, corporatism,
protectionism and New Deal liberalism. They saw economics as a universal science which seeks to
understand the free interplay of market forces in order to create institutions that set the incentives
for engaging in productive activities and peaceful cooperation. 
As far as ideas of democracy and political liberty are concerned, this study has found,
contrary to the standard opinion in the literature, that the liberal worldview of the Chicago Boys by
no means excluded them from the process of institutional transformation. It was not the case that
political liberties and democracy did not matter for Chilean neoliberals. Nor was it the case that the
Chicago Boys just opted to fully ignore them. The issue is that for classical liberals and neoliberals
even though democracy is the most desirable system, it is not an end in itself and cannot exist
without economic liberty.  The direct consequence of this doctrine is that private property becomes
the central preoccupation of every institutional and intellectual project since it is private property
that in this view ultimately enables the existence of a free market and provides the individuals with
the means to pursue their ends. Equally important for the Chicago Boys was the idea that private
property and economic liberty, as part of the rules of game, enables the individual to oppose
government power. In addition, it creates the incentives for economic growth. This last aspect is
crucial to understand the Chilean institutional transformation. If North argued that experience, that
is to say, the feedback offered by reality is a substantial part of the process of beliefs formation,
then Chile’s experience from the 1930s to the 1970s with the ISI model, an over-expanded welfare
state, chronic inflation and government attacks on property rights, reinforced the Chicago Boys’
view that no society or democracy could function without economic freedom and the benefits that it
produces for the masses. Moreover, the fact that in the eyes of the Chicago Boys Chile became a
“rent-seeking society” in which interest groups captured the state for their benefit confirmed a deep
suspicion towards democracy on the part of the Chicago Boys, which was already part of the
classical liberal worldview. Like classical liberals such as Tocqueville and Madison, and neoliberals
such as Friedman and Hayek, the Chilean reformers thought that democracy could easily degenerate
into demagoguery or totalitarianism if it was not checked by constitutional constraints. In the eyes
of the Chicago Boys and other reformers like Jaime Guzman, it had been precisely the abuse of
democracy and the gradual destruction of economic liberty that had led to the collapse of the
Chilean economy and ultimately to the destruction of the Chilean democracy itself. This process of
institutional and political distress was compounded by the Cold War and the threats posited by
socialist revolutionary movements to the existing social and economic order based on private
property. The resulting “political disorder”, as North called it, had a negative economic effect and
was a decisive factor in reinforcing the pro American liberal worldview among the Chicago Boys.
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Indeed, political disorder in the context of the Cold War provided a sort of reality feedback that led
the Chicago Boys and reformers like Jaime Guzmán to put the strongest emphasis on the protection
of property rights and economic liberty. As the fourth chapter explains, the novelty of the Chilean
Constitution of 1980 created under the direction of Jaime Guzmán was precisely that it introduced a
classical liberal worldview in which private property and economic freedom were considered the
highest values being secured through several constitutional mechanisms. Thus, Chile’s Constitution
to a large extent shared the same Lockean aim of the American Constitution, namely to limit the
power of government in order to protect the individual’s liberty and property from the democratic
tendencies that could crash economic and individual freedoms. Hayek’s influence on Guzmán
explains in part the unprecedented crystallization of British-American liberalism in the Chilean
Constitution. It is in this ideological framework that this work concludes that Guzmán and the
members of the constituent commission, the same as the Chicago Boys, did in fact have a concern
for ideas of political liberty and democracy. In other words, because economic liberty was
considered the base for all other liberties and also the base for democracy, it had to be secured first
in order to achieve an integrally free system with democratic institutions and political liberties.
Democracy and political liberties were the ultimate aim of the reforms and institutions created by
the Chicago Boys and Guzmán. This view is to be found in several documents written by the
Chicago Boys; in “The Brick”; in the declaration of principles of the military regime of 1974
drafted by Guzmán; in interviews, books, and articles. Besides “The Brick”, Álvaro Bardón’s memo
to General Pinochet analyzed in Chapter Two is probably one of the most telling documents in this
regard. Bardón’s insistence that the military regime had to create the basis for a democratic and
“libertarian” society in which all people enjoy economic liberties as well as political liberties leaves
no doubt as to what the Chicago Boys had in mind as the major goal of their reforms. Jaime
Guzmán and the members of the constituent commission applied the same rationale. As the fourth
chapter shows, the members of the constituent commission and Jaime Guzmán always worked
under the assumption that the dictatorship had a limited lifespan and that democracy had to be
restored. This is an important reason why the Constitution of 1980 created a set of democratic
institutions and an itinerary for the transition to democracy. It was the permanent efforts of the
different branches of the armed forces that ruled the country in the form of a junta to block one
another in their attempts at consolidating power over the others that probably made it possible for
Guzmán and the Chicago Boys to put forward their ideas for a transition to a democratic regime
based on free market institutions. As this study shows, for the Chicago Boys the transition to
democracy also involved credibility. Their justification for collaborating with an authoritarian
regime rested largely on the claim that this collaboration would eventually lead not only to
economic prosperity but also to democracy. In this context it is also important to note Milton
Friedman’s warning that if Chile did not make the transition to democracy and political liberties,
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the military would feel tempted to reverse the liberalization process. This view was taken seriously
by the Chicago Boys and Jaime Guzmán, who consistently advocated for the transition back to
democracy and to political liberties. Interestingly, Friedman’s argument that a regime of civil and
political liberties was crucial for the existence of a free economy is also supported by North’s
theory that questions the predictability of the rules of the game under authoritarianism claiming that
civil liberties are essential for the well-functioning of the market. If North is right, then the
transition to democracy orchestrated by the Chicago Boys and Guzman, among others, was also
decisive to consolidate Chile’s free market model after the dictatorship. In turn, according to
North’s approach, the free market model was crucial to consolidate an Open Access Order and
thereby a democratic regime.
A second major finding of this study is that the sort of ideas promoted by the Chicago Boys,
particularly in the economic field, were not alien to Chile’s institutional and political history. It is
therefore not true, as many scholars have argued, that the free market revolution had no antecedent
in Chile’s political or intellectual history. Evidence indicates that the classical liberal worldview of
British-American origin that inspired the Chicago Boys had been extremely influential in the
Chilean intellectual and political life from the mid-19th century to the early 20th century. This
influence was achieved mainly due to the work of the French economist Jean Gustav Courcelle-
Seneuil, who was a proponent of the British -American liberal tradition of Adam Smith, Benjamin
Constant, William Graham Sumner and John Stuart Mill. Andrés Bello, who is arguably the most
influential non-economic thinker in Chilean history, also fully endorsed classical liberalism
especially with regard to market arrangements. His most important institutional legacy, the Chilean
Civil Code, put an end to a feudalist and collectivist vision of ownership replacing it with a
completely capitalist and individualist system of private property. The same capitalist system that
Jaime Guzmán would establish in the 1980 Constitution more than a century later.  As the second
chapter explained, the Civil Code of 1855 is the most influential legal document in Chilean history
and had a gigantic impact on the country’s legal and institutional tradition thereby facilitating the
institutional success of free market reforms. As a public intellectual, Bello was also an ardent
proponent of free trade policies along the lines of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations which
contributed to deepen his classical liberal legacy in Chile. Bello was also instrumental in bringing
over Courcelle-Seneuil, who arrived in Chile in 1855 to work as an adviser to the finance ministry
and teach political economy at the two most emblematic educational institutions of the country,
namely, the Universidad de Chile and the Instituto Nacional. His academic activities were crucial to
education, which North has identified as one of the two sources of belief formation. Thus,
Courcelle-Seneuil became the “founding father” of the discipline of economics in Chile and
achieved gigantic influence on the country's intellectual and political elites. As this study argues
following North’s theory, the institutional success of the free market revolution of the Chicago
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Boys and its acceptance by the democratic elites after 1990, is largely explained by the fact that
Chile had a strong liberal intellectual and institutional tradition.  In other words, this study
concludes that the Chicago Boys were nothing but the heirs of this old and once dominant Chilean
tradition of limited government, which started to rise again in the 1950s and which was crucial for
the institutional success of the free market revolution. While Courcelle –Seneuil’s intellectual and
political efforts sought to debunk the socialist and protectionist ideas that were fashionable at the
time, the Chicago Boys and neoliberals in general had identical goals. Despite the intervening time
gap, all of them took the same side in the global clash between classical liberalism and theories that
promoted active government intervention. In Europe, the beginning of this ideological clash is
usually traced back to Adam Smith and his ferocious critique of mercantilism in his 1776 Wealth of
Nations. As this study has argued, more than any other country in Latin America, Chile became a
battlefield between the heirs of Smith and those who endorsed government intervention. Moreover,
in no other country in Latin America were most of the major economic theories of the last one and a
half century—including British-American liberalism, the ISI model, socialism and corporatism,
welfare state liberalism and neoliberalism— tried out in such a consistent and radical way as in
Chile. First, under the influence of Courcelle-Seneuil classical liberalism came to dominate
economic policy, shaping the economic institutions towards a free market system. After the Great
Depression a new form of protectionism along with a substantial welfare state emerged following
the ideas spread by Keynesian economist Raul Prebisch and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Latin America (ECLA). The failure of the structuralist theories promoted by ECLA
to solve the most urgent economic and social problems led the political and intellectual class to seek
a more radical solution. As a result, structuralism paved the way for a Marxist and anti-American
interpretation of development called dependencia, which held that rich countries were rich because
they exploited the poor countries. Dependencia became fashionable among Latin American
politicians and intellectuals on the left, who resented the American influence on the region and
pushed for revolutionary changes. It provided part of the intellectual foundations of the socialist
experiment under the UP government, which ended with the military coup in 1973. In turn, the
military regime led to the free market revolution and the definite revival of Chile’s British-
American liberal tradition. As this work has shown, there were not many differences between the
Chicago Boys’ set of beliefs and those of Courcelle-Seneuil and his followers. For all of them,
economic liberty was the base of all liberties. In other words, the Chicago Boys and Courcelle-
Seneuil advocated political freedom but did not believe that it was possible to attain without
economic freedom. This is an important reason why all of them advocated free trade, free prices, a
small government, strong protection of private property and stable money and rejected
protectionism, socialism and government interference in economic affairs. They also shared the
same methodological approach to economics, which they viewed as a universal science that could
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not be ignored of prosperity and a stable society were to be achieved. Also, both the Chicago Boys
and Courcelle-Seneuil were skeptical of democracy and feared that an expanding government
would be captured by interest groups attempting to extract rents through government favors. They
understood liberty in a negative sense and rejected the idea of people having a right to claim goods
of any kind from society.  The central difference between them was that the Chicago Boys accepted
a redistributive though limited role of government in order to help the very poor whereas Courcelle-
Seneuil rejected this notion.  This difference, however, is minor compared to the similarities
between them. 
  A third conclusion of this work is that the free market revolution of the Chicago Boys was
only partially a revolution. This is the case not only because American liberalism had a strong
antecedent in Chilean history, but because the emergence of neoliberalism in the 1950s started a
gradual process of change in the climate of opinion, which contributed to the acceptance of the
reforms. It was in the 1950s that the Catholic University sealed an exchange agreement with the
University of Chicago in order to import to Chile the American liberal ideas. The institutional
framework for this agreement was President Truman's Point Four program, which had the aim of
spreading American ideas of freedom and democracy to contain the advancement of communism. It
was also in the 1950s that El Mercurio, the most influential newspaper in the country, started a
systematic campaign to spread the values of American democratic capitalism. Also in the 1950s El
Mercurio’s owner, Agustin Edwards, organized on behalf of the Chilean government the visit of
another group of liberal economic experts called the Klein-Saks Mission to liberalize the economy
and solve the economic crisis that was affecting the country. Some years later, Edwards himself
would provide financial support for the liberal think tank CESEC created by some of the Chicago
Boys, which became crucial in the elaboration of the liberal economic program that was later on
applied by the military regime.
When all the efforts to spread classical liberalism since the 1950s are examined, it is clear
that a gradual change in the climate of opinion in Chile preceded the free market revolution. The
complete transformation of the teaching of economics at the Catholic University was part of the
strategy to overthrow the hegemony of statist economic theories such as those promoted by ECLA,
socialist intellectuals and right wing nationalists. The CEP, founded by some of the most
emblematic Chicago Boys in the early 1980s with the aim of inclining the public debate towards
British-American liberalism, also played a substantial role on the intellectual front. The Mont
Pelerin Society also played a role in spreading classical liberal ideas in Chile. Its 1981 meeting in
the city of Viña del Mar showed the close collaboration between the neoliberal world elite and the
Chilean Chicago Boys to advance the classical liberal cause. Many of the conferences given at the
MPS meeting were published by the CEP with the aim of providing intellectual support for the
process of institutional transformation that was taking place in Chile.
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The fourth major conclusion of this work is that the Chicago Boys were willing to
collaborate with a military regime largely as a result of Chile’s particular political and economic
context in the Cold War as well as for ideological reasons. Given the fact that in the neoliberal
worldview democracy is not an end in itself and economic liberty is considered the base of all other
liberties, there is no ideological reason in the neoliberal worldview not to collaborate with an
authoritarian government that in times of economic and social distress has assumed the task of
restoring economic liberty and eventually democracy. The Chicago Boys did not feel uncomfortable
working for a military regime because in their view the regime was taking the right steps to
consolidate a free society that would create prosperity and keep the socialist threat at bay. From a
philosophical perspective the idea of a “transitional dictatorship” defended by the Chicago Boys,
finds intellectual support in the tradition of classical liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill, Isaiah
Berlin and especially Friedrich von Hayek. It must be stressed however, that even if this tradition
justifies a dictatorship in cases of social and economic crisis it does so only in order to restore
integral freedom and prevent a greater evil, that is to say, a situation in which human suffering and
the threat to liberty would be much bigger. For the Chicago Boys, the military regime was not only
restoring order and liberty but was also preferable to a communist regime of the UP government
sort. In that sense, they viewed Pinochet’s regime as the lesser evil, which was an entirely
subjective assessment. It is important to stress that the theory of transitional dictatorship in classical
liberalism does not justify human rights violations such as the ones that occurred under the Pinochet
regime. It is one thing in a situation of emergency to justify a transitional dictatorship and a partial
temporary restriction of civil rights, but it is a different thing to justify crimes. The case could
certainly be made that a period of authoritarianism was necessary to correct the chaos in which
Chile found itself in 1973. However, the same cannot be said of human rights abuses. Thus, the
moral dilemma faced by the Chicago Boys and the people who collaborated with the Chilean
authoritarian regime is not solved. The question remains if it is justifiable to collaborate with a
regime —democratic or non-democratic— under which human rights violations occur even if this
collaboration is not directly responsible for the crimes and even if the collaboration contributes to
economic growth and to reintroduce democracy and political liberties. The question is worth
formulating in the Chilean case for, as this work shows, there is no doubt that the civil advisers to
the military regime —Chicago Boys and people like Jaime Guzmán— pushed for the liberalization
of the economy and the reintroduction of democracy. But they did this while human rights were
being violated. This points to the essentially paradoxical nature of the Chilean experience: an
authoritarian regime that crushed the fundamental rights of  opponents and restricted other liberties
of the population at large proved to be instrumental not only in creating the institutions that
guaranteed economic freedom and led to economic prosperity, but also those necessary for a stable
democracy. Accordingly, this work concludes that authoritarianism can set the foundations for a
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free society if certain conditions are met. Among them, what is required is a set of beliefs favorable
t o political liberties, democracy and economic liberties that serves as inspiration to those in a
position to make the new institutions. It is highly unlikely that Chile would have followed the path
of free markets and democracy if the Chicago Boys had been inspired by fascism or Marxism
instead of the tradition of British-American liberalism. It must be stressed that this analysis does not
imply that the Chicago Boys and other civil advisers to the Chilean dictatorship are exempt of any
kind of responsibility for what happened under the military regime with regard to human rights.
However, from potential responsibility it does not follow that there was a total lack of concern for
democracy, political liberties and even the respect for human rights on the part of the Chicago
Boys, as many scholars have argued. Evidence does not support a claim of this sort. In fact José
Piñera, the most outspoken proponent of American liberalism among the Chicago Boys and one of
the most influential reformers, systematically engaged in the defense of political liberties and
human rights once he had left his position in the government in the early 1980s. Piñera’s defense of
political liberties and human rights, shows that there was indeed a tension between the classical
liberal worldview of the reformers and the way in which the dictatorship was acting. This becomes
clear in the fact that Piñera explicitly invoked classical liberalism in his defense of human rights.
Piñera’s intellectual engagement is crucial because it provides additional evidence that during the
late 1970s through the 1980s American ideas of economic and political freedom as well as
democracy were at the core of the free market revolution. Both during the institutional
transformation in the 1980s and after it, Piñera systematically linked the political and economic
reforms made by the Chicago Boys to American liberalism. In the late 1970s Piñera founded the
magazine Economía y Sociedad with the explicit purpose of spreading American liberalism among
the Chilean ruling elites to ensure the survival of the free market reforms and the transition to
democracy. Economia y Sociedad did indeed achieve great influence, becoming a platform for the
discussion of political and economic issues among leading public figures, business people and
intellectuals. The magazine was thus a major intellectual source for the free market revolution and
the process of institutional transformation that took place in Chile at the time. It consistently came
back on crucial aspects for classical liberalism, stressing the importance of economic liberty for
political liberties, the need of economic growth for a stable democracy and of a limited government
for a free society. Although many of the articles and interviews addressed technical economic
issues, there was an equal concern for wider aspects, which showed an interest to integrate
economic as well as cultural and philosophical aspects in a broader classical liberal framework.
 After the return of democracy Piñera would insist more explicitly in the connection between
the reforms and the ideas of the American Founding Fathers. In these later writings he openly
addressed the ideological connection between the free market revolution and the thinking of figures
such as Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams. With his philosophical consistency
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over time Piñera confirmed the classical liberal worldview that inspired the Chilean institutional
transformation during the 1970s and 1980s. The analysis of  Piñera’s material, so far absent in the
literature on the free market revolution and the Chicago Boys, provides further evidence that ideas
of economic liberty as well as political liberty and democracy, all in the tradition of British-
American  liberalism, were at the heart of the institutional transformation that took place in Chile in
the 1970s and 1980s.
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